Understanding the nature of ISIS is the hinge of our ISIS strategy

ISIS started as a nucleus of two issues. First, the insurgency in Syria had left a vacuum that no West-friendly force was filling, becoming an open invitation for Sunni jihadis to take a punch at the Assad regime – similar to the adventurism of fighting in Afghanistan during Soviet occupation.  

At the same time, the Shia-led government of Iraq disenfranchised large numbers of military-trained Sunni officers, doubling down on the insult of the American-led policy of de-Baathification, which kicked many of them out of military and government careers after Saddam fell.

{mosads}The confluence of these actions allowed al-Qa’eda’s former ‘man in Baghdad’ to spin off from the organization and create his own jihad, quickly surpassing the diminished attention al-Qa’eda was getting in the post-Bin Ladin era under the far less charismatic Ayman al-Zawahiri.

The truth is that with numerous conflicts and movements around the globe, ISIS likely would have been ignored but for the fact that it started taking territory. Confronted with this new threat, the Iraqi Army was ill-prepared to respond and quickly dropped its weapons after early confrontations with ISIS forces. ISIS continued to gain momentum by seizing large caches of US weapons and banks full of cash.

And while the capture, ransom, and beheadings of Westerners has gotten the lion’s share of the media attention here in the United States, ISIS was conducting mass executions of Muslims who did not join them and ransoming European and other hostages long before the first Westerner was brutally executed.

Western analysts are now struggling to determine why and to what end the enormity of this violence has occurred and this week, the White House is convening a conference to look at methods of countering violent extremism (CVE) – the nomenclature of this struggle. Just as we saw experts in counterinsurgency (COIN) weighing in during the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, we will soon see CVE experts opining on every new action by ISIS.

Those experts should understand that there is a big difference between strategic and tactical planning. We always hope that tactical plans are proactive and designed to achieve strategic objectives, but far too often they are reactionary. This puts our senior-most policymakers on the adversary’s turf, giving opponents the ability to define the battlefield and the actions to which we must respond. Thus, our CVE experts need to understand the enemy well enough to anticipate where they are going next and why.

For example, even a question as simple as what is the fundamental nature of ISIS is not nearly as simple to answer. Depending on your outlook, ISIS could be either an ideological movement seeking to establish a geographic zone where its ideology is the only game in town, an ethno-religious movement seeking to establish a hegemonic Muslim theocracy similar to the caliphate that once stretched all the way into Spain, or a criminal enterprise that simply enjoys killing and ransoming under the guise of being religious.

Each of these answers brings with it a very different set of strategic and tactical solutions.

If ISIS is pursuing a reconstitution of the caliphate, history tells us they will target Jordan, Spain, and Turkey as soon as they consolidate sufficient power. This puts the highest burden of governance on them, as the killing and seizure of territory must then be replaced with a viable state. ISIS is killing Sunni Muslims who refuse to join their cause, Shia Muslims whenever they encounter them, and going out of their way to kill Christians in Iraq and Libya. This suggests this religious motive.

If ISIS is ideological, it will expand wherever there are populations that buy in to what it is selling. While some are being radicalized in places like London, British populations have no direct contact with ISIS making Internet-based radicalization something to watch.

If it is a criminal enterprise, it will attract those who seek violence for its own purpose – regardless of the veneer – as we have seen in many conflicts in Africa. As one potential upside, this format has the highest potential to collapse upon itself when it runs out of people to kill and the wannabe bad guys figure out they now need to govern if they want to eat.

As the White House struggles over such fundamental questions as “Is this Muslim radicalization or just extremism?” and “Should we call this ISIS or ISIL?” we are watching the enemy conduct barbaric actions against our fellow humans. We are seeing those who are self-affiliated with the movement pop up in non-contiguous locations in Europe and elsewhere.

If we do not acknowledge that fully understanding the nature of the enemy is the hinge on which our strategy must move, history has shown that the failure to do so can cause major damage as you try to defeat your adversaries.

Lebson served at the Pentagon from 2007-2009, the National Security Council from 2009-2011, and was the chief architect of Australia’s Strategic Risk Assessment from 2011-2013. He is currently a senior vice president with LEVICK and can be reached at elebson@levick.com.