A new Cold War order?

Mikhail Gorbachev’s essay “A New Cold War Order” (2014) is very inspiring, and there are assumptions that resonate strongly in today’s conflicts.  His first point is that the U.S. assumed “victory” at the end of the Cold War.  I’m researching that transition in American grand strategy now and can agree with his claim.  We assumed a unipolar world that “required” leadership from “the indispensable nation”.  We did not, it seems, look to engage Russia as an equal partner in world affairs or Eastern European regional affairs and took advantage of her period of weakness.   

The limited conditions for NATO expansion is another of Gorbachev’s “faits accompli” assumptions, which I have also verified as occurred in presidential discussions between Gorbachev and Bush I, and between Yeltsin and Clinton (NATO stipulates there was no signed agreement on this).  Russia clearly wanted to maintain its sphere of influence in the region (now termed “near abroad”).  Considering its history, that may not have been assumed to be an unusual request or Western conciliation- even if it was not documented in a formal agreement.  (You must think back to what we said at the time.  Euphoria may have pushed out leaders to agree to this limitation.) The London Accord (1990) does not address the issue of NATO expansion beyond the reunification of Germany.  NATO expansion eastward, including the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland in 1999, sent jolts of fear through the Russian Politburo.  (For an analogy, consider how peacefully China would react if we democratized North Korea.)  Gorbachev suggests this directly contributed to the annexation of Crimea, the current Ukrainian crisis, and the earlier crisis in Georgia.  The sequence of events does support this assumption as Russia reacted to state leaders reaching out to the EU for assistance. 

{mosads}I agree NATO expansion upset the fragile balance of the region and insulted Russia’s delicate influence in the near abroad.  But no one can suggest Russia was deftly handling its responsibilities as a regional power!  Allowing Ukraine and other states to flounder and fail and kleptocracies is unacceptable.  If Russia wanted the influence, they should have used it to expand and deepen the region’s economy, functioning political structures, and industries.  They did not.  The consequences were those states looked for economic development, political improvement, and industrial assistance from the EU, which inflamed Russia.  Russia became reactionary instead of proactive, and there is the pivot point. 

Gorbachev’s other points are also inspiring.  He suggests continued conversations with world leaders to discuss these issues and find relevant solutions within existing forums, such as the UN Security Council and OSCE.  He also suggests lifting sanctions against Russian leaders, which signals the sanctions are working. 

The larger debate is Russia’s leadership in the region and U.S. leadership in the world, both important topics that need to be reviewed.  Russia’s belligerence should not be tolerated, regardless of who the leader is.  America’s influence in the “near abroad” should be tempered, out of respect, to help Russia do what leaders do… lead and develop their areas of responsibility toward a common view of European and world development- economic improvement and integration and political development.   

This may fit a larger view that the U.S. is struggling to actually run the world.  It’s big, complex, and expensive.  Our presidents have more than enough trouble trying to run this country effectively, with budget constraints, looming debt, crumbling infrastructure, voting rights infringements, etc, that to assume world leadership is really a bit of a stretch.  I think any American president would want to rely on regional leaders who share the western world view (economic improvement, integration and political development) to be responsible regional leaders… so we don’t have to do it for them. 

Could Iran benefit from a similar regional leadership conversation?

Carter is a retired Army Master Sergeant with a Master’s in National Security.  He is finishing his doctoral dissertation in Public Policy (topic: American post Cold War grand strategy), with Walden University.