Egypt’s electoral road to reform

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It would also strengthen its legitimacy as a serious party of moderate conservatives capable of forging unity during historic national transition.  Furthermore, operating within a multi-party coalition would shield it from direct blame for lack of economic progress.
 
Like Morocco and Tunisia, Egypt’s Islamists are largely modeling themselves on Turkey’s Justice and Development Party of Prime Minister Erdogan.  Generally, his political formula provides useful lessons.  It has already led to new Islamist governments in Tunisia and Morocco.  However, Erdogan’s ability to deliver economically explains much of his success since coming to power. 

Public expectations for economic results in Egypt, and the region’s other newly emerging democracies, will not be met anytime soon.  Whereas Turkey is a dynamically growing economy, Egypt is still dependent on international assistance.
 
What of Egypt’s military? Ultimately, the stronger the electoral numbers of parties like the FJP, the greater its legitimacy, leverage and ability to offset the influence of the armed forces.  The infrastructure of Hosni Mubarak’s regime, despite his removal, largely survives through the military establishment and the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). 

Formally, its principal mission remains maintaining stability and ensuring an orderly transition. The SCAF clearly does not want to govern.  Since Mubarak’s fall, it has largely proved incapable and unprepared. Its reactive policies have led to considerable mistakes marked by a consistent pattern of resisting and then submitting to public pressure.
 
Convinced it represents a silent majority, Egypt’s military prefers reform through civilian rule and a political accommodation whereby it provides order in exchange for retaining its status, privileges, and accompanying benefits.   According to some estimates, it controls 10 to 15 percent of the national economy. 

Whereas Egypt’s FJP looks to Turkey’s Islamists, Egypt’s armed forces aspire to the Turkish military’s former status as guardians of the constitution during the pre-Erdogan era.  Further expectations include no civilian oversight over its budget and business interests and a prevailing say over national security.
 
Whereas years of grass-roots organization proved indispensable to the EJP’s expected first place finish, the ultraconservative Al Noor Salafist Movement’s alarming second place was the electoral grand surprise, particularly since it formed only a few months ago.  For Egypt’s secular-liberal bloc, the results provided a rude awakening.

Its poor performance begs the question of whether it’s really representative of Egyptian society, particularly after recent protests and violence in Tahrir Square resulted in over 40 deaths. Should they fail to organize, unify and connect more effectively with voters, further electoral disappointments will follow. 
 
The meteoric rise of the Salafists can further benefit FJP’s prospects. If the secular-liberal bloc continues to prove weak and Salafist numbers strengthen, many undecided voters will turn to the Islamist FJP as a safe and solid bulwark against extreme religiosity.
 
With the largest voter turnout in its history, Egypt’s first round of parliamentary elections has provided considerable insight into the road ahead.

Marco Vicenzino is a geopolitical risk expert and directs the Global Strategy Project.