Obama and Venezuela: Executive disorder

Executive orders are a key feature of U.S. presidential and institutional politics. As a domestic instrument they have been crucial for the management of the federal government and, sometimes, they were fundamental for landmark changes such as Abraham Lincoln’s “Emancipation Proclamation” and Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “New Deal” undertakings. As a foreign policy means they have been mostly a component of a coercive diplomacy, both during and after the Cold War. Internally, they are supposed to be basically an important inducement for a positive handling of significant issues; internationally they are, in general, part of a punitive strategy for the purpose of compelling allegedly ominous counterparts to modify their behavior. Thus, these orders are a combination of “carrots” at home and “sticks” abroad.

The most recent foreign affairs-related presidential executive order was on Venezuela and due to the fact that, according to the White House, this country constitutes an extraordinary threat to American national security. It blocked property and restricted entry of 7 Venezuelans: it avoided unrestrained economic sanctions, an oil-export restriction or other politico-military punishment, as has been the case with other executive orders against North Korea, Libya, Iran, among many others. Notwithstanding the rationale, Washington’s decision regarding Caracas is flawed and may be counterproductive.

{mosads}In no real or hypothetical sense does Venezuela represent a “clear and present danger” for the United States. No significant internal constituency—the liberal side of the Democratic party, entrepreneurs with profitable business in the region, NGOs devoted to human rights, scholars of Venezuelan reality, think-tanks working on inter-American topics, key figures in the media, among others—has been demanding such an order. A weakened democracy in turmoil such as Venezuela’s is not a security menace for Americans but a political challenge for the whole continent. Venezuela`s poor human rights record is not worst than Mexico’s or Egypt’s. No key principle seems to have influenced the Obama administration on Venezuela unless one makes an argument about the strategic convenience of a double standard. The complexity and severity of domestic clashes between the government of President Nicolás Maduro and the opposition are still more manageable and negotiable than in any hot-spot of the Middle East or Northern Africa. No major human rights organization inside Venezuela or in South America has supported Obama’s directive. No Latin American country—especially no close neighbor to Venezuela–has favored such a move. No U.S. ally, including Canada and the European Union, has joined Washington or congratulated Obama.

Thus, there are two alternatives to understand—not to justify—Washington’s new policy regarding Caracas. On the one hand, it may be the result of a combination of instinctive reaction and trade-off logic. Prior to, but particularly after 9/11, Washington has been reacting against what it calls “rogue states” or “outlaw states” or “predator states” with some type of sanctions: the conventional response against those overstated “threats” has been, usually sooner than later, some form of coercive diplomacy. Currently, and in addition, the United States has decided to normalize the relations with Cuba and Havana has been requesting that the country be de-listed as a state that has been sponsoring terrorism. Meanwhile there is a potential agreement between the P5 plus 1 and Iran on nuclear matters. In order not to appear soft on both issues, the Obama administration wants to demonstrate that it is sufficiently tough with the new breed of “enemies,” be they ISIS, Venezuela or Russia. The executive order against Venezuela has then more to do with a mix of foreign and domestic politics in the short term as well as with electoral politics in the medium term.

On the other hand, the decision on Venezuela may be only based on what is going on in that country. It is possible that the perception among U.S. policymakers was that hardening the stance vis-à-vis the Maduro government contributes to rallying the opposition and accelerates a regime change in Venezuela. If there are divisions among the armed forces the executive order will work as a signal: they should define, sooner than later, their posture regarding the Maduro tenure. In this case, Washington is ready to pursue a very risky policy without caring too much about the overall impact on U.S.-Latin American relations: in the end the region has never created a countervailing coalition of center-left forces in government able to deter U.S. power projection in the area.  

But whatever the rationale is, it looks perplexing that someone in Washington (and Arlington and Wall Street) believes that working alone and exacerbating tensions in Venezuela is good for the long-term interests of the United States in Venezuela, in particular, and Latin America, in general. Perhaps a small clique of individuals, groupings, and interests think that America (and the world) is better off with more confrontation and a new, potential (un)civil war. In the end, Obama’s decision on Venezuela may become a source of executive disorder rather than a prelude to peaceful transformation in the country.  

Tokatlian is the director of the Department of Political Science and International Studies at Universidad Di Tella (Buenos Aires, Argentina).