We need to be creative in support of Iraqi Prime Minister Kadhimi

On Thursday, the president will meet Iraq’s new prime minister, Mustafa al-Kadhimi, at the White House. This is more than an important event, it is a strategically critical one.

It is an opportunity to begin to put Iraq back on its feet, diminish Iranian influence there, and start to bring much needed stability to a Middle East reeling from the pandemic, an oscillating oil market, and the emergence of a vast security vacuum created by American disengagement over the past decade.

The United States has a remarkable opportunity with Kadhimi. He is the best Iraqi prime minister any American could imagine, and far better than we deserve given the endless parade of mistakes the U.S. has made in Iraq since 2003.

As a political commentator, Kadhimi routinely demonstrated unsurpassed insight and understanding of Iraqi politics. As the director of the Iraqi National Intelligence Service, Kadhimi proved himself a superb executive, willing and able to use those talents to fight corruption and Iranian-backed Shi’a militias. Now, as prime minister, he has already taken a series of steps signaling his willingness to continue those battles and start to build an Iraqi government capable of meeting the needs of its people.

He has the backing of Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, key moderate Shi’a leaders like Ammar al-Hakim, Iraq’s protest movement, and the wider Iraqi public. Both the Sunnis and Kurds see him as a capable technocrat they can work with and who will treat them fairly.

Yet the opportunity could prove fleeting. Kadhimi was only able to gain the premiership because the vast Iraqi protest movement that began in October 2019 and the Trump administration’s killing of Iranian General Qassem Suleimani together threw Iran’s foreign policy apparatus into a state of disarray. Iraqi President Barham Saleh seized the moment to install Kadhimi as PM — something Suleimani had blocked at the eleventh hour in 2018.

Moreover, Iraq’s problems are daunting, and Kadhimi needs help. Because he is a technocrat, he has no political party behind him to back him. He could build support, but in Iraq that requires resources — resources that he can direct to those who are willing to do the right thing, and willing to help him fight those determined to do the wrong things.

Congress prefers to invest in institutions, not individuals, and the administration is offering little unless Kadhimi can prove he is everything they hope by fixing Iraq’s myriad problems and shutting out Iran. Both approaches are likely to fail because they put the cart before the horse.

Iraq has no strong institutions, and sending money to those there are means giving them to thieves and to Iran. But strong institutions cannot be conjured from the ether simply because we demand them. They have to be built by good men and women with the strength and resources to do so. As Emerson observed, “An institution is the lengthened shadow of one man.”

That is a lesson that the Iranians know only too well. They focus on individuals, rewarding and threatening Iraqi leaders in personal ways that motivate them in ways that offering billions to ministries simply cannot.

Nor will it work to tell Kadhimi that if he can move the ball 99 yards down the field, then we will give him the resources to push it over the goal line. If he — or either of his predecessors — had the ability to do so, they would have. What Kadhimi has said and demonstrated by his initial actions is that he will do as much as he can with whatever resources are available to him, but without more help from Washington and the international community, he won’t be able to do much at all because Iraq’s problems are so great.

What does Kadhimi need? Direct resources in the form of budget support, along with slightly longer-term assistance in the form of loans, trade credits, short-term contracts, and the like, all at his discretion. The kinds of things we failed to provide either of his predecessors.

We need to recognize that if the third time isn’t the charm, there is a very great risk that it will be three strikes and you’re out.

Someday, Iran will regain its balance and if it does not face a stronger Iraq at that point, it will also regain its sway there. Because Kadhimi is seen as the candidate of the U.S. and the moderate Shi’a, if he fails, he is likely to be replaced by someone much worse — someone entirely in Iran’s pocket.

Alternatively, if becomes clear that even Kadhimi — with his technocratic smarts, his non-partisan nationalism, and the assumed support of the United States — cannot begin to move Iraq in the right direction, the Iraqi people may turn against the system entirely and opt for a revolution that would be unlikely to work out well for the United States.

Kenneth M. Pollack is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and a former Director of Persian Gulf Affairs at the National Security Council.