Amid Biden foreign policy stumbles, Ukraine and Israel act independently

Two recent developments in the current hot wars have highlighted the failures of Biden administration foreign policy: Ukraine’s invasion of Russia in the Kursk campaign, and the assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, presumably carried out by Israel which however has not claimed responsibility. Both of these steps, which reshaped their respective theaters of war, in Ukraine and in the Middle East, are assumed to have taken place without prior consultation with Washington.

The administration that has so assiduously tried to manage conflict — rather than defeat the adversary — finds itself outmaneuvered by its own allies. Whatever the implications may be for Ukraine and Israel themselves, these developments represent defeats for the execution of American policy. Four years of the administration’s failed geostrategy are coming to their end with no accomplishment to show.

It is instructive to review the path that has led to this outcome. The Biden administration’s foreign policy began with a burst of moralism in an effort to isolate Saudi Arabia as a “pariah,” in the wake of the murder of Jamal Kashoggi. Severing ties with an important ally is not a good idea, and President Biden eventually had to recant when he needed Saudi oil and strategic cooperation. Values are vital in foreign policy, but they are far from the sole consideration.

After moralism came appeasement in different registers. It is important to remember how Biden first signaled weakness to Russia by lifting the Trump-era American objections to the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, and then he even greenlighted Russian aggression by suggesting that a minor incursion into Ukraine might be tolerated. The Ukrainian president thought otherwise, but Moscow took the presidential gaffe as an invitation, resulting in a catastrophic war.

The Biden administration also effectively canceled — by way of non-enforcement — many of the Trump administration’s sanctions against Iran, in the hope of a renewed nuclear deal. The result: Iran is closer to nuclear capacity  than ever before, and it has been able to utilize the revenue from renewed oil sales to bankroll its proxies across the region, proxies that are not only waging war on Israel but that are attacking American positions in Syria and Iraq.

The Kursk offensive and the Haniyeh assassination mark new kinds of failures of the Biden-Blinken-Sullivan era.  Washington has been giving lip-service to Ukraine and Israel, and of course it has supplied some weapons, albeit with limitations. Yet the American strategy in the two wars has never been driven by a Clausewitzian vision of defeating the respective enemy. Instead, a strange kind of caution has paralyzed Washington, a fear of humiliating Russia and an insistence, obsessively repeated, that Hamas cannot be defeated. 

The “escalation management” has effectively meant that Washington imposes restrictions on our allies, and our adversaries know that the price that they will have to pay for their crimes will be limited. The Kursk campaign and the Haniyeh assassination show Ukraine and Israel respectively refusing to adhere to some of the limits imposed by Washington because they want to achieve more than stalemates.

After facing territorial losses in the East, Kiev’s decision to open a new front by invading Russian territory is a risk. Ukrainian resources, especially manpower, are stretched thin. Yet the ability to occupy Russian territory has dealt a considerable blow to what is left of the prestige of Moscow’s military, just as it has given a boost to Ukrainian morale.

President Zelensky has defended the Kursk initiative with the argument that Russia had located artillery in the border regions with which it has been attacking Ukraine. That narrow tactical justification is surely legitimate but much more is at stake. Ukrainian operations inside Russia had been previously limited, especially to drone strikes. Now a different kind of war is emerging.

Ukraine may be calculating that its occupation of Russian territory could improve its position in eventual negotiations. However, moving from a primarily defensive strategy to direct offense may be crossing redlines of the ever-cautious Europeans, especially the Germans, and it may add fuel to the arguments of pro-Russian political parties on the left and the right. From a U.S. point of view however, the Kursk campaign is nothing less than a direct repudiation of the self-defeating caution of the Biden administration.

If Washington had provided sufficient weaponry earlier in the war, it could be over by now with a Ukrainian victory and — even more important for American interests — a Russian defeat. Instead, the Biden administration has opted for an endless war scenario. Particularly telling is that it has provided no active diplomacy agenda toward a negotiated end of the war, a stunning abdication of leadership.

The Gaza War seems to offer a stark contrast in light of the extensive efforts at diplomacy. Yet in Gaza, like in Ukraine, the Biden administration has tried to restrain our ally rather than forge a path toward a successful outcome. In the immediate aftermath of Oct. 7, U.S. influence probably prevented an Israeli attack on Hezbollah, at which point that terrorist organization might have been degraded significantly. The Biden administration in effect went to the mat to protect an Iranian proxy force.

In addition, Washington has signaled the prospect of cutting off arms to Israel, whether or not it has followed through on the threat, and this suggestion has introduced a new variable in the calculations of enemies and allies around the world by undermining the credibility of American commitments. The core parallel however in Biden policy between Ukraine and Gaza is that in both cases it has tried to restrain our ally from taking the battle to the root cause: the Russian homeland, where supply chains could be interdicted, and Iran which, so far, has evaded consequences for the actions undertaken by its proxies.

It is noteworthy that in these waning days of the Biden administration, our allies in the two active theaters have chosen to break though the limits Washington has imposed in order to pursue their own war goals more aggressively. Whether they succeed remains to be seen.

The Kursk campaign, for all of its symbolism from the Second World War, may yet turn out to have been too big a risk, if Ukraine cannot withstand an enhanced Russian assault. The Haniyeh assassination, a profound embarrassment for Tehran, may yet spark a chain of events that could turn out badly for Israel. Yet at this point, the willingness of Kyiv and Jerusalem to act on their own perception of their national interests, against the advice of a lame-duck Washington administration caught up in election year calculations, seems to be paying off.

There might even be a positive outcome. Although it may be wishful thinking, if the halting steps toward negotiations begin to succeed, the risks taken by Ukraine and Israel will be viewed in retrospect as the extra steps that were necessary to accelerate diplomatic resolutions.

Russell A. Berman is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and served previously as senior advisor on the policy planning staff of the State Department.