Rex Tillerson can raise State’s profile by starting with China

President Trump has proposed a budget that makes deep cuts to the State Department, and to one of its more expensive functions, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Although the cuts to the State Department have raised eyebrows, given the hard-edged opposition to the Trump presidency from State Department officials, expressed through leaks to the media, it is not surprising that Trump is lacking in enthusiasm for funding the department.

In addition, Secretary Rex Tillerson’s business background inclines him to look at most government spending skeptically, and to look for places to cut in his own budget. But having inherited a sizable collection of foreign policy problems, from Iran to North Korea, the possibility of a long-term estrangement between Trump and the State Department has troubling implications for America’s national interests. In their hearts, the professionals at the State Department know this.

{mosads}They must also realize, uncomfortably, that they are not immune from either budget cuts, or from changes in work rules that could significantly erode the job security of foreign service officers. Fortunately, there are ways for the department to earn the president’s trust, and the upcoming summit between Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping represents a likely starting point.

Chinese leaders often express their foreign policies in a bewildering series of hints, signals, symbolic actions, and circumlocutions. Extreme displeasure could be expressed by the omission of complimentary words in an editorial in a government publication. Thus, Chinese leaders are often uncertain how to respond to the much more direct and blunt language of American diplomacy.

The subtle language of diplomacy could be used to express Trump’s foreign policy shifts, and the specific words and actions of that language are things that Trump could learn from a willing State Department. Indeed, tasking the State Department to come up with a Chinese-like set of communications to express the president’s priorities would serve as a useful test of the department’s loyalty, and therefore of its usefulness to the current administration.

For example, Chinese diplomats have an unfailingly hierarchical view of government. They are far more likely that most Americans to know the difference between an undersecretary of State and a deputy secretary of State. This being the case, Trump could send a State Department official of a higher rank than usual to visit the Taiwanese representative just after Xi’s visit, secure in the knowledge that the Chinese government would notice. In a similar vein, Trump could seat a high-ranking Homeland Security Department official at his right hand during his meetings with Xi, to highlight American determination to combat Chinese currency manipulation.

Even more subtle signals, from body language, to “code” words, to how long the meetings last, could be used to convey determination, impatience, flexibility, or even belligerence. At a minimum, the time it would take their Foreign Ministry to “decode” the unexpectedly subtle language of Trump’s diplomacy would wrong-foot the Chinese and permit the United States to take more initiatives, such as sending higher-ranking than usual officials to Taipei, or sending a slightly differently-configured naval force to the Sea of Japan.

Contrary to popular belief, such diplomatic maneuvers do not prevent serious talks from taking place, on matters as vital as the saber-rattling of the North Korean regime and American concerns over China’s island-building territorial grabs in the South China Sea. On the contrary, diplomats advising Xi would likely conclude that Trump has quickly learned how to make full use of the diplomatic tools at his disposal, and would likely advise Xi to get very serious, very quickly.

Approaching the Chinese leader with determination wrapped in diplomacy would also nonplus the president’s domestic critics, most of whom are probably expecting to criticize what they assume will be a much more ham-handed approach to the meetings with Xi. Their criticism, however, would require explanation, underlining the truth of the old saying, “In politics, whenever you’re explaining, you’re losing.”

Given the bad blood that already exists between Trump and the State Department professionals, Trump and Tillerson would be well advised to confirm the advice about diplomatic subtlety that they receive from the State Department with “China hands” from conservative think tanks in Washington, and to do so openly.

Such a procedure would send a not-so-subtle signal to State Department officials that Trump is willing to make use of their expertise, and listen to their advice, while assuming toward them the same attitude that former President Reagan adopted toward Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev at the start of another uncertain relationship: Trust, but verify.

Edward Lynch is chair of the Political Science Department at Hollins University in Roanoke, Virginia, where he teaches courses on foreign policy and international affairs. He served in the Office of Public Liaison at the White House under President Reagan.

The views expressed by contributors are their own and are not the views of The Hill.