Peace on the Korean Peninsula must start in the shadows

A recent North Korea policy review under the Trump administration has christened the new U.S. strategy toward Pyongyang — “maximum pressure and engagement.” The strategy calls for increasing pressure on North Korea with China’s help while holding out the promise of future engagement.

In line with this new strategic framework, it is time for bold new ideas that signal a long-term willingness to engage while simultaneously increasing pressure on Pyongyang.

{mosads}In October 2015, North Korean Ambassador to the United Nations Ri Su Yong spoke on the floor of the U.N. General Assembly calling on the United States to sign a peace treaty with North Korea to formally end the Korean War, the hostilities of which have been mitigated for the past 63 years by a “temporary” armistice agreement.

Ri’s speech underscored a renewed emphasis Pyongyang is placing on advocating for a peace treaty in diplomacy. Despite perpetual clamors from Pyongyang that the U.S. maintains a hostile “regime change” policy toward North Korea, the U.S. has long acknowledged the necessity of a Korean peace regime but rejects any formal peace coexisting with a nuclear North Korea.

The balance of military forces between the U.S.-South Korea alliance and the North Korean military have prevented general hostilities from resuming since the armistice was signed in 1953. It would be naïve for the U.S. to think a peace regime could wag the dog toward a more stable peace if it is unaccompanied by a commitment to maintain the full strength of the U.S.-South Korea alliance.

However, with North Korea’s progress in nuclear weapons development and a spate of attacks on South Korea over the last several years, stability on the Korean Peninsula in the decades to come is far from a fait accompli. A peace regime would reduce the risk of provocations that otherwise could lead to the unforeseen consequences of escalation.

The United States can help to prevent a ratcheting up of tensions by strengthening the incentives for North Korea to choose a peace treaty over nuclear weapons. Along with the other two most influential stakeholders on the peninsula — South Korea and China — the U.S. should initiate “shadow peace treaty talks” to strongly signal commitment to a formal peace process.

North Korea would initially be left out of the talks. Through participation in shadow peace talks, the U.S., South Korea and China should detail proposals for a peace regime that stipulate what each side is willing to offer North Korea as part of a comprehensive peace plan.

Although China has called for simultaneous denuclearization and peace treaty talks, this is untenable politically in the United States and for good reason. The U.S. has supported peace regime talks in the past but only if North Korea demonstrates a firm commitment to denuclearization. North Korea fears that if it pursues a non-nuclear path, the U.S. and South Korea will never reciprocate by following through with their end of the bargain.

Shadow peace treaty talks allow the U.S. to circumvent this sequencing problem as North Korea is not initially part of the dialogue. The prospect of getting to actual peace regime talks may be improved if North Korea is not immediately sitting at the table. Since the talks start only in the “shadow” state, the U.S. is not rewarding North Korea for provocative behavior but instead more clearly signaling its long-term commitment to a Korean peace regime. This is not a change in the U.S. position but a shift in strategy to improve the chances of achieving it.

A precondition for actual peace treaty talks with North Korea must be a clear commitment from all parties to the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Pyongyang is aware that obtaining a peace treaty and possessing nuclear weapons are mutually exclusive prospects. The next step is to empower the North Korean establishment to see a peace treaty as crucial to its security.

In concert with increased international pressure through sanctions, a shadow peace regime ultimately offers a way out for North Korea to save face in taking a new peaceful path as it is forced to more directly confront the benefits of a peace mechanism that it forgoes by pursuing nuclear weapons.

This process will allow for the U.S., China and South Korea to offer large carrots to Pyongyang but behind these talks there should be implicit sticks as well. The three parties agreeing to engage in shadow peace treaty talks could have the spillover effect of creating stronger U.S.-China-South Korea trilateral trust, allowing for better coordination against future provocative behavior by Pyongyang.

President Trump should send a message to Kim Jong-un that the U.S. supports a peaceful de jure conclusion to the Korean War in the confines of a denuclearized Korean Peninsula. The U.S. should not, however, be tricked into legitimizing North Korea’s nuclear ambitions by entering into the formal peace talks phase without a firm commitment to denuclearization from North Korea. That would be a bad deal.

Even if North Korea ultimately rejects the idea of a peace treaty, such shadow talks could improve cooperation amongst the U.S., China and South Korea to take more resolute punitive action against Pyongyang and to plan for a peaceful Korean Peninsula for future generations. We should throw the party fully expecting that the guest of honor will be late.

Kent Boydston is a research analyst at the Peterson Institute for International Economics and non-resident Kelly Fellow at Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic and International Studies. 

The views expressed by contributors are their own and not the views of The Hill.