Much ado about not much

Over the weekend, the kind of peculiar kerfuffle that can only happen inside-the-beltway erupted about a profile written by David Samuels on Ben Rhodes, President Obama’s Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications.

Much of the furor has centered on Rhodes’ dismissive attitude to the foreign policy establishment and less-than-kind term for its adherents. But, the most frustrating and misleading line of critique has centered on the apparent subplot of the profile: Rhodes’ role in securing a sufficient base of support for the Iran nuclear deal in Congress to prevent its rejection.

{mosads}To hear critics tell it, Rhodes’ wholesale manipulation of a naïve press corps, seduction of existing nuclear nonproliferation experts, and manufacture of new such experts prevented the nuclear deal from meeting its deserved date with destiny.

To quote Joe Cirincione, one of the experts dismissed by Samuels (who we have since learned is himself an opponent of the Iran deal), “This is utter nonsense.”

For starters, the implication that the folks at Ploughshares Fund or the Iran Project would support the Iran deal simply because “Ben told them too” is insulting in the extreme. These two groups have supported a nuclear deal with Iran for years and came to their own conclusions about the merits of the deal by themselves.  

For my own part, I joined the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration in 2003 — as a non-political civil servant — for the Bush Administration. My own support for the deal stemmed from my direct participation in its negotiation and in the efforts over the preceding 12 years to arrest Iran’s march toward nuclear weapons.  

I think the deal is a good one. I personally testified to this effect to three Congressional committees and, I might add, probably rendered myself unconfirmable for any future position in the U.S. government, judging how Adam Szubin’s deserved nomination for Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence has been blocked. I took on this responsibility and risk because I believed in the Iran nuclear deal and thought it merited positive consideration by the U.S. Congress.  

Many people on my side of the Iran issue have spent their careers in furtherance of nonproliferation via international negotiations, and they would have supported the Iran nuclear agreement regardless of who was President and especially who was in his NSC staff. Why? Because, as many of us said, the technical aspects of the deal will likely prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon for at least 10-15 years and ensure that we have clear visibility into the Iranian nuclear program during that time. And, for those of us interested in the Iranian domestic situation, it’s because we saw a moment in time in which Iran’s political system could accept and implement a deal, albeit under rigorous monitoring and verification. 

I respect those who disagree with this line of thought. But, I have never suggested that their positions are the result of someone pulling the strings. Critics crowing now should do the rest of us the courtesy of the same respect.

That said, if that’s the tenor of our debate, let’s talk about it. The very idea that passing along talking points in defense of the Iran deal is a problem smacks of truly absurd, outrageous, and unmistakable hypocrisy. To be blunt: I have read along with U.S. Senators asking questions about the deal from lists provided by certain U.S. lobbying organizations to ensure that critics of the Iran negotiations spoke with one voice. I have seen statements written by some of the very critics of Ben today, but issued under the names of U.S. politicians. Some of these very individuals continue to advise members of Congress today on the content of legislation, steering them in their creation of arguments and lines of attack.  

All of this is part of the political maneuvering of ALL sides of the Iran debate and it has been happening as long as I can remember.  

And, I see nothing wrong with it. It is not manipulating the American people for the White House to pass along to experts its view of issues. No one was forced to use what was provided and, in fact, at least one skeptic of the Iran agreement was invited to participate in some of the very conversations now seen as insidious even after it became clear that they would be skeptical of the deal.  

Persuading experts of the merit of your position, particularly in something as sensitive and important of the Iran deal, is no deception or underhanded deceit: it is responsible, prudent governance. For that matter, it’s the heart of a vibrant, informed democracy.

Now, some have argued the real problem is the exaggeration that went along with this debate. But, that was hardly one-sided. True, some critics of the Iran deal – like some advocates – caveated their positions. But, all too often there was a tendency across the board to amp up the rhetoric to take a position of higher moral rectitude. Anyone suggesting a “deal or war” dichotomy was below the belt should recall phrases like “paving Iran’s way” to a nuclear bomb and the accusation that the deal was the equivalent of launching a new Holocaust. The debate was fractious and it was vicious. I too wish it had been more factual and sober. 

But, was the White House strategy founded on duplicity? Hardly.

Richard Nephew is the former Deputy Coordinator for Sanctions Policy at the State Department and currently Director of the Economic Statecraft, Sanctions, and Energy Markets program at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy.