Venezuela’s path back to democracy is narrow and vanishing

Key players are moving their pieces on the chessboard of Venezuelan politics, raising hopes for a democratic transition in a country that has been on an authoritarian trajectory for more than two decades. 

On Oct. 22, Venezuela’s opposition picked longtime activist María Corina Machado as its Presidential candidate for elections in the second half of 2024. Machado won her primary with almost 93 percent of over 2.3 million ballots cast. 

The opposition deserves considerable credit for having managed to hold this primary without the participation of the National Electoral Council, a body hand-picked by the ruling government of Nicolas Maduro, the successor to the late Hugo Chavez. But the fact remains that in June, Machado, whom polls favor to win the general election by a substantial margin, was declared ineligible to hold political office, ostensibly for having supported U.S. sanctions against the regime.

The Biden administration is seeking to midwife a successful electoral process with a significant goodwill gesture towards Maduro — that is, the relaxation of sanctions against Venezuela. Biden is granting a six month license for oil and gas transactions and permitting secondary transactions in Venezuelan bonds. 

However, the administration has stressed that sanctions will be reimposed if Maduro does not fulfill his commitment to democratic practices, including resolving the issue of the opposition candidate’s eligibility. 

The U.S. has stated its “expectation and understanding” that, by Nov. 30, a process will be initiated for the expedited reinstatement of all candidates for president.

The Venezuelan government, for its part, agreed on Oct. 18 to let the opposition choose a candidate “according to its own internal procedures,” and it in fact did let the primary take place. But it remains unclear whether Machado will actually be allowed to run and take office if she wins.  Also, the regime agreed to permit international observation of the electoral process and released five political prisoners. On a separate track, it has begun to allow the U.S. to repatriate Venezuelan illegal immigrants.

But in the immediate aftermath of Machado’s victory, the Venezuelan government has apparently decided, at least for now, to go on the offensive.  Attorney General Tarek Saab has announced that he will be initiating a criminal investigation into the primary, suggesting that it was fraudulently conducted and that foreign money was used to finance it.

It is hard to believe that Maduro has had a sudden conversion to supporting free and fair elections that most likely would oust him from power.  Thus, a final determination regarding Machado’s eligibility may remain up in the air until very late. At the last minute, the opposition may be forced to replace her with a less prominent figure, thus discouraging potential voters who have seen rigged elections on multiple occasions in the past.

Moreover, international observation may be permitted at first, then slowly curtailed — especially during the vote counting on election night.

The opposition may take some hope from its January 2022 victory in the race for governor of rural Barinas state — the home of Hugo Chavez.  An initial narrow victory by an opposition candidate was annulled by the courts on the grounds that he was supposedly ineligible to run.  However, a substitute took advantage of popular discontent with this crude maneuver and, in a second vote, won by a margin which the government felt compelled to respect.

However, the stakes are far higher in a presidential race. There is ample reason to suspect that Maduro and his followers would be unwilling to give up the wealth and power that they have accrued over the years and accept the additional risk of being held to account for their human rights violations and other crimes, as other authoritarians have after losing power.

So why did Maduro enter negotiations with the opposition in the first place? Why did he allow it to move ahead with its campaign thus far? 

His calculus may be that, if his regime manages to guarantee its victory, while keeping the overall picture sufficiently blurred, it may gain its goal of making sanctions relief permanent, thus obtaining the foreign investment needed to rebuild Venezuela’s debilitated petroleum sector, which produces less than a quarter of what it did at its height. 

The Biden administration sees the Trump-era “maximum pressure” approach as a dead end. Biden may decide that if oil prices and illegal immigration rise, he would prefer to avoid a return to that approach. Meanwhile, even a highly flawed election process could give the opposition political space, sending the message that it should bide its time and build on its efforts for a chance to run again at some later, somehow more favorable date.

This might sound like the worst case scenario for those hoping to reestablish democracy. But in Venezuela, worst case scenarios are par for the course.

Richard M. Sanders is senior fellow for the Western Hemisphere at the Center for the National Interest.  He is a former senior foreign service officer who served throughout Latin America, including in Venezuela.