The situation on the Korean peninsula remains one of the thorniest challenges for Asian security and politics. For decades it has represented a Gordian Knot that much like that mythical knot has perplexed policymakers in the United States, South Korea, Japan, and China.
For the new American President, Donald J. Trump, it also has represented a significant early challenge to his new Administration. Given the myriad of unpleasant options available to the Trump Administration as well as the regional actors most directly impacted by North Korea’s ever evolving nuclear weapons and missile programs, something bold must be attempted. The conundrum of the Korean Peninsula still awaits an Alexander the Great, who according to legend finally solved the riddle of untying the fabled knot by cutting it.
{mosads}As the critical provider of security in the region, the position of the United States is critical in rectifying the present set of problems as well as the broader issues confronting not just the Korean Peninsula, but the entire region.
U.S. President Donald Trump has stated that the North Korean regime is “acting very, very badly.” However, the question remains, what options does the Trump Administration have to deal with these new pressures?
The U.S. is working to deploy its state of the art Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in South Korea in order to quickly shoot down threatening missiles emerging from North Korea. While the soon to be newly elected South Korean President will be under enormous pressure from China not to allow this system’s deployment, the recent tensions are likely to make this close to a fait accompli.
Clearly, the time for clean options has long since passed. Whether the U.S. and its allies attempt to negotiate with North Korea, continue the failing Obama era policies or seek a military option, no outcome will be good. Negotiating with a regime that has blackmailed the U.S. and its neighbors for decades seems like a recipe for appeasement. Yet, engaging in any type of military response seems even more dangerous now that at any other point since the armistice freezing, but not formally ending, the Korean War was signed in 1953.
To further complicate things, North Korea has already used it’s potential walking away from the armistice as another point of leverage, in addition to its typical talking of turning part of America into a wasteland of radioactive ashes, in order to seek concessions from the U.S. and South Korea. Despite the regimes obvious bellicosity of rhetoric, North Korea has also been at pains to point out that they have sought a full peace treaty to replace the armistice and feel that the U.S. has spurned such proposals.
Perhaps, it is time to call the North Korean bluff and actually sit down at the table with Kim Jong Un and seek an official end to the Korean War? While this seems far-fetched and utopian at a moment of such intense tension, this could also be the best moment to attempt such a gambit.
Kim Jong Un appears to have ruthlessly assured himself of the top position in North Korea by eliminating both real and any potential opposition, including, most recently, his half-brother. Despite this, it seems as if there is a sense of insecurity that drives much of the rhetoric and military flexing.
Rather than a sign of strength, this appears to really be a sign of North Korean weakness. The only card it has to play is the madman card. Otherwise, it risks being ignored or, infinitely worse from its perspective, targeted for regime change.
Though understandable given North Korea’s own irresponsible behavior over the decades, ongoing joint military exercises with the U.S. and South Korea act as a perpetual irritant. By stopping these temporarily and pulling back on the THAAD deployment, though still maintaining a robust regional presence, the U.S. could show a great willingness to engage in an honest dialogue.
For those who think this smacks of appeasement, consider that the U.S. clearly has a deterrent capability that could virtually eliminate the North Korean regime should North Korea ever have the temerity to actually use a nuclear weapon in any conflict with a neighbor or the U.S. itself.
This is a position of strength from which the U.S. can negotiate if it is willing to bargain. Further, the U.S. could make clear that while it will negotiate in good faith and will not immediately look to denuclearization as a prerequisite for a peace agreement, it will draw a firm red line. Further North Korean intransigence will force the American hand and make it consider pushing for an independent nuclear deterrent for South Korea and Japan.
This is a nightmare scenario for North Korea and for China. Thus greater pressure is brought to bear not only on the Kim regime but on China too.
Though the Trump Administration’s carrot of better trade with China has elicited a more helpful than usual response from Beijing, the specter of nukes in South Korea and, even more so, Japan should further concentrate their focus. That said, while Chinese leverage over North Korea is greater than any other single nation, it remains more limited than often portrayed by American media.
Attempting to negotiate a peace treaty would be a particularly bold effort to finally put an end to over half a century of problems on the Korean Peninsula. It could certainly fail. Given North Korea’s past actions, it is reasonable to think that failure is indeed the most likely outcome.
Yet, moving from a policy of muddling through to a direct military altercation without at least attempting to one last major diplomatic effort would also be extraordinarily dangerous.
Opening the door to a peace treaty with North Korea is as close to cutting the Korean Peninsula’s Gordian Knot as possible under the present set of ever direr circumstances. The U.S. should consider this.
Greg R. Lawson is a contributing analyst at Wikistrat.
The views expressed by contributors are their own and are not the views of The Hill.