Russia understands power, not peace
With the Russian invasion of Ukraine in its third year, there is a growing belief among some international observers that Ukraine should be forced into a ceasefire with Russia. They claim that the war has entered a stalemate.
Some state that the Ukrainians cannot win the war. Others argue that a ceasefire would freeze the conflict, assuming the Russians would honor the agreement. Finally, some say that an agreement would save lives.
But calls for a forced agreement between Ukraine and Russia are naïve. First, they ignore the voices of Ukrainians. According to independently conducted public opinion polls organized by Gallup, the International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute, most Ukrainian citizens believe that only a total Ukrainian victory and liberation of their country from Russia will end the war.
Second, calls for peace negotiations ignore that Russia has a history of violating ceasefires and international norms. In these instances, the Russians have ignored the terms of the agreements. Instead, they choose to pursue policies favoring Russian interests, disregarding the standards established. There are some recent examples where this has occurred.
During the collapse of the Soviet Union, 15 new republics were formed. One of them was Moldova. As this Eastern European country became independent, there were growing concerns that Moldova may try to reunite with Romania. The Russian-speaking region of Transnistria was alarmed by a growing sense of Moldovan nationalism and proclaimed that it would try to establish its independence from Moldova.
A conflict emerged between the Moldovan government and Transnistria, in which 700 people were killed. Russia then intervened, stating that it would serve as an intermediary, and a ceasefire was signed in July 1992 between the Moldovan government and Transnistria. It was then reported that Russia would withdraw its forces from the region. Thirty-two years later, Russia maintains its presence in Transnistria, in violation of the terms of the ceasefire.
Something similar occurred in Georgia. During the Russo-Georgia War of August 2008, Russian forces invaded the Georgian provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia after skirmishes occurred between troops in these areas and the Georgian military. Hundreds were killed during this war, and Georgia requested support from the international community to help put an end to the war.
France eventually intervened, helping Georgia reach a settlement with Russia. The agreement stated that Russia would withdraw from Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Sixteen years later, Russian forces continue to occupy these two regions and show no signs of leaving.
The most recent example took place when Russia first invaded Ukraine in April 2014. During this period, Russian forces emerged and took over parts of the Luhansk and Donetsk provinces. Ukraine then launched an operation to liberate these areas from Russian occupation.
Several months later, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe intervened, establishing the Minsk Agreements. The terms of agreement attempted to establish a “peaceful resolution” to the Donbas conflict. The provisions stated that the Russian Federation had to withdraw its soldiers and military equipment from the region, and a ceasefire was implemented. Russia, however, maintained its military presence and violated the ceasefire repeatedly. By February 2022, the Russian Federation declared that the Minsk Agreements were no longer serving their purpose and launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
These examples in Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine suggest that Russia does not honor ceasefire agreements, and that its goal is not peace in the region. Rather, the Russian Federation festers chaos in these countries and just uses ceasefires to get an upper hand.
In other words, Russia has determined that the rules do not apply to it.
This did not begin with Vladimir Putin, either. History has shown that the Russian Federation violates every ceasefire it enters, and submits only to brute force.
Take, for example, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In December 1979, Soviet forces invaded that country in an attempt to support the pro-Soviet government. For ten years, the Soviets faced stiff opposition from Afghan resistance forces, who killed nearly 15,000 Soviet soldiers. By 1988, these human and financial losses forced the Soviet decision to withdraw.
In December 1994, the Russian government attempted to overthrow the government of Chechnya after residents toyed with independence. For two years, the Russians attempted to subvert the Chechens and captured the capital, Grozny. Then they faced stiff resistance, failing to establish firm control over the mountainous regions of Chechnya. Eventually, the Chechens reclaimed their capital. Thousands of Russians were killed during the war, and whose indecisive conclusion swiftly led to a discontented Russian population. By 1997, they withdrew from the region and signed a peace agreement with the Chechens.
These historical examples suggest that Russia does not respect ceasefires brokered by the international community for conflicts the Russians start. Instead, Russia seeks to undermine these agreements, finding ways to discredit their effectiveness. The Russian Federation does not understand the language of peace. It only listens to power and force.
Lessons from Afghanistan and Chechnya show that only embarrassment and defeat will make Russia quit an invasion like the one in Ukraine. Russia will not respect any other outcome. Therefore, the international community must do everything it can to help Ukraine win the war and defeat Russia. Only then will the conflict end.
Mark Temnycky is an accredited freelance journalist covering Eurasian affairs and a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.
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