My support of the new START (Sen. Ben Nelson)

“Thank you, for that kind introduction. Thanks also to everyone at U.S. Strategic Command for sponsoring this important symposium.

This morning, when I got up my wife asked where I was going so early. I told her to speak to folks about deterrence. But I don’t think she heard clearly.
She said reprovingly, “I’ve been near your hunting clothes, Ben…and you don’t know a thing about detergents.”
“No, dear,” I said more clearly. “It’s to military folks and others discussing deterrence.”
“Ohhhh!” She said. “That’s good…but, you know, your hunting clothes really are deterrents!”

Just kidding.

It is great to be here this morning and I know you will have a valuable discussion over the next two days about one of the key elements of our country’s national security strategy, deterrence.

I thought I would offer some thoughts about what I’ve heard and learned as a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee and most recently as chairman of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee.

In particular, I’ll address the value of nuclear arms treaties, and issues and concerns that I’ve heard about the one pending before the U.S. Senate known as New START.

What Nuclear Arms Treaties have accomplished:

In the last 40 years, our country has participated in numerous arms control and nonproliferation efforts. They are a critical element of our national security strategy.

If done right, arms control agreements can enhance U.S. national security by promoting transparency and information-sharing that can inform us about the size, make-up, and operations of other military forces.

They also provide other countries with information about our force and capabilities…and that promotes a strategic balance and discourages an attack on the U.S. or its allies.
 
Transparency and information-sharing enable our military planners to better prepare for a response to a real threat. Without such agreements and understandings, our military and the military of countries like Russia must prepare for worst-case scenarios.

That leads to inefficient runaway defense spending, which probably sounds familiar to you. We’ve done that before – it was called the arms race. The U.S. and USSR poured massive amounts of resources into building vast stockpiles of nuclear weapons and systems to defend against incoming bombers and missiles.

Since the late 1960s, a number of arms control agreements and other measures have worked to reduce nuclear forces and systems that support them.

Former Nebraska Senators Kerrey and Exon backed START I.

Former President Ronald Reagan, who accelerated nuclear modernization and launched the ‘Star Wars’ missile defense effort, overcame his initial distaste for arms control agreements. Working with Soviet Premier Gorbachev, Reagan laid the foundation for today’s START treaty.

In July 1991, Presidents Bush and Gorbachev signed the START I treaty. The Senate approved the treaty a year later on an overwhelming and bipartisan vote of 93-6. Nebraska’s senators at the time, J.J. Exon and Bob Kerrey both supported the START 1 treaty.

For his part, Bob Kerrey called it a “vital treaty, an essential treaty.” He raised concerns that U.S. taxpayer dollars might be needed to help some of the impoverished former Soviet republics abide by its terms. In the end, though, he suggested that the U.S. should be ready to do so.

If not, Senator Kerrey said: “We run the risk of losing the greatest opportunity presented by our victory in the Cold War.”

Four main concerns about the treaty:

Today, we’re hearing a new round of concerns about the New START treaty. I’d like to address some of them. They focus on four issues:
• Treaty limitations on missile defense.
• Sufficiency of modernization plans for nuclear enterprise.
• Adequacy of treaty verification measures.
• Force structure changes resulting from treaty reductions.

First, the New START treaty won’t affect any current or planned U.S. missile defense. Some point to language in the treaty’s preamble and the inclusion of unilateral statements. But they are not legally binding. The only binding restriction on missile defense systems arises in Article 5. It prevents conversion of ICBM silos into missile defense launchers. That has no practical effect because converting silos is more expensive and less desirable than building new silos.

Second, some have questioned the administration’s commitment to modernize our nuclear facilities and forces. I’d note that the administration asked for $7 billion in FY 2011 for stockpile sustainment and infrastructure investments. That is roughly 10% more than 2010 funding. The Administration also plans to invest $80 billion in the next decade to sustain and modernize the nuclear weapons complex. That’s the biggest commitment to the nuclear enterprise in more than a decade.
 
Third, some argue that verification measures are less rigorous than for START I. Its verification measures expired last December. So, as of today, we’ve gone 249 days without on-site monitoring and verification in Russia. The less we are allowed to see for ourselves the more uncertainty we’ll feel about Russian forces.

New START includes verification measures allowing 18 on-site inspections annually. We determine where and when to go, with very little advance notice to the Russians. As many of you know, this treaty counts every warhead and delivery system and tracks them with unique identifiers. That’s a tremendous advancement.
 
Fourth, some say they’re worried about the treaty’s impact on the nuclear triad—our strategic bombers, missiles and ballistic missile submarines. In testimony and in direct conversations with me, our military leaders have assured that the New START retains the triad. Proposed reductions by the Pentagon aim to spread across all systems and minimize impacts to any one system or base, thus retaining a safe, secure, and effective triad.

New START Supporters:

Those are concerns from detractors. Let’s look now at supporters I’ve taken note of as well.
In recent months, I’ve spoken about it with key current military leaders including Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, General Cartwright, and General Chilton. Each has expressed full support and participation in this treaty. They also fully support the proposed reductions to the nuclear arsenal and the continued sustainment of the nuclear triad.

Secretary Gates has said: ‘This treaty strengthens nuclear stability. It will reduce the number of strategic nuclear weapons that both Russia and the United States are permitted to deploy by a third, and maintains an effective verification regime.’

In addition, six former secretaries of state, five former secretaries of defense and seven former SRATCOM commanders have endorsed the treaty. In a July letter to Senate leaders, the former STRATCOM commanders write that they spent years overseeing U.S. strategic nuclear forces and advising Presidents from Reagan to George W. Bush. In their judgment the New START treaty will enhance American national security.

They wrote: ‘The New START treaty will contribute to a more stable U.S.-Russia relationship.’

It’s important, I believe, that STRATCOM played a key role in the negotiating terms of the treaty. With that experience, STRATCOM’S Commander General Kevin Chilton has said: ‘Our nation will be safer and more secure with this treaty than without it. What we negotiated to is absolutely acceptable to the United States Strategic Command for what we need to do to provide the deterrent for the country.’

I will support New START:

I agree wholeheartedly with General Chilton that our country will be safer and more secure with the New START Treaty than without it.

Because it promotes our national security and can make the world safer; Because it increases transparency between nuclear nations and continues the maxim “trust but verify” coined by President Reagan; because it promotes cooperation and not suspicion; and because it reduces the possibility of a nuclear exchange and still enables America to respond to the terrible threats that continue in the Nuclear Age, I am prepared to vote to ratify the New START treaty.

America will be stronger if we can continue to look under Russia’s hood, and they under ours. Ronald Reagan’s “Trust but verify” still works.

I’d like to explain in more detail the reasons I’m supporting the treaty.

Not far from where we are right now is STRATCOM. It is charged with deterring attacks on the U.S., ensuring freedom in cyberspace, providing national security surveillance and overseeing our nuclear forces. This treaty will help STRATCOM accomplish its absolutely vital mission for our nation.

Further, as the chairman of the US Russia Inter-Parliamentary Group, I have held many meetings with my Russian counterparts about this treaty. It’s a step in the right direction to encourage further cooperation. There is sense that U.S. – Russia relationship has been reset and there is an eagerness to cooperate.
As we work toward cooperation, the treaty reestablishes verification measures and increases transparency. That will reduce uncertainty about Russian forces, and increase their predictability.

Without this treaty, our understanding of Russian nuclear forces would deteriorate. We’d have a tendency for U.S forces to overcompensate for what we don’t know. That’s a losing strategy in an era of large budget deficits and needed fiscal constraint.

Entering into this treaty demonstrates our commitment to modernizing the stockpile by making the most of what we have to spend. Today, no one wants to overspend to compensate for what we don’t know. The New START Treaty offers the possibility of providing our military with insights needed to efficiently and successfully provide a safe, reliable and secure nuclear deterrent.

At the end of the day, the New START treaty builds on successes from previous treaties. It moves us further away from a nuclear war likely to kill and maim millions of innocent people. Even as it does, we’ll retain a powerful and effective deterrent capability.

For those reasons, I believe it deserves ratification in the Senate.”