Trump’s Afghanistan policy needs a reboot

Since President Trump announced his new Afghan policy in August, foreign policy watchers have regularly debated whether or not it’ll be successful. Trump authorized an increased military presence in Afghanistan by sending an additional 4,000 troops. As a result, has Afghanistan fared any better? Unfortunately, it doesn’t seem so.

The security apparatus in Afghanistan appears to be staring down the barrel. For there to be hope, they need a combination of shrewd political moves, and tactical military maneuvers.

{mosads}Last week, authorities in Afghanistan had to grapple with one of the bloodiest weeks in the country this year. On Saturday, the Taliban attacked the bus carrying Afghan army cadets. Fifteen cadets died as a result of the suicide attack outside the training center in Kabul. In other attacks conducted last week, Taliban killed at least 55 soldiers, 36 policemen, and 20 civilians.

None of the carnage, apparently, satisfied the insurgents and terrorists. The Islamic State decided to enter the foray as well. ISIS engineered two suicide attacks last Friday that killed more than 70 people in Afghanistan.

Whenever you analyze an organized terrorist activity, the attack patterns and the timing, somehow, provide a clue about the motive. The latest attacks in Afghanistan were no different. Representatives from the United States, China, Pakistan and Afghanistan met on October 16 to discuss the prospects of Afghan peace under the Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG). The gathering in Oman was the sixth such meeting, but it was the first time the Taliban wasn’t part of the discussions. The insurgent group didn’t want to be part of the discussions on the peace process.

Then, on October 18, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson formally announced his South Asia trip. Tillerson visited Afghanistan Monday, and the events from the past week were part a “warm welcome” the insurgents and terrorists in Afghanistan had planned for him.

Here’s the thing: More U.S. troops in Afghanistan isn’t the most appropriate answer to the current stalemate. United States maintained 100,000 troops in Afghanistan in 2010. Did it help? There were 34,000 troops in the country in 2014. Did it prevent Afghan Taliban from executing large-scale attacks? In the meantime, the Islamic State also emerged in Afghanistan. The current number of the NATO and U.S. troops in Afghanistan, 13,500, isn’t going to significantly alter the dynamics, either. A massive boots on ground policy isn’t likely to serve America’s counter terror and security goals, but it will expose the U.S. servicemen to the increased dangers of insider attacks.

On Sunday, President Trump gave the C.I.A. the go-ahead to conduct covert operations in Afghanistan. Director Mike Pompeo stated earlier this month: “we can’t perform our mission if we’re not aggressive.” But, it’s not always about flexing your wartime muscles. The latest plan as authorized by Trump calls for hit-and-run operations. But, in order for these actions not to attract disdain from local Afghan residents, there are some important points for the Trump administration to consider.

In territories like Afghanistan, multinational intelligence sharing serves the key. Local forces are required to share intel reports with foreign military officers. But, are the local Afghan authorities capable enough to gather meaningful information? Even if they’re able to do so, can the Afghan officials maintain unity of effort, a concept integral to effective intelligence-based operations? For the covert operations to succeed, the U.S. authorities need to build a credible support system in Afghanistan. Until then, hit-and-run covert operations aren’t likely to succeed.

Covert operations in areas like Afghanistan require integrated intelligence and subsequent operations based on intel reports, reconnaissance and surveillance. Again, Afghan authorities aren’t competent enough to provide the U.S. forces with “assets” and information dissemination systems.

In such a case, hit, annihilate and run type of operations aren’t likely to produce the goods in the longer run. America needs to dent the insurgents from within. You’ve got to infiltrate their apparatus, and ward off the support system. The CIA is more than capable to do this but it’s just the wrong choice of operations that’s pegging them back.

NATO’s Resolute Support stated on Saturday that “the insurgents are desperate and cannot win.” Wrong. The Taliban have been winning for a long time now. Remember, you’re fighting the insurgents, and you can’t easily defeat them.

Here’s why: A guerrilla and an insurgent always win by avoiding losing. A counter insurgent, on the other hand, needs to win every time to ensure his power remains intact.

The Taliban have been winning by avoiding losing. It’s a trend prudent military and intelligence decisions can reverse. Is Trump listening?

Shazar Shafqat is a counterterrorism and security analyst for the Middle East Eye, Middle East Monitor and others. His research focuses on South Asian security, Middle East politics and security issues, counterterrorism strategies, and military-related affairs. His commentary has been published by World Policy Journal, Asia Times and RealClearDefense, among others.