Iran nuclear agreement meets the Reagan verification standard

In April, Congress demanded the opportunity to review and if warranted disapprove the P-5+1 nuclear agreement with Iran.  Regrettably, many in Congress have engaged in political posturing and bombast to express their opposition to the agreement, including Sen. Lindsey Graham’s (R-S.C.) threat to block U.S. funding for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

 “Trust, but verify” is President Reagan’s much cited dictum for the credibility of an international arms-related agreement. The lack of trust on all sides makes the verification elements of the Iran nuclear agreement particularly important.   

{mosads}A group of 30 U.S. nuclear experts, including some who designed the global nonproliferation architecture, recently endorsed the Iran nuclear agreement’s verification modalities as a “vitally important step forward.” Our own experience working on nonproliferation issues, including a decade on Iran, as diplomats and senior officials, at State and the Intelligence Community, leads us also to conclude the Iran nuclear agreement allows effective verification, even without trust.  

Opponents to the agreement, to the extent they refer at all to the agreement’s specifics, ignore the interconnectivity of the verification measures, and the fact that the agreement involves reinforcing layers of verification.   

The first layer is the IAEA, which has the expertise, experience and access to monitor Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle from beginning to end. If refined materials go missing at any point, the IAEA will know it.  

The terms of the agreement strengthen the IAEA’s hand in Iran. The IAEA will conduct inspections using the authorities of the Additional Protocol, allowing it to investigate any activities or sites to verify Iran is meeting its nuclear commitments.  The agreement creates for the first time a deadline for Iran to permit the IAEA to visit any site, including military sites, about which it has questions.   Critics claim this deadline of up to 24 days would allow Iran time to hide its illicit activities, but no activity using nuclear material could be cleaned up in such a short time (it would take months or years) and efforts to make changes at a questionable site would very likely be detectable. 

The second verification layer is in the provisions of the agreement. For example, Iran successfully evaded past nuclear sanctions through covert procurement, so the agreement establishes a Procurement Working Group to monitor Iran’s purchases of material and equipment for its nuclear program during the first ten years of the agreement, providing information of value well into the future.    

The agreement’s provisions also strengthen the hand of U.S. and allied intelligence agencies, which form the third layer of verification. The agreement’s baselines for activities, material and equipment will help intelligence collection and analysis. Additionally, the agreement’s various transparency elements will yield intelligence benefits well beyond the life of the agreement. 

The verification elements of the Iran nuclear agreement are synergistic. The IAEA will have new inspection tools and authorities; the international community will have new access and insights; and intelligence agencies will have enhanced opportunities to learn about Iran’s nuclear program.  

Meeting the Reagan verification standard requires funding. The administration and the Congress, therefore, must enhance U.S. support for the IAEA’s budget and safeguards inspections program.   Graham’s threat to block funding for the IAEA would undermine efforts to constrain Iran’s nuclear program and longstanding U.S. global nonproliferation goals. If Graham is concerned about Iran’s activities, the proper course is to increase funding for the IAEA, not block it.  Additionally, the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Iran teams will need robust funding to monitor Iran’s implementation of the agreement and identify promptly any illicit Iranian activities.   

We expect Iranian hardliners will try to cheat on the obligations to which Iran has agreed.  But the verification elements in and around the Iran nuclear agreement make it likely any Iranian effort to divert material, equipment or people to a clandestine nuclear effort will be detected, for the life of the agreement and beyond, giving the U.S. and its international partners time to respond. Without the agreement, there is no effective throttle on Iran’s nuclear programs.  Accordingly, we urge Congressional support of the Iran nuclear agreement.

Brill was U.S. ambassador to the IAEA (2001-04) and founding director of the U.S. National Counterproliferation Center (2005-09); Wolf was assistant secretary of State for Nonproliferation 2001-04.