Iran: Denying the undeniable

Recall that the enrichment facility at Natanz and the heavy water facility at Arak only came to light after being exposed by an opposition group in 2002. Since 2006, Iran’s non-compliance with the international community has resulted in three UN Security Council resolutions, each widening the sanctions against Tehran. In August of this year, the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency stated that “there remain a number of outstanding issues which give rise to concerns, and which need to be clarified to exclude the existence of possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear program.”

There is scant reason to believe that Iran’s leaders will change their behavior. Their conviction that Iran is going to exercise its “right” to master the nuclear fuel cycle remains unshakable, as international negotiators will likely discover first-hand when they arrive in Geneva on Thursday for direct talks.

That doesn’t mean that engagement is doomed. But it does significantly narrow the scope of what is achievable. In particular, it is hard to envision the Iranians agreeing to the kind of robust, intrusive monitoring regime that would allay US, Israeli, Arab and European fears about Tehran’s true intentions.

Indeed, asking the difficult questions on everybody’s mind (like, “what else are you hiding?”) could propel Iran into an even more bellicose stance. Already, one influential Iranian hardliner has warned that Iran could withdraw from its Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations if it is unhappy with the way the talks proceed.

In such a context, it’s hardly surprising that the prospect of military action is a key factor in the current public debate. All options remain on the table, as the Obama Administration has repeatedly made clear. But the road from failed talks to a pre-emptive strike is not as direct as some might think. 

The sanctions against Iran can still be toughened up, to the point where they are, in the phrase of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, “crippling.” Target areas include arms sales, banking and insurance services and – most importantly, given that Iran has virtually no refining capacity – exports of refined petroleum.

Getting Russia and China on board is a daunting task. Policing the porous borders in the region will be no less of a challenge. The price of years of inaction is that every option now available courts both great risk and the possibility of failure.

For that reason, forging a genuine international consensus is essential. One might even say that the negotiations that really count at this stage are not those involving Iran, but those between the US and its allies and partners.