A new way forward in Afghanistan

The
U.S. interests at stake in Afghanistan do not warrant this level of sacrifice.
President Obama justified expanding our commitment by saying the goal was
eradicating Al Qaeda. Yet Al Qaeda is no longer a significant presence in
Afghanistan, and there are only some 400 hard-core Al Qaeda members remaining
in the entire Af/Pak theater, most of them hiding in Pakistan’s northwest
provinces.

America’s
armed forces have fought bravely and well, and their dedication is
unquestioned. But we should not ask them to make sacrifices unnecessary to our
core national interests, particularly when doing so threatens long-term needs
and priorities both at home and abroad. Instead of toppling terrorists, America’s
Afghan war has become an ambitious and fruitless effort at “nationbuilding.” We
are mired in a civil war in Afghanistan and are struggling to establish an
effective central government in a country that has long been fragmented and
decentralized.

No
matter how desirable this objective might be in the abstract, it is not
essential to U.S. security and it is not a goal for which the U.S. military is
well suited. There is no clear definition of what would comprise “success” in
this endeavor, and creating a unified Afghan state would require committing
many more American lives and hundreds of billions of additional U.S. dollars
for many years to come.

As
the WikiLeaks war diary comprised of more than 91,000 secret reports on the
Afghanistan War makes clear, any sense of American and allied progress in the
conflict has been undermined by revelations that many more civilian deaths have
occurred than have been officially acknowledged as the result of U.S. and
allied strike accidents, the Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence continued to
provide logistics and financial support to the Afghan Taliban even as U.S.
units were fighting these units, and that Karzai-government affiliates and
appointees in rural Afghanistan have often proven to be more corrupt and
ruthless than the Taliban.

Prospects
for success are dim. As former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger recently
warned, “Afghanistan has never been pacified by foreign forces.”1 The 2010
spring offensive in Marjah was inconclusive, and a supposedly “decisive” summer
offensive in Kandahar has been delayed and the expectations downgraded. U.S.
and allied casualties reached an all-time high in July, and several NATO allies
have announced plans to withdraw their own forces.

The
conflict in Afghanistan is commonly perceived as a struggle between the Karzai
government and an insurgent Taliban movement, allied with international
terrorists, that is seeking to overthrow that government. In fact, the conflict
is a civil war about power-sharing with lines of contention that are 1) partly
ethnic, chiefly, but not exclusively, between Pashtuns who dominate the south
and other ethnicities such as Tajiks and Uzbeks who are more prevalent in the
north, 2) partly rural-vs.-urban, particularly within the Pashtun community,
and 3) partly sectarian.

The
Afghanistan conflict also includes the influence of surrounding nations with a
desire to advance their own interests– including India, Pakistan, Iran, Saudi
Arabia and others. And with the U.S. intervention in force, the conflict includes
resistance to what is seen as foreign military occupation.

Resolving
the conflict in Afghanistan has primarily to do with resolving the distribution
of power among these factions and between the central government and the
provinces, and with appropriately decentralizing authority.

 

Negotiated
resolution of these conflicts will reduce the influence of extremists more
readily than military action will. The Taliban itself is not a unified movement
but instead a label that is applied to many armed groups and individuals that
are only loosely aligned and do not necessarily have a fondness for the
fundamentalist ideology of the most prominent Taliban leaders.

The
Study Group believes the war in Afghanistan has reached a critical crossroads.
Our current path promises to have limited impact on the civil war while taking
more American lives and contributing to skyrocketing taxpayer debt. We conclude
that a fundamentally new direction is needed, one that recognizes the United
States’ legitimate interests in Central Asia and is fashioned to advance them.
Far from admitting “defeat,” the way forward acknowledges the manifold
limitations of a military solution in a region where our interests lie in
political stability, and it shifts our resources to focus on U.S. foreign
policy strengths in concert with the international community to promote
reconciliation among the warring parties, advance economic development, and
encourage region-wide diplomatic engagement.

