Conflict in Ukraine is a conflict of Ukrainians

While much of the analysis of the crisis in Ukraine is in terms of a confrontation between Russia and the West, this can obscure the fact that the conflict there does arise from a deep division among the Ukrainian people on the central question of whether they should move closer to the European Union or closer to Russia.

A recent survey reveals that there is not a majority position about what Ukraine should do. While more favor moving closer to the EU than favor moving closer to Russia, less than half – 47 percent – favor moving toward the EU. Just 13 percent favor moving closer to Russia. The rest do not want to move in either direction.

{mosads}More importantly, there are sharp regional divides. In the Western and Northern parts of the country large majorities do favor moving closer to the EU, but majorities in the South and especially the East are opposed, in some areas very strongly.

Clearly the move toward the EU on the part of the present government is provoking a strong reaction in the Eastern part of the country, a reaction that Russia has effectively exploited.

Fundamentally, problems arise from the fact that the cohesion of Ukraine is tenuous. In the Western part of the country, where most people speak Ukrainian, there is a strong historical and cultural affinity to Europe, while in the East and South, where most speak Russian, there is a stronger resonance with the culture to the East.

Still, the survey, conducted by the Program for Public Consultation, affiliated with the University of Maryland, and the Kiev International Institute for Sociology, finds that large majorities in all regions of the country, including the East, want to preserve the unity of Ukraine. Even in the rebel-held areas of the Donbass only 4 in 10 favor secession.

Further, while in the West and North majorities do want to move closer to the EU, there is not a majority in the East for moving closer to Russia. In the East only 26 percent favor being closer to Russia as do 20 percent in the South. Even in the rebel-held areas of the Donbass less than half (45 percent) favor stronger relations with Russia.

Putin is not popular: 79 percent disapprove of how he is dealing with the crisis, including 72 percent in the South and 53 percent in the East. Only in the rebel-held areas does a majority approve. Large majorities reject his claim that Russia has a right to intervene to protect Russian speakers—87 percent overall, 90 percent in the South and two-thirds in the East. Russian speakers themselves overwhelmingly reject this proposition.

So is there a potential for finding common ground between the different regions of Ukraine? The survey not only asked respondents what they prefer but also what they could tolerate. Overall, a large majority said they could tolerate moving toward the EU, but this idea is rejected by a large majority in the rebel-held areas, and is tolerated by only a bare majority in the East overall.

The approach that elicits the most consensus is for Ukraine to affirm a neutral position. While in no region does a majority embrace this idea, in no region or area does a majority reject it. The strongest resistance comes from the Western region, where 48 percent say they can tolerate it but 48 percent say they cannot. In the North 71 percent say they can tolerate it, as do 67 percent in the rebel-held areas. Overall 63 percent say they can tolerate a neutral position.

Given how far President Poroshenko has moved toward the EU, it may be difficult for him to backpedal at this point. However, he cannot ignore that fact that his political position is precarious. While he has lukewarm support in the West and North for how he is handling the current crisis, 61 percent disapprove in the East. One must remember that this is the country that elected Yanukovych, albeit by a narrow margin, and 72 percent in the East and 52 percent in the South still disapprove of the ending of his presidency. Poroshenko faces the challenge of mitigating any westward movement lest it continue to aggravate defiance in the East–most likely through granting the oblasts there greater autonomy.

It is in this context that Poroshenko has negotiated and renegotiated the Minsk agreement, which not only calls for a ceasefire, but for greater autonomy for the oblasts—an agreement that gets large majority support in all regions.

It is unclear that it will be feasible for Poroshenko to eventually undertake an aggressive push to wrest territory back from the hands of the Russian-supported rebels. Nationally only 48 percent support such an effort. While 64 percent favor it in the West and North, 68 percent are opposed in the East.

Many in the United States are now calling for the United States to provide weapons to the Kiev government, and a slight majority of Ukrainians (52 percent) are favorable. But here again, while a large majority favors the idea in the West and North (79 percent), a large majority is opposed in the East (62 percent).

The idea of balancing Russian military support to the rebels is attractive in a broader great-power context, and it is easy to think of the defiance from the East arising simply from Russian intervention. However, much of the defiance is in fact homegrown. Coming in on one side of the conflict has the potential for destabilizing the tenuous and leaky ceasefire, if it emboldens the Poroshenko government to try to use military force rather than diplomacy to resolve the current conflict. The survey suggests that people in the rebel-held areas, much less the rebels themselves, would not likely advocate accommodation to the Kiev government under these circumstances.

Clearly the United States should not forgo the option of providing military support to the Kiev government. But it should also evaluate the situation with a clear-eyed understanding that, Russian chicanery notwithstanding, it would be entering into a conflict internal to the Ukrainian people.  

The full report of the survey results can be found here. 

The survey’s questionnaire can be found here. 

Kull is director of the Program for Public Consultation, from the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland.