The myth of the lobbyist-staffers

Viewed in this light, the 130 to 150 former lobbyists in top policy-making positions on the Hill are not excessive, considering that there are 535 congressional offices, and roughly 1,070 chief of staff and legislative director positions in total. In fact, we should be concerned about the other 900 or so senior staffers. Ideally, even if they were not registered lobbyists, we should hope that they at least worked for a “special interest” in some capacity. This leads me to my second and related point. 

Many, if not most, of the supposed “public interest” groups are not disinterested. They generally advocate for more government regulation in the name of promoting the general welfare. While regulation is not necessarily a zero-sum game, when the government acts in one direction, it will generally cause a reaction in an opposite direction. Cleaner air and water may benefit public health, but they come at the cost of raising prices for consumers. Tighter financial restrictions may prevent “predatory” lending, but they raise the cost of credit for borrowers. Stricter controls over drug research and marketing may improve patient safety, but they impair innovation and access to experimental medications.

The way to balance these competing interests, as the Founding Fathers determined, was to set them in competition with one another through a form of republican representative government with checks and balances within the legislative branch; between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches; and between the federal and state governments. And, indeed, we see this competition of interests between some of the congressional offices, staffed by former industry and corporate lobbyists, and the Obama administration, where many of the top regulatory officials have never worked in the private sector. 

Take, for example, the current heads of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Food and Drug Administration, the Consumer Product Safety Commission, the Department of Health and Human Services, and the Department of the Treasury. The common thread here is that each of these officials’ administration service was preceded by at least 20 years of almost contiguous government service, during which they never ran a business, struggled to make payroll, or competed in the marketplace. While this does not belittle their qualifications and accomplishments, it should serve as a reminder that the “public interest” does not consist of government service alone. 

Even if we could, in theory, all agree on a common “public interest,” what sort of government could implement it? Certainly not the current system we have, which can’t even seem to agree to keep the government operating. According to Plato, we could all consent to be governed by a council of all-knowing, benevolent philosopher kings. But in reality, history has taught us that this ideal tends towards autocratic rule with its own unique brand of cronyism. Viewed in this light, having a bunch of sleazy former lobbyists duke it out in their legislative offices might not be so bad.  

Eric Wang, a political law attorney, has advised clients on all aspects of government ethics laws. He can be reached at ericwang@alumni.princeton.edu.