Why limits in an ISIL AUMF are necessary

This week Congress begins considering an authorization for use of military force (AUMF) against the Islamic State. So far, the debate has focused on how specific a potential authorization should be. The administration has requested a modestly limited authorization and some in Congress want an even more tailored resolution. In response, conservative hawks in Congress are leading what amounts to a Blank Check Caucus that wants to grant this and future presidents broad war authority that is unspecific and unlimited so long as the Islamic State and vaguely related groups are the targets.  

But the Blank Check Caucus misunderstands the basic functions of war authorizations and fails to appreciate the challenges that non-state actors like the Islamic State pose to Congress’ constitutional role to declare war. By correcting these errors, it is evident that limits are necessary and appropriate in an Islamic State AUMF.  

{mosads}The basic purpose of Congress having the power to grant war authority is to make sure the conflict is justified and assessed according to the national interest. The process of justifying and authorizing wars presumes that the actual conduct of the war will in a general sense conform to the terms in which it was authorized. This is not to say that Congress needs to know exactly how a war will transpire down to the smallest detail, but it is to say that the basic scope of the war needs to be defined. Without having a relatively clear, collectively shared sense of the basic scope of the conflict, it is not possible for Congress to weigh the costs and benefits of military action to inform its decision to authorize or not.  

Sometimes, the basic scope of the war is clear in the discussion of war aims, the enemy, the interests at stake, and the proposed strategy. This can particularly be the case in wars against state actors, where things like the geographic and operational scope can be easier to anticipate. Other times, the basic scope of the conflict being considered is not as clear. Under these circumstances, it is important that Congress explicitly define the scope of the conflict well enough that a cost-benefit analysis can be meaningfully carried out in weighing granting the president war authority

The war against the Islamic State is a case in which the future scope of conflict is utterly unclear without being defined in statute. The Islamic State has or is trying to obtain affiliates in at least five countries in North Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia. What the future holds for additional affiliates is anyone’s guess. Furthermore, it is uncertain to what extent American partner ground forces in Iraq and Syria will be able to degrade the Islamic State without American forces on the ground. Depending upon the preferences of the next president, the range of possible conflict under a Blank Check AUMF runs from a continuation of President Obama’s limited operations to potentially perpetual war from North Africa to Central Asia, including sizable deployments of conventional ground forces.  

Therefore, under an unconditional authorization, lawmakers and the American people cannot possibly know what they are authorizing, nor assess its justification or implications for American interests. The possible range of the conflict’s scope is simply too broad. Fortunately, there is a simple solution: Congress can define the scope of authorized conflict in terms of geography, time, and permissible operations – such as allowing conventional ground forces or not – and then proceed to debate the merits.   

But the hawkish Blank Check Caucus in Congress has deployed a number of misguided arguments to avoid defining the conflict.  

First, Republicans like Speaker John Boehner (Ohio) have opposed a limited authorization because it would “tie the President’s hands.” But the point of defining the scope of authorized conflict is not to undermine success. Instead, it is defining the initial scope of the conflict as a marker that can be collectively recognized by Congress, the current (and future) president and the American people who will be asked to pay and sacrifice for the war. Should the president need to broaden the scope of the conflict, then he can return to Congress.  

Second, Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.) has asserted that a counter-Islamic State AUMF should be “unconditional” and that it is unprecedented for war authorizations to include “limitations on the time or the geography or anything of this nature.” But Congress has a rich tradition of limiting the president’s war authority by specifying where, when, and how force is to be employed. According to a comprehensive review completed by the National Security Network, 56 percent of past AUMFs contained geographic limitations, 37 percent limited the kinds of military operations or forces authorized to be employed, and 29 percent contained a timeframe for expiration.  

Rubio qualified his claim by saying that there are supposedly two exceptions in modern history to war authorities being allegedly unconditional: 1983 in Lebanon and 1993 in Somalia. But to claim these as special cases that are not supposed to count towards precedent is to dismiss a full quarter of authorizations for use of military force since WWII.  

Third, Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) has said that Congress’ “power of the purse” is sufficient to check the executive’s war authority. But this view side-steps the issue of meaningfully defining the scope of anticipated conflict so that it can be meaningfully justified before authority is granted. Moreover, it assumes that Congress will be willing in unknown future circumstances to check war policy by defunding active combat operations at great political risk when American troops may have already been engaged in new missions and battlefields.  

By defining the scope of the conflict in law that is otherwise far from clear, Congress and the American people can know the basic character of the war they are considering authorizing. From there, a constructive debate becomes possible.  

French is a policy analyst at the National Security Network, a foreign policy organization based in Washington, D.C.