Manchester bombing illustrates intelligence challenge posed by ‘lone wolf’ terrorists

This month’s Manchester concert terror attack is yet another reminder of the difficulties Western intelligence agencies encounter when trying to cope with the lone wolf terrorist phenomenon. Over the past several years, the West has been hit over and over again in attacks led by individuals with no direct affiliation to terrorist groups.

It has been argued that this shift is primarily motivated by the radicalization of Muslim communities in the West, empowered by ISIS and other Salafist organizations’ effective online recruitment activity. To that, we should add ISIS’s growing difficulties on the battlefields of the Middle East, which force them to find new ways to strike at the West and maintain their relevancy and popularity.

Given that this phenomenon has been around for several years with no sign of abating, why do intelligence agencies continue to be surprised by such attacks? There are two types of surprise: strategic and tactical. The former relates to the strategic conditions in which such challenges arise, while the latter refers to the mechanics of facing a challenge. From a strategic standpoint it was — and still is — clear to British intelligence that the United Kingdom is a target for ISIS-inspired terrorists, who have both the motivation and the basic technical ability to conduct such attacks. Just two months ago, on March 22, a lone wolf terrorist drove his car into a crowd near Westminster Bridge, killing four people and injuring 40.

{mosads}There is another key question: are there any genuine “lone wolf” terrorists? Some have claimed the lone wolf phenomenon is nothing but a myth. Such terrorists may not be part of any organization, but they don’t just show up out of nowhere. They are a product of a certain social atmosphere, ideology, and public agenda. They may start as lone wolves, but if they succeed they quickly become role models for other terrorists to follow, and enjoy the material or ideological support of terrorist organizations. If this is the case, can we really dismiss it as simply beyond our ability to handle?

Intelligence organizations invest tremendous efforts in monitoring communications, social media in particular. Many terrorists released social media posts prior the attack in which they expressed their willingness to conduct an attack, sometimes even providing specific details. In the case of the Manchester bomber, former classmates reportedly tried to alert authorities on two separate occasions that he had expressed radical tendencies.

While it is indeed difficult to separate the wheat from the chaff in these situations, it is possible. After all, agencies such as the FBI or the Israeli Shin Beit have successfully thwarted potential attacks based on their monitoring capabilities.

While those capabilities are impressive, they are often the last line of defense. Intelligence agencies should deal first and foremost with the motivations for terror. They should be the first to acknowledge that blaming Islam as the root cause of such an aggression is wrong and simplistic. Research has shown that potential terrorists turn to Islam as a remedy for other distresses: divorce, unemployment, mental illnesses, and more. Islam, like other fundamental ideologies, provides certainty in an uncertain world and allows them to externalize their anger in a violent way.

Intelligence organization must identify and understand the characteristics and motivations of two sets of challenges: First, the social groups that nourish extremism and provide the justifications and means for potential terrorists; second, the drivers that motivate people to join such groups. Intelligence agencies should be the driving force behind a shift in priorities. The solution must emphasize deterrence more than prevention, and combat the motivations of potential attackers rather than their ideology. Such personalized deterrence should be rooted in a broader social context, while highlighting the personal price one pays for engaging in a terror attack.

Shay Hershkovitz, Ph.D., is chief strategy officer at Wikistrat, Inc. and a political science professor at Tel Aviv University specializing in intelligence studies. He is also a former IDF intelligence officer whose book, “Aman Comes To Light,” deals with the history of the Israeli intelligence community.

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