I recently talked to a group of Hill staffers on the question, “Is Congress Too Conflictual?” Co-sponsored by the R St. Institute and New America under the rubric, Legislative Branch Working Group, #Make Congress Great Again. The gathering is one of a series of monthly forums on problems confronting Congress.
As I explained to the group, the title of the talk was perfect for my purposes because I wanted to make a case on both sides of the question: “Yes,” Congress is too conflictual on matters it should not be so conflicted about; and “No,” it is not conflicted enough over matters on which it should be drawing sharp lines of distinction and fighting for.
I drew on Madison’s Federalist No. 10 as the text for my talk – his famous essay on the dangers of factions. Writing in February 1788, Madison observes that, “Complaints are everywhere heard from our most considerate and virtuous citizens…that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and that measures are too often decided on the superior force of an interested majority, not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party.” Apparently, even then state legislatures were looked to as the laboratories of democracy –for better and worse.
That captures precisely the point I wanted to make, and that is that Congress it too caught up today in the rivalries between the two parties over the next election and control of Congress, and not combative enough over the ways in which they intend to promote the public good, which Madison ties closely to the “rules of justice” and “rights of the minor party.” Both are central to the serious deliberation needed to determine what is in the national interest.
In my two books I refer to how Congress has evolved from a culture of legislating to a culture of campaigning, leaving us with what I call the “perpetual campaign” that dominates the proceedings of Congress. Our vision of long-range planning for the future of our country tends to stop today at the horizon of the next election. Both parties, regardless of which is in the majority, resort to the same games and procedural shortcuts as their predecessors to produce instantaneous results that advantage the majority party and disadvantage the minority. Yes, that’s called majority rule, in the basest sense of the term; but it ignores minority rights which we were taught in eighth grade civics is a vital appendage in successfully navigating the democratic shoals of governing.
In my talk I cited political scientist Frances Lee’s excellent book, “Beyond Ideology: Politics, Principles and Partisanship in the U.S. Senate” (2009), which I think applies equally well to the House of Representatives. She shows how the conflict in Congress is not all ideological –conservative-liberal, right-left, as many political scientists and journalists would like to portray it. A very substantial number of roll call votes (upwards of 45 percent) are non-ideological and go instead to matters of procedure and agenda setting, ethics scandals, and reactions to presidential initiatives and failings. That is not to lessen the importance of such matters to the two parties in their bids for electoral success and chamber control, but rather to put the conflicts we observe into a more realistic perspective.
My point about these additional factors is that they are all legitimate avenues of pursuit by the parties in Congress, but that Congress does not necessarily prioritize them in terms of what I call institutional maintenance. What beyond immediate party concerns and gains should Congress being paying more attention to? Certainly the ideological differences on the legitimate role and scope of government should be the major focus in debating what legislative alternatives will best address our problems. But, what about fighting for the basic prerogatives of Congress under the Constitution – such things as the power of the purse, the war power, trade agreements and so on? A good case has been made that in the last several decades Congress has abdicated so many of its Article I powers to the executive. Taking them back should be a major source of conflict in Congress, not so much between the parties as between the branches.
I commented to my co-panelist before the meeting began that 50 years ago I could count over two dozen “institutionalists” in the House alone, without thinking or blinking. Today I am hard-put to count on one hand those members who think Congress is worth fighting for as an institution. The more important fights to most members are at the polls, at the next election. My reading of history is that Congress’s institutional strengths ebb and flow in cycles over time. Therefore, Congress should come back. I am just waiting for more than a spin cycle.
Don Wolfensberger is a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center and the Bipartisan Policy Center, former staff director of the House Rules Committee, and author of “Changing Cultures in Congress: From Fair Play to Power Plays.” The views expressed are solely his own.