We
base these conclusions on the following key points raised in the Study Group’s
research and discussions:

 -The
United States has only two vital interests in the Af/Pak region: 1) preventing
Afghanistan from being a “safe haven” from which Al Qaeda or other extremists
can organize more effective attacks on the U.S. homeland; and 2) ensuring that
Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal does not fall into hostile hands.

 -Protecting
our interests does not require a U.S. military victory over the Taliban. A
Taliban takeover is unlikely even if the United States reduces its military
commitment. The Taliban is a rural insurgency rooted primarily in Afghanistan’s
Pashtun population, and succeeded due in some part to the disenfranchisment of
rural Pashtuns. The Taliban’s seizure of power in the 1990s was due to an
unusual set of circumstances that no longer exists and are unlikely to be
repeated.

 -There
is no significant Al Qaeda presence in Afghanistan today, and the risk of a new
“safe haven” there under more “friendly” Taliban rule is overstated. Should an
Al Qaeda cell regroup in Afghanistan, the U.S. would have residual military
capability in the region sufficient to track and destroy it.

 -Al
Qaeda sympathizers are now present in many locations globally, and defeating
the Taliban will have little effect on Al Qaeda’s global reach. The ongoing
threat from Al Qaeda is better met via specific counter-terrorism measures, a reduced
U.S. military “footprint” in the Islamic world, and diplomatic efforts to
improve America’s overall image and undermine international support for
militant extremism.

 -Given
our present economic circumstances, reducing the staggering costs of the Afghan
war is an urgent priority. Maintaining the long-term health of the U.S. economy
is just as important to American strength and security as protecting U.S. soil
from enemy (including terrorist) attacks.

-The
continuation of an ambitious U.S. military campaign in Afghanistan will likely
work against U.S. interests. A large U.S. presence fosters local (especially
Pashtun) resentment and aids Taliban recruiting. It also fosters dependence on
the part of our Afghan partners and encourages closer cooperation among a
disparate array of extremist groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan alike.

-Past
efforts to centralize power in Afghanistan have provoked the same sort of local
resistance that is convulsing Afghanistan today. There is ample evidence that
this effort will join others in a long
line of failed incursions.

-Although
the United States should support democratic rule, human rights and economic
development, its capacity to mold other societies is inherently limited and the
costs of trying should be weighed against our need to counter global terrorist
threats directly, reduce America’s $1.4 trillion budget deficit, repair eroding
U.S. infrastructure, and other critical national purposes.

Our
support of these things will be better achieved as part of a coordinated
international group with which expenses and burdens can be shared. The bottom
line is clear: Our vital interests in Afghanistan are limited and military
victory is not the key to achieving them. On the contrary: Waging a lengthy
counterinsurgency war in Afghanistan may well do more to aid Taliban recruiting
than to dismantle the group, help spread conflict further into Pakistan, unify
radical groups that might otherwise be quarreling amongst themselves, threaten
the long-term health of the U.S. economy, and prevent the U.S. government from
turning its full attention to other pressing problems.

The
more promising path for the U.S. in the Af/Pak region would reverse the recent
escalation and move away from a counterinsurgency effort that is neither
necessary nor likely to succeed. Instead, the U.S. should:

1.
Emphasize power-sharing and political inclusion. The U.S. should fast-track a
peace process designed to decentralize power within Afghanistan and encourage a
power-sharing balance among the principal parties.

2.
Downsize and eventually end military operations in southern Afghanistan, and
reduce the U.S. military footprint. The U.S. should draw down its military
presence, which radicalizes many Pashtuns and is an important aid to Taliban
recruitment.

3.
Focus security efforts on Al Qaeda and Domestic Security. Special forces,
intelligence assets, and other U.S. capabilities should continue to seek out
and target known Al Qaeda cells in the region and be ready to go after them
should they attempt to relocate elsewhere or build new training facilities. In
addition, part of the savings from our drawdown should be reallocated to
bolster U.S. domestic security efforts and to track nuclear weapons globally.

