What does Canada think of Trump’s America?

At the end of the 2016 primary campaign, when tycoon Donald Trump was promising security and prosperity as U.S. president, the Financial Times posted this phrase, a variation of which is attributed to Robin Williams: “Living in Canada is like a nice family living above a biker bar.”

{mosads}As Trump was rising to political prominence, a new batch of Americans — young and old this time — began gazing toward the Great White North with rising curiosity. Canadian scholar Irvin Studin offered them a manifesto in The Globe and Mail: “Americans of the world, unite! In Canada.” He suggested that Canada pick off some of the world’s best talent in the service of “the Canadian project and a Canadian 21st century.”

“After all,” he wrote, “modern Canada was created precisely as the antithesis of some of the more extreme U.S. passions and tendencies.”

Would it not be in our interests to learn more about how Canadians are feeling about our changing place in the world and our place together in North America as plates shift, castles burn and the unthinkable of just a few years back today becomes the daily occurrence? I asked Studin for his opinion: What are his thoughts on pertinent issues today and how do they affect America’s relationship with Canada and the rest of the world?

Studin is president of the Institute for 21st Century Questions and editor-in-chief and publisher of Global Brief magazine. He has been called one of the leading international affairs thinkers of his generation.

BQ: Does the rise of Trump bring a paradigm shift from post-World War II attitudes that advanced globalism to a new approach favoring decentralization and nationalism?

Studin: I’m not sure. American politics are sui generis, even though many countries around the world have historical cycles of populism and anti-populism. America is certainly in a hyper-populist mood these days. To the extent that other countries look to American politics and leaders for cues — and these countries are far fewer today than they were in the 1980s and 1990s — then Trump’s (faux?) anti-immigrant, anti-establishment sloganeering has some ripple effect.

That ripple effect would be much greater, of course, were Trump to ascend to power — but so too would the counterreaction around the world. That counterreaction would be fierce (and particularly fierce in East Asia, I suspect), and it would form a basis for considerable and growing international disagreement on many issues in the coming decade.

BQ: Is the EU on the verge of collapse as the former leader of the U.K. Independence Party, Nigel Farage, predicts?

Studin: It is still far from collapse, although collapse in the coming decade is certainly possible, and it could happen quickly. Only fools should wish this, and there are many fools out there, including in current positions of power. What could cause a collapse of the EU, or at least a transformation to some unrecognizable, highly emasculated form?

First, any direct war with Russia — this would be catastrophic for Europe and the world (and for Russia). Second, a very bad post-Brexit deal with the U.K., either proving the weakness or impracticality of the EU, or otherwise giving perverse incentives to other countries that may be on the bubble about future membership. Third, the rise of very strong populist or nationalist forces in key European countries, including France, Germany and Italy. More terrorist attacks, further economic deterioration and a poor U.S. presidency could all fuel these forces.

BQ: Is there still a thing to be called “the West” if a President Trump successfully challenges the traditional objectives of NATO?

Studin: Certainly. The West is a recognized construct, both among “Western” countries and among non-Western countries — and especially among non-Western countries, from Russia to China, who have been studying and emulating Western methods since the 1700s (the Russian case) or the 1980s (the Chinese case). NATO is an important Western military institution, but it evidently does not include all Western countries — e.g., Australia, New Zealand, Israel and several neutral European countries.

If Trump wishes to challenge NATO purposes, then that is presumably his prerogative. Whether it is wise or not is a different question. But tensions within a Western military institution will not be injurious to any intellectual or even civilizational notion of a “West.”

BQ: Mr. Trump’s convention speech was said to be based on Richard Nixon’s 1968 speech. Do you think Mr. Trump hopes to bring America to a new opening with Russia as Nixon did with China?

Studin: The enervating thing about a Trump presidency is that Trump’s actual and perceived capriciousness could bring on a major international conflict, including with Russia (but also with China), very quickly. This can easily be “gamed.”

The less-appreciated paradox of this capriciousness is that, in Western-Russian relations, only a very lucky flight of fancy (or “bet” or “dare”) can really move the yardsticks in a direction that is good for both sides. In other words, we are currently in a very path-dependent dynamic that is leading toward ever-growing deterioration in international trust and stability. (The Russians realize this path dependency far more acutely than we do in the West.)

It will take great imagination and chutzpah from key leaders to get the world out of this rut. Is Trump such a potential leader? I don’t know. Clinton is not. She will continue to work along this same path-dependent vector, especially in relations with Moscow.

BQ: How would Mr. Trump’s “America first” nationalism affect world trade and economy? How will Canada respond to America under a Trump regime?

Studin: Regarding Canada, there is no political formation that sincerely wishes a Trump presidency. The right wing of Canadian politics does not support any of Trump’s more extreme public positions — far from it.

Now, what Trump would do in power would likely depart significantly from his public electoral pronouncements, including in matters of trade and security. He would quickly be dissuaded by countless briefings by leading officials, as well as through conversations with other global leaders, from pursuing radical autarkic or destabilizing courses of action. The U.S. legislative branch, depending on its composition, would also likely have a mitigating impact.

BQ: Are there new opportunities for leadership for Canada to provide a link between Asia and Europe if America (and Britain after Brexit) pulls out of the post-World War II established world order?

Studin: I don’t think the U.S., under any presidency, will pull out of the post-World War II order, but there certainly is an opportunity in the coming years for Canada, whatever its political leadership, to play a far bolder role — and especially a bridging role — in helping to provide international stability. To do that, Canada requires two things: more assets (deep relationships around the world, diplomatic assets, military assets, intelligence assets) and, to be sure, a change in strategic mindset. These go hand in hand, to some extent, but the change in strategic mindset is by far the more interesting problem.

I’ve argued for the last decade that Canada should aim to be a country of 100 million people by century’s end. We certainly have much room to grow. And this growth should come with a transformation in our self-image from a second-tier power that invariably looks to Washington (before that, London) for strategic guidance (and protection) to effectively the second largest country in the West — larger than any European country, and possibly larger by century’s end than even Russia.

For now, we remain a remarkably happy and stable country, but in international terms, one that still has a colonial mindset. This can be changed quite rapidly, with growth and also some key achievements in international affairs — brokering a major peace or two in a conflict, leading the creation of international institutions, and so on. It would also certainly help if the world “expected” far more of us on a regular basis. I hope that such a high expectation will become a constant characteristic of different countries’ relations with Canada.

We also, in Canada, need to realize that, when American and British elites and top thinkers have so little to offer these days in terms of solving major global questions, we really must begin to think for ourselves and to lead on setting the terms for international solutions.

Quigley is a prize-winning writer who has worked more than 35 years as a book and magazine editor, political commentator and reviewer. He lives in New Hampshire with his wife and four children. Contact him at quigley1985@gmail.com.

The views expressed by contributors are their own and not the views of The Hill.