How we can prevent Afghanistan from becoming the next Iraq

The Trump administration’s consideration of a surge of 3,000 to 5,000 troops in Afghanistan is reminiscent of an episode of Homeland. Saul Berenson made the impolitic comment that we had not been fighting one war for 15 years, but the same war 15 times. The administration’s surge is all tactics and theatrics, divorced from any policy or strategy. The answer is to contain and deter the Taliban.

The Trump administration has not answered basic questions about Afghanistan. What are we trying to accomplish? Eliminate the Taliban leadership or its entire network of supporters? How much are we willing to pay in terms of time, treasure, and casualties? How will we know victory when we see it? Why would an additional 3,000 to 5,000 troops succeed when the Obama administration’s larger, but shorter, surge failed?

{mosads}Is that a sufficient number counter the support the Taliban is receiving from Iran and Russia? Will we create more terrorists than we kill? What opportunity costs will we to suffer when we divert resources from other potential threats such as China, Russia, Iran, ISIS, and North Korea? What countermoves can we expect from Russia and Iran in theatres from Syria to Iraq, Ukraine, and any other number of countries?

A full-scale counterinsurgency is not in the cards. The Trump administration has prioritized defeating ISIS. Stephen Biddle and Jacob Shapiro point out that effective counterinsurgency requires 20 counterinsurgents for every 1,000 civilians. Unlike ISIS, the Taliban has been the recipient of largesse from donors such as Saudi Arabia. This limits American leverage.

It is unclear if the U.S. and its Afghan allies are willing to administer cleared territory for an indefinite period of time. However, a smash-and-leave strategy will allow the Taliban to have a zombie-like recrudescence.

Alternatives include “international trusteeship” and renewed state-building efforts. Recent research by David Lake at the University of California, San Diego shows that state-building efforts often fail because foreign-backed regimes lack domestic legitimacy.

Peace talks are another option. While the Taliban is not in a position to take over the country, it can play the role of spoiler. Some question whether the Taliban is interested in peace. Outbidding within the group may turn talks into a forum for leadership contenders to jockey for status.

Withdrawal is another option. Building on his work The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, Robert Pape argues that terrorists are motivated by a desire to compel occupying forces to withdraw from their lands. Pulling out robs them of their incentive to fight.

However, terrorist organizations have been able to exploit withdrawals. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak withdrew from Lebanon without an agreement with Hezbollah. Instead of evaporating support for Hezbollah, the terrorist organization perpetuated its survival by looking for new issues, starting with Shebaa Farms.

Prime Minister Ariel Sharon pursued a similar policy in Gaza. Renowned military historian Martin Van Creveld argued that Israel’s military superiority meant that it no longer needed the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and the Golan Heights to defend itself. Terrorism was its main threat, and it could be combatted through retrenchment.

Sharon’s hopes were dashed. After Hamas won the 2006 parliamentary elections, it kidnapped Cpl. Gilad Shalit that summer. In 2008 Israel fought Operation Hot Winter to compel Hamas to stop firing rockets into Israel. Israel also fought Operation Cast Lead, combatted cross-border attacks in 2010 and 2011, Operations Echo and Pillar of Defense in 2012, and finally, the 50-day Gaza War in 2014.

The withdrawal from Iraq in 2011 gave Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki carte blanche to pursue sectarian policies that dismembered the Awakening Councils. He undermined the limited stability the surge had begun to bring to Iraq. Maliki’s sectarianism and the outbreak of the Arab Spring in Syria opened a window of opportunity for the Islamic State of Iraq, which evolved into ISIS, to establish its own fiefdom.

This leaves us with containing and deterring the Taliban. The U.S. and its allies should rededicate themselves to keeping the Taliban pinned down in the areas they already control. This will leave the Taliban at the mercy of their foreign patrons and the sale of opium. Supporters of the Taliban, like citizens of the Soviet Union, will grow tired of Taliban promises of successes-to-come that fail to materialize.

Deterrence is the second component. The conventional wisdom suggests that terrorists cannot be deterred. However, recent research suggests that this is not true. Terrorists are not irrational, can be found for retaliation through intelligence and covert action, and are committed to perpetuating their organization’s existence. Unlike Cold War deterrence, bespoke solutions must be devised in order to credibly convey that there will be retaliation against terrorist attacks.

Naysayers may point out that using containment and deterrence against terrorists is little more than old wine in new bottles. They have a point. But there is a reason many are willing to pay handsomely for an old, established vintage.

Containment and deterrence do not have the crowd-pleasing appeal of a brand new strategy. But they are the proven, right choice for the threat we face and the costs we are willing to pay to accomplish our goals within the timetables we have set for ourselves.

Albert B. Wolf, Ph.D., is an assistant professor of political science at the American University of Afghanistan. He previously served as a Republican legislative assistant in the U.S. House of Representatives.

The views expressed by contributors are their own and are not the views of The Hill.