US, Israel and the nuclear deal

Any Democrat in Congress remaining unsure whether to cast their vote for, or against, the nuclear deal with Iran will not be convinced by the numbers of letters signed by a galaxy of military insignia.  Nor will even the most adept physicists, chemists and other scientists assist them.  Nor can the most sainted theologian.  No.  The fact that a vast majority of Congress will reject the Iran nuclear deal next week means that those who support it will isolate themselves from Israel.  The names, ranks and scientific laureates they will cite to support their vote in favor of the deal will be of no protection.  The tools these Democrats will use to soothe rough feelings include arms sales and other security assistance, but no amount of either can reverse their decision to back a deal that is clearly so wrong.

The very heart of this nuclear deal with Iran is not finally about Iran, but rather the future of the U.S.-Israeli relationship.  The best politicians are masters of assessing human behavior and its changes.  To date, not much human behavior has changed, despite what Iran deal supporters call a historic nuclear deal with it.  A necessarily unctuous and tough Israeli prime minister has tried to put President Obama in a corner.  Obama returned the favor with an Iran deal Netanyahu hates.  The battle between the two democratically elected titans has forever changed the way both nations will deal with one another, and not for the better.  It is a fact that the current nuclear deal with Iran has created more immediate and lasting anger between Israel and America than between Iran and Obama. 

{mosads}The Obama-Netanyahu divide will outlast them both.  The terrible problem is that Netanyahu is right and the deal Obama embraces now is not the best; it in fact approaches territory reserved for the worst.  Every aspect of Iran’s nuclear program will grow with time under the deal.  And each kilogram or additional centrifuge added over the years will not be judged only in terms of its worth to Iran, but its place in the never-ending U.S.-Israeli split.  The nuclear deal is certainly not disarmament since Iran has to dismantle nothing, including its ballistic and cruise missiles.  It is not arms control since its limits are at best temporary and unverifiable; even permitting upward growth of fissile material stockpiles in the least secure place for them on earth, the Islamic Republic of Iran.  And it is by no means nonproliferation since Iran keeps all of its nuclear facilities intact and will certainly, over the duration of the deal, become more, not less, nuclear-capable.  It is buffoonery to say this deal is like those negotiated between the Soviets and the Americans—frankly speaking, if it were, why was Israel not invited to negotiate?

The question of whether or not sanctions are “fraying” is also a familiar issue from Iraq in 2002.  The Obama administration claims they are faltering primarily because they see Russian and Chinese deals proceeding.  Japanese oil deals, however, did not become more public until well after Secretary of State John Kerry made the dismemberment of the sanctions regime he once praised Congress for creating (after he first opposed them) his most ardent mission.  One of the interesting insights of the now-forgotten Duelfer Report on Iraq was its finding that sanctions on Iraq had been circumvented.  Those particular sanctions endured longer than those John Kerry now pronounces near death.  France was among the chief Iraq sanctions violators of the last decade of the 20^th century.  A U.S. ally, France is now known to have serious doubts about the present nuclear deal with Iran.  As well, rather than seeing Iranian nuclear underlings falsifying nuclear capabilities to please superiors, as was the case in Saddam’s Iraq, instead, we see progress at Natanz, Parchin and other places with commercial imagery.  If both sanctions and Iranian nuclear capability were fraying, it would be a good thing.  Sadly, the deal will ensure an end to sanctions and the strengthening of Tehran’s nuclear program.

In sum, this Iran nuclear deal risks the U.S.-Israeli relationship by creating more than the impression that the United States intends to back it over any Israeli objection.  Unlike the Iraq war of the last decade, it thus creates a force for independent risk taking in the Middle East.  Israel certainly has the means to preempt an Iranian nuclear weapon.  Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states are now turning to Russia for weapons that could assist in such a war, too.  In this way, we may well find ourselves, again, across the table from Russia, but this time, negotiating for future American access and influence in the Persian Gulf, and without our historic Arab and Israeli allies.  Charles Evans Hughes declared that “The way to disarm, is to disarm.”  In this century, it appears the way to disarm is to dismantle—nothing.   

Moore is an independent consultant.  For over a decade he worked as senior Republican staff member at the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.