What two GOP senators get right and dangerously wrong about Afghanistan

Like many Americans, I listen closely when Sens. John McCain (R-Ariz.) and Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) speak about Afghanistan and national security issues. I deeply respect the service and sacrifices of both men and greatly appreciate their longstanding support for our veterans, courageous stand against torture, and sensible approach to national security issues.

The senators wrote recently in the Washington Post that the Afghan conflict was in a stalemate and risked sliding into strategic failure – an outcome damaging to American interests. As someone engaged closely with Afghanistan for the past 10 years, I could not agree more.

{mosads}The senators argue that more advisors and greater use of American firepower can “break the stalemate” and presumably enable the Afghan security forces to defeat the Taliban, al Qaeda, and other threats. This is certainly the most desirable outcome, but is it realistic?

At the height of the surge, international forces topped 140,000 troops. Afghan forces grew past 300,000. Airpower was used more effectively after 2009 and with fewer civilian casualties. Capacity-building programs occurred on industrial scale at over $16bn in 2010 alone. These efforts could not force the Taliban to capitulate.

There is little doubt that the Obama withdrawal timeline undermined the surge’s potential. The Taliban knew they could play for time. “In a contest of wills,” General David Petraeus told me recently, “that matters.”

There were bigger problems, too. The Taliban are an insurgency that aims to replace or change the current Afghan government. They have sanctuary in neighboring Pakistan and ample local recruits in Afghanistan. Roughly 80 percent of Taliban battlefield detainees are seized operating within 10 miles of their home village. As of November 2016, they control or contest 43 percent  of the country – up from 29 percent a year earlier.

These distinctions matter. According to RAND studies (here and here), an insurgency that has durable internal support and external sanctuary has not lost a single time since at least World War II. When they have been unable to replace the existing government, they have gotten the better end of a negotiated settlement.

The Taliban have strong differences and frictions with al Qaeda, as documents seized in the bin Laden raid clearly suggest. The Taliban did not invite bin Laden to Afghanistan in 1996 – that merit belongs to then-Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani and (current U.S.-backed warlord) Abdul Rasoul Sayyaf. The Taliban allowed al Qaeda to remain, benefitted financially, and then paid a deservedly terrible price since 9/11.

The Afghan government, meanwhile, evolved under Karzai into a predatory kleptocracy. Many government officials, to include army and police leaders, pay vast sums of money for their positions. A police chief from a lucrative province can go for $1 million or more. These are not patriotic donations to government coffers. They are a license to plunder. For too many generals, governors, and police chiefs, winning the war takes a back-seat.

Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, a committed reformer and co-author of the book Fixing Failed States, has made little progress. His government is divided against itself. Warlords have too much financial stake in the status quo. They have destroyed their country to loot it.

The RAND studies show that a government incapable of winning the battle of legitimacy in contested and insurgent-controlled areas has not won a single time since World War Two. In no case has foreign support overcome this problem.

To believe that 3,000 more advisors and more airstrikes will change these dynamics invites catastrophe. At some point, Congress will tire of bankrolling a kleptocratic government fighting a never-ending war. The resulting collapse will invite terrorist safe-haven.

What to do instead? As discussed in my report Focused Engagement, the United States needs a more effective strategy. Increased military support should be a small part of a broader effort focused on 3 objectives:

1. Stabilize the battlefield by improving U.S.-Afghan strategic alignment, enforcing conditionality for political and security sector reform, and supporting an enduring commitment;

2. Promote Afghan sovereignty and reduce destabilizing regional competition by backing an Afghan commitment to regional neutrality in return for credible commitments to non-interference; penalize states that enable the Taliban and other militants;

3. Advance a peace process to bring the war to a successful conclusion that protects U.S. interests and respects the service and sacrifices of the American and Afghan people;

To implement this strategy, the Trump administration needs to reverse the growth of White House micromanagement. President Trump should decentralize authority to a single U.S. civil-military command that would manage the full range of American efforts in Afghanistan, but retain NSC-level oversight.

This approach is not a panacea, but stands far greater chance of gaining a favorable and durable outcome that protects America and our allies.

Christopher D. Kolenda, a veteran of four combat tours in Afghanistan, is a senior fellow at the Center for Global Policy and adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security.

The views expressed by contributors are their own and are not the views of The Hill.