Who’s ‘historic mistake?’

When the nuclear deal reached between Iran and six world powers was announced on July 12, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu deemed it a “historic mistake.”  Was it a mistake for President Obama and America?  Or was Netanyahu’s truculent opposition to the deal a mistake for the Prime Minister and Israel? 

Despite uncertainties and enormous challenges, the 20-month negotiations reached a successful conclusion.  Most Americans have applauded the apparent triumph of diplomacy over war.  But was the agreement a “mistake?”  

{mosads}For the U.S. and the rest of the world, it was not a mistake.  In the short to medium run, the agreement has forestalled a likely war.  Though war is never a quick and easy solution, Israel was bent on bombing Iranian nuclear facilities, with U.S. participation.  A war on Iran would have stirred Mideast turmoil and Arab backlash– with unintended consequences, including inevitable civilian casualties.

Without an agreement, Iran would have no constraint on its nuclear bomb production and could aggressively pursue nuclear research and development.  Meanwhile, a continuation of economic sanctions would increasingly alienate ordinary Iranians, fueling anti-western hostility—and a government tilt toward its hardliners. 

The signed agreement blocks Iran’s path to a nuclear weapon for at least 10 years and imposes a system of verifiable monitoring and inspection.  Under the agreement, Iran will give up two-thirds of its centrifuges and 97% of its enriched uranium.  It will be forbidden from enriching uranium beyond energy-grade fuel and it must destroy or export the core of its plutonium at Arak and replace it with a new core that cannot produce weapons-grade plutonium. 

In the event Iran should cheat without detection, it will have surrendered so much of its program that it would take a full year of cheating, with every centrifuge spinning at full capacity, to produce enough material for a single bomb. By then the Western powers would have had time to interrupt the process. 

Opponents of the deal argue that removal of economic sanctions would give Iran the resources to expand its support of militant organizations such as Hezbollah and Hamas.  More likely, the Iranian government would use its released funds to alleviate the severe hardships on its citizens and to put the country on a sounder economic path. 

Certainly, with no agreement and continued sanctions, Iran’s uninterrupted capacity to build a nuclear bomb would still allow it to dominate its neighbors. 

As New York Times columnist Roger Cohen observed in his July 18 article, the agreement “increases the distance between Iran and a bomb as it reduces the distance between Iran and the world.” In the Soviet Union, China and Cuba, time and diplomatic engagement overcame political barriers presumed to be insurmountable.   

If the nuclear deal is not a mistake for Obama and America, what about its impact on Netanyahu and Israel?   Israeli political analysts now portray the agreement signing as a huge defeat for a Prime Minister who banked his office on scuttling the Iran diplomacy.  Yet Israeli efforts to discredit the agreement and secure its revocation continue apace and may yet result in a Netanyahu victory.   

Although Netanyahu’s vehement opposition to the Iran deal has, for the moment at least, impaired his relationship with the Obama administration, the Prime Minister has already extracted from the U.S. (as “compensation?”) promises of enhanced military aid. 

In retrospect, a more serious mistake for Israel may have been its failure to grasp the bargaining potential of a nuclear free zone.  Had Israel offered to destroy its nuclear arsenal and join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in exchange for Iran’s abandonment of its nuclear ambitions, Netanyahu probably could have eliminated the perceived nuclear threat without either protracted negotiation or war.  Unlike Israel, Iran is an NPT member and a past proponent of a nuke-free zone.  Unlike Israel in modern times, it has never attacked another country.   

Perhaps Israel’s opposition to a diplomatic solution had less to do with Iran than with Palestine and its efforts to seek legal remedies against the Israeli occupation and to enlist the support of international NGOs in its BDS campaign.   

Through his anti-diplomacy effort, the Prime Minister has successfully diverted the world’s attention from the Israel/Palestine conflict, BDS and war crimes allegations.  Thus, from a cynical point of view, Netanyahu may not have made an historic mistake after all.

Hager is cofounder and former director general of the International Development Law Organization, Rome.