Has the PA already collapsed?

The Palestinian Authority (PA) may have avoided an immediate, devastating crisis following Israel’s recent decision to resume the transfer of tax revenues, but the failure of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process, and the unwillingness of the PA to exercise representative good governance, have created a dynamic that will continue to erode the PA’s legitimacy, and could lead ultimately to its collapse. 

To be sure, much has been invested in the PA, and there are important dynamics that militate against an imminent implosion. The world and regional order, which is largely invested in a two-state solution, sees the PA as the address for managing and ultimately resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. For Israel, the PA fulfills an important security function in addition to being an interlocutor for peace. For the Palestinians, the public sector is by far the largest employer. 

{mosads}Despite this support, the PA is currently at its most fragile since its creation in 1994. Why? Because it has failed to deliver for the Palestinian people. 

The PA has so far been unable to achieve its founding objective: ending the Israeli occupation and creating an independent Palestinian state. The two-state solution on which the Palestinian leadership has staked its credibility remains desirable to a majority of Palestinians but is increasingly seen by an even larger majority as unachievable. 

Nor has the PA been able to point to gains extracted from Israel during the recent negotiations. This does not only relate to political issues concerning a peace deal, but also to concrete improvements that positively touch Palestinians’ daily life. Instead, most Palestinians see negotiations as a cover for the expansion and entrenchment of the occupation, particularly due to settlement activities.  

The PA’s inability to advance the “independence agenda” has been compounded by its failure to provide good governance. Operating under occupation imposes inherent limitations on the PA’s ability to function. Yet problems of corruption, inefficiency, and poor governance, as well as the rapidly shrinking political space are problems that are of the Palestinians’ own making. Attempts by former Prime Minister Salam Fayyad to tackle these issues were robustly, proactively, and ultimately successfully resisted by the PA’s traditional leadership. 

Compounding Palestinians’ frustrations is the PA’s apparent unwillingness to take control of Gaza’s crossing points, a donor condition for beginning reconstruction and a step that would have reintroduced the PA into Gaza. This misstep is perceived by many Palestinians as indifference to the plight of the residents of the coastal strip. 

The failure on the diplomatic and governance fronts does not mean that the Palestinian public is eager to do away with the PA. It still provides services and pays salaries to a large segment of Palestinian society. What these failures do create, however, is an increasingly vulnerable PA that is ill-equipped to survive a protracted financial crisis or momentous political developments. 

The recent financial crisis caused by Israel’s withholding of tax revenues is not the first time the PA has been unable to pay salaries and running costs. This time, however, the PA lacked reserve political credit or alternative sources of legitimacy to maintain public support and relevance among Palestinians.  

Projections for the near future do not give much cause for comfort. As things stand, Palestinian-Israeli relations seem to be headed to more confrontations in the international arena – and more Israeli reactions on the ground. Additionally, there is a growing sense of donor fatigue, exacerbated by competing, more immediate regional priorities.  

A collapse of the PA would have dire consequences. It would be seen by the Palestinian public as the end of the beleaguered two-state solution and would likely spell the end of the Palestinian national secular camp. It is difficult for a leadership that lacks credibility among its public and whose national project has failed to reconstitute itself as a government in exile akin to the role played by the PLO in the past. For Israel, the resulting governance, security and political vacuum would create numerous immediate and long-term challenges. 

Now that the PA’s immediate financial crisis has receded, steps need to be taken to address the underlying causes of its fragility. Peace negotiations should only be resumed when the parties are ready and there is a reasonable chance of success lest another failure further erode the PA. Instead of grand diplomatic initiatives, international focus should be turned to finding concrete steps to start releasing the pressure building up among the Palestinians. Palestinians on the ground must start feeling tangible benefits from the PA’s ongoing relations with Israel and must see credible steps to reform the PA and begin the reconstruction of Gaza. Otherwise, we might soon find ourselves facing the prospect of the collapse of an even more brittle PA once again.

Al-Omari is a senior fellow with The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.