The US’s Abe problem

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has been called quite a few things: a militarist, a reactionary, and one of my personal favorites, “The Voldemort of Asia.” While he’s certainly earned a reputation as a pugnacious and polarizing figure, the U.S.’s partnership with Japan has remained remarkably resolute. As much as the U.S. fears China’s growing influence and needs Japan to be an anchor in the region, our unqualified support for the Abe administration ultimately risks our tenuous position in East Asia. The U.S. must begin treating its relationship with Japan with a measure of caution; otherwise, Abe’s aggressive foreign policy risks ensnaring the U.S. in a diplomatic fight that we cannot afford to lose.

Last March, it was announced that Abe would be visiting this nation’s Capitol and delivering a historic address to a joint session of Congress. Speculation has been mounting for weeks as politicos from across the globe try to divine the tone and tenor of the speech. Unlike Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s recent address to Congress (which was a naked attempt at rallying support on the eve of his election), Abe is not interested in scoring cheap political victories. Rather, he wants to consolidate power and project Japan’s supremacy to the rest of the world. And at a podium of the U.S. Capitol, he will have the opportunity to do just that.

{mosads}Normally, an address from a longtime international partner like Japan would not inspire the type of political consternation we see brewing here. However, Abe has built his political brand around a policy of nationalist provocation that should worry both enemies and allies. Much to the chagrin of Japan’s neighbors, Abe’s past remarks, like his address to the Australian Parliament last July, sought to fundamentally gloss over the violence of Japan’s imperial legacy. This is a common concern echoed by critics who worry he is “reinterpreting” Japan’s history for political gain.

Abe wants to revamp Japan’s military capabilities so it can exert greater influence around the globe. The problem is that Japan has an institutional reflex against these types of policies because the specter of its history still looms so large. Navigating this kind of cultural landscape can prove tricky for any leader pushing an agenda so inimical to the country’s historical consciousness. This has led Abe down a path of literally rewriting history as a way to change public opinion. 

For example, he has fought tirelessly to revise Japanese school textbooks so they strike a more “patriotic” tone. His “education reforms” have sought to scrub major controversies like the abuse of Korean “comfort women” from his nation’s collective memory. Abe’s reforms even attracted attention from the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights who recommended that Japan “write about the comfort women issue in history textbooks.”

Abe again faced charges of historical revisionism when he paid tribute to the notorious Yasukuni Shrine in 2013. This controversial site honors the memory of soldiers who participated in Japan’s brutal military campaign in China and South East Asia. To many outsiders, Abe’s visit was viewed as an attempt to normalize the horrors of Japan’s military history and silence criticism.

By softening wartime abuses and antagonizing foes, Abe has successfully ginned up support for his political vision. Recently, he removed post-war restrictions on arms exports and increased defense spending to historic levels. Even more alarming, he orchestrated the reinterpretation of Article 9 of Japan’s post-war Constitution, which expressly forbids belligerency. These are major victories for Japan’s right-wing, but they are a quagmire for the U.S., who will have to bear the burden of mediating Japan’s image. During a time when there is so much regional anxiety about Japan’s political outlook, the U.S.’s invitation to Abe looks like a ringing endorsement of unfettered militarism. This is not a standard we should be setting especially when we are trying to negotiate arms reductions around the world.  

From a foreign policy perspective, what makes Abe so frustrating is that he does not care that his nationalist agenda will close crucial diplomatic channels making future conflict all the more likely. After his stunt at the Yasukuni Shrine, China and South Korea blasted Abe for his disrespectful gesture and signaled how these spectacles of hyper-patriotism were breaking down relations. This dilemma is illustrated by a recent survey out of South Korea which found that even Kim Jong-un is perceived more favorably than Japan’s illustrious Prime Minister.

Despite the U.S.’s attempts to facilitate trade and security talks as an avenue for diplomatic relief, little progress has been made because of Abe’s readiness to undercut the U.S.’s efforts for peace. How much further do relations have to dissolve before the U.S. finally reins Japan in? So far, Japan has gained nothing from cornering China and South Korea; and at a time when so much is riding on Japan’s economic recovery, it is mind-boggling to think how precious political capital is being wasted. Instead of trying to recreate the mythology of a supreme Japanese empire, Abe needs to bring a more thoughtful political demeanor to the fore.

With no subtlety to his foreign policy and no mystique to a man whose raison d’être includes historical revisionism and nationalist aggression, Abe stands as a loose cannon uninterested in maintaining stability. Now is not the time to give him a loudspeaker and hope the world receives him well.

Watanabe is a freelance political writer, specializing in identity and electoral politics.