Ideas that kill, strategies that fail

As 2014 draws to a close, the so-called “Islamic State” in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) maintains its grip over large swaths of the two countries despite coalition air strikes designed to degrade and ultimately defeat the jihadist group. Meanwhile the map of Libya has lost its meaning, with the country a bloody mosaic of tribal militias, criminal gangs, and terrorist cells. There is hardly any international mobilization against the increasingly virulent Boko Haram insurgency now spilling over Nigeria’s borders into neighboring countries—although here in Morocco, their success and the consequent destabilization of the Sahel constitutes a real and growing security concern. And now, a new kind of ISIS-inspired terrorism has reared its head with the recent incident in Sydney, Australia—a lethal hostage taking in a public place by one man with one black flag. This global pathology will get worse before it gets better.

{mosads}There is so much blame to go around that one could turn out a full-length monograph that simply lists the litany of sins of commission or omission in a line or two each. However, there are a few common points that need to be recalled.

For starters, with respect to the military campaign against ISIS and its jihadist cohorts, the strategy remains incoherent and internally contradictory. The extent to which the United States and its allies have made a serious dent in ISIS is yet to be determined, recent announcements of the targeted killing of some senior leaders notwithstanding. The Iraqi army, even after ten years of training, has not mustered the capacity or determination to take a stand against the militants. Overall, rank-and-file troops are demoralized, unpopular, and sectarian in their loyalties. There are hopes that moderate Syrian opposition forces may achieve unity and operational coordination, but doubts persist that the anti-ISIS coalition will actually provide the equipment and training they require. There is confidence in Kurdish fighting morale, but also concern about Turkey’s ambivalence in helping them win their battles due to its rejection of the possible establishment of a Kurdish state in Iraq. All these factors only add to a piece of advice born of the bitter experience of a decade and half of war: There is no purely military solution for the jihadist phenomenon.

Meanwhile, in the West, Islamophobia appears to be on the rise and increasingly tolerated within mainstream society. The normalization of all forms of racism cannot be dismissed in assessing the motivation of some American and European converts to Islam to join the jihadists’ ranks. Nor have moderate Arab states behaved much better in quelling hate speech and diatribes of disinformation about the West spread by extremist elements in their societies. And while the festering conflict between Israelis and Palestinians has its own separate dynamic for which there is likewise plenty of blame to go around, that conflict, to which there is no end in sight, has become interwoven into the broader extremist narrative.

But rather than just air concerns about present strategies, I will close with a couple of suggestions I have made before, but consider worth repeating.

First, is while jihadists must be hit military, they can only be defeated through long-term holistic solutions that rectifies the conditions in which they grow. It is heartening that commanders like Major General Michael Nagata, head of U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Middle East and the man President Barack Obama has designated to train Syrian opposition forces to fight ISIS, have increasingly emphasized the need to target the psychology of extremists. Countries split by tribal, sectarian, and political polarization require bold initiatives for national reconciliation—and there are a number of models worth considering, including experiences in places as different as South Africa and Morocco. Wealth inequality and impoverished educational systems must be meaningfully addressed, with a more just distribution of wealth and opportunity and the introduction of civil discourse and critical thinking skills into the curricula. Women—in the Middle East as in all developing countries, often a bulwark of moderation and tolerance—must be enfranchised and empowered.

Furthermore, political will and diplomatic resources must be brought to bear to end persistent intraregional conflicts that create openings for the sort of extremism we have witnessed all too much of over the course of the past year. The Israeli-Palestinian example has already been cited. I would also add a matter closer to my home in Casablanca: the Sahara conflict, a decades-old obstacle to effective security cooperation between Morocco and Algeria against terrorism in the nearby Sahel. There needs to be a way to finally overcome these impasses. If the international community fails to do so, “take 2” of the crisis in Syria and Iraq may well take shape in the Sahel and neighboring North and West African states.

Ahmed Charai, chairman of the Maroc Telematique media group, is a member of the board of directors of the Atlantic Council and an international councilor of the Center for Strategic and International Studies.