4.
Encourage economic development. Because destitute states can become incubators
for terrorism, drug and human trafficking, and other illicit activities,
efforts at reconciliation should be paired with an internationally led effort
to develop Afghanistan’s economy.

5.
Engage regional and global stakeholders in a diplomatic effort designed to
guarantee Afghan neutrality and foster regional stability. Despite their
considerable differences, neighboring states such as India, Pakistan, China,
Iran and Saudi Arabia share a common interest in preventing Afghanistan from
being dominated by any single power or being a permanently failed state that
exports instability to others.

We
believe this strategy will best serve the interests of women in Afghanistan as
well. The worst thing for women is for Afghanistan to remain paralyzed in a
civil war in which there evolves no organically rooted support for their social
advancement.

The remainder of this report elaborates the logic behind
these recommendations. It begins by summarizing U.S. vital interests, including
our limited interests in Afghanistan itself and in the region more broadly. It
then considers why the current strategy is failing and why the situation is
unlikely to improve even under a new commander. The final section outlines “The
Way Forward” and explains how a radically different approach can achieve core
U.S. goals at an acceptable cost.

Members
of the Afghanistan Study Group

The
individuals listed here have provided the ideas and language used in this
report. While many of them would not agree with every detail of the report,
they do agree with the overall recommendation and direction put forward here.
We are deeply grateful for their leadership, involvement, and support during
the process.

Bruce
Ackerman- Yale
University

Gordon
Adams- American
University and
Stimson Center

Amjad
Atallah- New
America Foundation

James
Bamford- Author/Documentary
Producer

Darcy
Burner- Progressive
Caucus Action Fund

James
Clad- National
Defense University

Steve
Clemons- New
America Foundation and The
Washington Note

Juan
Cole- University
of Michigan and Informed
Comment

Patrick
Cronin- Center
for a New American Security

Arnaud
de Borchgrave- Center
for Strategic & International Studies

Graciana
del Castillo- Columbia
University

Michael
C. Desch- University
of Notre Dame

Robert
H. Donaldson- University
of Tulsa

Bernard
I. Finel- National
War College

James
K. Galbraith- University
of Texas-Austin

William
C. Goodfellow- Center
for International Policy

Selig
S. Harrison- Center
for International Policy

Leo
Hindery, Jr.- Chair,
US Economy/Smart Globalization
Initiative, New
America Foundation

Matthew
P. Hoh- Former
U.S. Marine and
former Department of State official

Michael
Intriligator- University
of California, Los Angeles and
The Milken Institute

Robert
Jervis- Columbia
University

Sean
Kay- Ohio
State University

Parag
Khanna- New
America Foundation and
former Senior Geopolitical Officer,
US Special Operations Forces
in Iraq and Afghanistan

W.
Patrick Lang- Former
Defense Intelligence Officer,
South Asia, Publisher, Sic
Semper Tyrannis

Flynt
Leverett- New
America Foundation and Race
for Iran

Hillary
Mann Leverett- Yale
University and Race
for Iran

Justin
Logan- Cato
Institute

John
Mueller- Ohio
State University

Robert
A. Pape- University
of Chicago

Paul
R. Pillar- Georgetown
University

Jason
Rosenbaum- writer

Priya
Satia- Stanford
University

Stephen
Schlesinger- Century
Foundation

Sherle
R. Schwenninger- New
America Foundation

Michael
Shank- Office
of US Congressman Michael Honda
and Afghanistan Taskforce Chair,
Congressional Progressive Caucus

Richard
Vague- The
Governor’s Woods Foundation and
American Strategy Program Leadership
Council, New America Foundation

Martin
Walker- Woodrow
Wilson Center

 Stephen
M. Walt- Harvard
University

Leighton
Woodhouse- labor
organizer

Mosharraf
Zaidi- international
development expert and
columnist