The war in Ukraine won’t end when the fighting is over

The fighting in Bakhmut has captured much attention. But the real attention should be on whether the allies are setting the Zelensky government and Ukrainian forces up for success in the coming offensive, thus increasing the probability of ending the war on terms favorable to Ukraine and the rest of Europe. War costs money — money that no government can spew out forever. Helping to end the fighting this year prevents dragging things out unnecessarily. 

If the Russians take Bakhmut — and that’s a big “if” — they will likely look back on their success as Sir Henry Clinton looked at the 1775 British success at Bunker Hill when he said, “This was truly a dear-bought victory; another such victory would have ruined us.” The Ukraine army is exacting a high cost in Russian blood and equipment, far beyond the strategic worth of Bakhmut’s geographic position. In doing so, they are improving the probability of a successful counteroffensive. The success of that counteroffensive, however, depends not only on reducing Russian capacity but also on NATO changing the way they supply Ukraine forces.    

NATO leaders must provide the supplies, arms, weapons and ammunitions necessary for a set of operations, the conclusion of which will put Vladimir Putin in a weak, and potentially untenable, position for coming negotiations. That set of operations may likely include two combined-arms, air-ground offensives to fix Russian troops in the east, preventing them from moving to impede a second offensive aimed to push Russian forces out of the oblasts between the Donbas and Crimea. Given the terrain and Russian troop dispositions, these offensives will be difficult and complex to plan, execute and sustain. Moreover, in addition to these offensive actions, the Zelensky administration must defend its airspace and critical infrastructure — as well as prevent Kyiv from becoming a vulnerable flank. 

This set of operations, in turn, requires a steady and sustained logistics flow — from rear area stockpiles to front line units — from start to finish. NATO cannot continue the “give them part of what they need, slower than they need it” approach to supplying Ukraine. 

As generous as the support for Ukraine has been, neither the U.S. nor NATO has been able to provide support in an anticipatory and continuous way. The result has restricted the pace and duration of Ukraine’s offensive actions — forcing them to culminate unnecessarily. And it has precluded full protection of Ukraine’s airspace and infrastructure. Protection of airspace will grow in importance; during the coming extended offensive operations, the airspace must protect not only critical infrastructure but also the flow of logistics and troops in the attack. Good military planners can anticipate such requirements in a rigorous way. Absent this rigor, Ukraine’s forces will not be able to keep up the momentum of their counteroffensives long enough to have a strategic impact.

When major combat operations end and negotiations begin, however, that does not mean the war is over. Putin cannot be trusted; he will continue to “fight” by other means. For example, he could use the return of refugees and ambiguity of land ownership as a way to muck up the peace and extend suffering. Or he could continue to block delivery of humanitarian assistance; agitate Ukraine’s recovery through the use of “deniable forces” such as paid criminals or street thugs; or use cyber, legal and diplomatic actions to stymie post-hostility operations. And he will do everything in his power to hide the crimes that his forces have committed. 

All these forms of disruptive actions, as well as others, have been present throughout history during other post-fighting periods. We can expect Putin to use them all.

U.S. and NATO leaders, in coordination with the Zelensky administration, should be planning and preparing for a post-fighting transition period that could last at least months — and if history is any judge, probably longer. The transition period also will include extended recovery actions before any “normalcy” is possible. Recovery will include repair and rebuilding not only of Ukraine’s civil infrastructure but also rebuilding economically, socially, politically and judicially.  Recovery will have a security component as well: rebuilding Ukraine’s army; providing security guarantees to prevent Russia from future aggression; reconstituting a police force; and enforcing whatever ceasefire agreement ends major combat operations. Countries that have experienced the intensity of war, as Ukraine has, do not just turn on a dime and return to “normal.” They need lots of help.

U.S., NATO and other allied leaders can avoid making the mistake of believing that the war will be over when the fighting stops by planning now for the inevitable, post-major combat operations transition period. Further, planning for a comprehensive and extended transition period — likely necessary even as negotiations drag on, as they will — allows the allies to incorporate long-term, low-interest loans to Ukraine so that it can recover and repay at least some of the war’s costs; to establish some kind of post-fighting commission to coordinate transition activities and help Volodymyr Zelensky continue his fight against corruption; and to increase the probability that transition can take place in a secure environment.

Wars are a complex business. Ending a war always includes more than ending the fighting. As Fred Ikle has told us in “Every War Must End,” it’s hard to fight a war but harder still to end one well.

James M. Dubik, Ph.D., a retired lieutenant general of the U.S. Army, is a senior fellow at the Institute for the Study of War. He served in military command and operational roles in Bosnia, Haiti and Iraq, and helped train forces in Afghanistan, Japan, South Korea, Thailand, Honduras, and many NATO countries.