Why would the Saudis normalize relations with Iran? The answer may surprise you

There has been much speculation about how China’s role in facilitating the recent Saudi-Iranian agreement to resume diplomatic relations presages a much larger role for Beijing in the Persian Gulf region, where America long has been the predominant external influence. The significance of this agreement, though, may be much less for what it says about China — which, after all, basically just facilitated an agreement that Riyadh and Tehran long had been working toward — than for what it says about Saudi Arabia’s growing diplomatic self-confidence.

The Saudi-Iranian normalization is not a rapprochement, as many have claimed it to be. Indeed, Riyadh still views Tehran as a threat. But unlike in the past, when Riyadh tended to view Iran as an implacable, unrelenting opponent, what this normalization agreement implies is that the Saudis now see Iran as a more manageable threat. Tehran is still doing things that Riyadh does not like in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen. But Riyadh also understands that the Islamic Republic’s leaders face widespread protests from Iran’s citizens, especially its young women.  Further, this is something that could spill over into the kingdom.

While Saudi Arabia has had reason to fear Iran in the past, the kingdom has no interest in seeing the ayatollahs overthrown by a democratic opposition movement. Just as the overthrow of the shah in 1979 by Islamist forces inspired Islamic opposition movements in neighboring Muslim states, the success of a democratic revolution in Iran could inspire the rise of democratic opposition forces in Saudi Arabia and other Arab autocracies. Saudi Arabia and other Arab autocracies, of course, have ample means to suppress internal opposition. But Riyadh would prefer to forestall the rise of such forces inside the kingdom and not have to go about the expensive, messy and uncertain task of suppressing such forces.

Another motive Riyadh may have in pursuing normalization with Tehran is to distance itself from Israel’s virulently anti-Iran prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, and the possibility of Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities — which Netanyahu has threatened. By normalizing relations with Iran, the Saudis may be signaling to Israel that they would not support any such action. They also may seek to avoid becoming involved in any escalating Israeli-Iranian hostilities that ensue.

Saudi-Iranian competition for influence in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen will not end as a result of resumed diplomatic relations and visits between Saudi and Iranian leaders. Indeed, reports about the impending improvement in relations between Saudi Arabia and Bashar al-Assad’s Iran-backed regime in Syria may not be a sign of Saudi-Iranian rapprochement but continued competition. Iran and Russia helped Assad win a war against his internal opponents, which had been backed by Saudi Arabia and others in the 2010s, but the normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and other Arab states and Syria may signal an intent to win peace by providing economic assistance to Assad — which neither Iran nor Russia is in a position to provide.

Whether Saudi Arabia’s willingness to normalize relations with Iran and with Syria will pay off for Riyadh is not yet known, of course. What is clear, though, is that while the U.S. and Israel are focused on preventing Iran from becoming stronger than it is, Saudi Arabia is instead more focused on managing the threats and opportunities Riyadh faces that may result from Iran’s weaknesses.

Mark N. Katz is a professor of government and politics at the George Mason University Schar School of Policy and Government, and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.