What are the real threats posed by small drones?
Henny Penny, a wolf, and a politician walk into a bar to talk about the threats posed by small drones. “The sky is falling!” “There will be a sheep insurgency!” “Ban all drones!”
Admittedly, the number of ‘drone incidents’ from small, commercial drones is increasing. And with that the amount of sensationalized information increases as well, resulting in knee jerk reactions from policy makers. The recent drone buzz has fostered relatively little informed discussion on what are the actual risk and threats posed by small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) to critical infrastructure, civil aviation, and public safety. In turn, there has been relatively little informed discussion on where public safety and law enforcement should focus their limited resources. For example, flying small UAS in an open field should not be seen as an equal threat to flying small UAS into a crowded stadium with an improvised explosive device, or near an airport where drones can find their way – deliberately or accidentally — into the intake of a passenger or cargo plane.
{mosads}And, there are risks – both threats and vulnerabilities – associated with semi-autonomous or autonomous aerial vehicles – whatever their size or number. Traffic, debris, and collateral damage are real considerations. While long-anticipated definitive legal guidance on the commercial use of UAS is still being pursued by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA); the creation of an FAA Center of Excellence (CoE) to investigate these issues could be seen as ensuring that the U.S. continues to foster innovation, remains competitive, and achieves commercial success.
To date, the private sector and academic response in the U.S. has been overwhelmingly positive to the idea of some form of informed and rational policy. Whatever the reason for industry’s participation, it is in its interest and the public’s for them to continue to keep their feet firmly on the ground when considering how to best mitigate risk. The threat of a UAS being used for a dangerous activity must always be weighed against the benefit of a UAS being used for good. We must be clear that no countermeasure is without costs, and any cost must be weighed against the benefit it produces, or inhibits. All too often there have been knee-jerk responses to perceived threats that have resulted in failed systems, cavalier spending, and loss of public confidence.
Once a strategy is put in place and tactics have been identified that both reduce the threat and the collateral damage associated with using countermeasures, policies can be rolled out. In this case, might it not prove better to wait for risk informed, defensible decision making than to err on the side of acting or reacting? Should we not wait, we risk making the same mistakes we did for Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) and smallpox vaccination.
Concern for the illicit use of MANPADS against U.S. passenger aircraft in U.S. airspace by terrorists prompted public safety decision makers to seek millions of dollars to identify capable countermeasures. While MANPADS are certainly a threat to commercial aircraft, so are asteroids and birds. If public safety is really the concern, then based on reasonable analysis and threat assessment, we should ask, is it logical and reasonable to have spent millions of dollars on MANPADS protection in U.S. airspace when a quantifiable threat to public safety exists from being decades behind in upgrading our air traffic control infrastructure? Since hindsight is twenty-twenty, strategic planning and policies for UAS should aim for risk-informed decision making processes.
Following the 2003 use of anthrax as a weapon of mass disruption, fears over the possible use of the now eradicated scourge, smallpox, as a weapon reverberated in the halls of Congress and in the media. At one point it was determined that nearly 500,000 health care workers needed to be vaccinated to provide a “reasonable” level of protection. However, when it was discovered that only 10 percent of this number were willing to be vaccinated, this number was revised downwards to 50,000. Did this course correction occur as a consequence of revisiting the original threat assessment and deeming it incorrect or was this C.Y.A. policy making?
Tougher legislation or regulation might be useful, and prosecuting offenders will be necessary. However, this may only serve to redress the irreverent, inebriated, or negligent. What it doesn’t address, are the tools available to deter, interdict, reroute, or mitigate the risk from a deliberate user who is not deterred or concerned about punitive or other punishments. Deliberate criminal intent is not unique to UAS use nor is recklessness. Permissible legal or policy tools aside, the major challenge facing law enforcement and public safety when it comes to managing the commercial UAS threat is defining what the threat actually is.
Hersh is a risk analyst and consultant and a fellow of the Truman National Security Project. Hopmeier is president of Unconventional Concepts, Inc., an engineering and policy consulting firm specializing in national security issues. He is also a consultant and senior adviser to numerous government agencies and organizations and an international expert in crisis response and communications. Views expressed are their own.
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