A global Internet needs organizing principles

By most accounts, the United States has been the source of many of the leading voices on global Internet policy, whether it is West Coast cyber-libertarians advocating for “no government-imposed rules” for the Internet or then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s influential “Internet Freedom” speech in 2010 calling for more online free speech around the world. While there is nothing wrong with the U.S. government and civil society groups advocating for U.S. values globally, as the Internet becomes increasingly international, they should not expect that their values can or should underpin how others around the world approach Internet policy questions. Countries will adopt Internet policies reflecting their own national priorities, and the United States should recognize that not all countries are coming to the table with the same values. Yet for the Internet to thrive, countries must still cooperate and coordinate their policies. What is therefore needed is a set of principles that recognizes that nations will have different and often discordant domestic Internet policies, but encourages them to do so without “breaking the Web.” In other words, we need a framework that gives nations the freedom to set their own policies, while also enabling the continued growth of the Internet globally.

Unfortunately we’ve made little progress on this front, either from a practical or conceptual standpoint. This is due in large part to the fact that the debate has been dominated by two contradictory approaches to Internet policy: universalism and Balkanism. Universalism calls for a single policy approach to the Internet (e.g., no government imposed rules, no censorship, etc.). Balkanism is the opposite approach, advocating for each country to have near complete freedom to do what it wants regarding Internet policy. In short, universalism appeals to the need for cooperation between nations, while Balkanism reduces disagreements between conflicting values.

{mosads}Unfortunately, neither universalism nor Balkanism can be the guiding star for international negotiations on Internet policy. The former is unworkable given differing national politics and values, while the latter threatens the interconnectivity of the global network and can result in digital trade protectionism. An alternative approach to Internet policy is needed to combine the benefits of each approach while minimizing the drawbacks. Luckily such an intellectual framework is possible.

First, nations must agree on the fundamental principle that policies concerning how the core Internet architecture is designed and operated should be universal. We need global, commonly shared standards for the Internet’s technical architecture — such as the domain name system — if there is to be a global Internet; otherwise the system would devolve into a series of national-level networks at the expense of global commerce and communications. A multi-stakeholder approach in a global forum, such as the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), is the best way to develop such standards, since disagreements over the technical architecture of the Internet is complex and can only be resolved if expert stakeholders reach consensus.

But countries need to also recognize that for policies that go beyond the Internet’s technical architecture, a pure universalist approach will often not work since countries often have different objectives. For example, the United States, with its tradition of free speech and 1st Amendment rights, allows websites to host hate speech. Germany, with its different views of free speech and its tragic history, prohibits more extreme information from being posted online. Neither nation is right or wrong; they just hold different values. In cases like these where there is no consensus on broad goals, the key is for countries to limit their policymaking to proposals that do not impact those outside their borders. If Saudi Arabia wants to prevent access to online pornography, then it should be free to pursue this course so long as its methods do not affect Internet users in other countries.

But there are some areas where Balkanism will lead to significantly reduced global welfare, and this is particularly true with cross-border digital trade. While nations should have the leeway to regulate the domestic Internet, they should not be able to do this as a cover for trade protectionism. For example, if a nation decided to ban the use of Internet telephony services, such as Skype, to protect its domestic telecom provider, then other nations should challenge such policies in appropriate international bodies, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO).

Finally, nations should also look for opportunities to build international consensus on common goals like combating child pornography, spam and malware. Countries interested in addressing these problems should work together to create new forums and agreements to foster cooperation on these issues.

This framework is conceptually simple, but it is needed to promote a global Internet where countries can work together even if they do not always agree. The current alternatives of universalism or Balkanism are clearly not working. It is time for a new approach that combines the best of both approaches.

This piece has been updated from a previous version.

Castro is a senior analyst with the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation and co-author of the report “Beyond Internet Universalism: A Framework for Addressing Cross-Border Internet Policy.”