Iran nuclear agreement: Diplomatic alternative to war or diplomatic road to war

There is a Persian proverb saying that “not everything that is round is a walnut,” which might be an apt aphorism for the JCPOA.  Some diplomatic agreements are alternatives to war.  But not every “diplomatic agreement” for a conflict is a “diplomatic solution” to the conflict, as the 1938 Munich agreement between the U.K. and France with Nazi Germany and fascist Italy well demonstrated.

The Obama administration has asserted that the JCPOA is the only alternative to war.  But is it?  The next few years will show whether the Obama narrative is true or a deadly mirage.

{mosads}Before the world crosses that Rubicon, we should do the following: (1) analyze the reasons the regime reached the agreement; (2) watch for forebodings and warning signs that the regime’s nuclear program has remained a weapons program; and (3) have the foresight and political courage (like FDR and Churchill) to foresee the evolving threats, prepare for the eventuality, and develop the ability to stiffen the spin of the weak ones around. 

Serious and honest observers of Iran know that the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program has been a weapons program, despite the denials and lies by Ayatollah Khamenei and his officials.  But nuclear weapons are means to ends.  We should ask what are: the regime’s grand strategy, the foreign policy goals, the place of nuclear weapon in realizing those objectives, the price the regime has paid for the acquisition of those weapons, and the reasons that it entered negotiations on its nuclear program.  The Shia fundamentalist regime is a revisionist state that wants to export its revolution to other countries in the region, undermine the international system, and create a bloc of countries under its domination in opposition to the West.  Nuclear weapons are absolutely essential in achieving these objectives. 

It is believed that since 1986, the regime has spent at least $100 billion on its program and has lost more than $100 billion in opportunity costs.  The reason that the regime entered the negotiations was to remove the sanctions that by early 2013 was threatening the collapse of the economy and the survival of the regime.  Due to the 2009-2010 massive protests, the regime was suffering from serious internal divisions and had lost credibility and legitimacy even among large segments of its base.  Khamenei did not authorize negotiations with the objective of reorienting Iran’s foreign policy goals: the sole objective was to remove or at least reduce the sanctions while maintaining Iran’s nuclear capabilities.  Khamenei does not want the nuclear capability to produce electricity, he wants it to produce atom bomb.  Therefore, if the analysis here is correct, the mandate of Iran’s negotiating team was to deceive the U.S. and its P5+1 partners.  Clearly, the JCPOA does not dismantle Iran’s nuclear infrastructure and the latent capability to produce highly enriched uranium for nuclear bomb.  It merely limits the program and with the confidential IAEA-Iran side deals hopes that it can detect sneak out by Iran.  The question for Khamenei is whether the agreements provide enough tools for the U.S. and the IAEA to detect Iran’s possible dash to clandestinely produce atom bombs.  If Khamenei gave his final approval to the deal, it would be safe to assume that he and his inner circle believe that they can clandestinely produce atom bombs despite the deals. 

Obama and Secretary Kerry have stated that the initial objectives — zero enrichment, only few hundred centrifuges, no research and development on advanced centrifuges, closure of Fordow, any time any place inspections, full disclosure of previous work on nuclear weapons, access to nuclear scientists and others who had worked on the nuclear weapon program — were not achieved because “they were not realistic.”  In other words, Khamenei said no, and the U.S. had to appease the Ayatollah if there was to be any agreement.

Iran’s nuclear program has no economic rationale and justification.  What is significant is that many in the ruling oligarchy are arguing that it would be better to not accept the JCPOA, and to continue the program, bear the costs, and live with the possible military confrontation.  And as of today, Khamenei has not made a public statement supporting or opposing the agreement.  If the regime had made a strategic decision to abandon the pursuit of atom bomb, it would have been an easy decision to say yes to the deal.  The debate among the oligarchy indicates that many in the regime are not even satisfied with the 12-month threshold state that the JCPOA would provide (if Iran did not cheat) in exchange for the release of about $100 billion of frozen assets, removal of sanctions, and lucrative trade deals.     

The Congressional efforts to stop the JCPOA may have failed.  But the struggle to prevent the Shia fundamentalist regime from acquiring the atom bomb continues.  At this historical juncture, the world badly needs statesmen/women of the stature and wisdom of FDR.  Lets hope one emerges soon enough.

Kazemzadeh is associate professor of Political Science at Sam Houston State University.