The recent unexpected death of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi has starkly exposed the fragile state of leadership in the country. Raisi’s demise, in what is being called a tragic accident, leaves Iran grappling with a significant power vacuum at a critical juncture. Raisi, controversially elevated to the presidency in 2021, was seen as the frontrunner to succeed Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. His elevation to the presidency in 2021, amid widespread unpopularity, had been viewed as a strategic move to position him as a successor to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
With Raisi gone, Iran’s political landscape faces deep uncertainty. He had been instrumental in managing Iran’s complex relationships with neighboring Arab states, Russia and China. His demise has disrupted these delicate balances. The feeble lineup of potential successors reflects this fragility, creating a climate of ambiguity and casting doubt on the country’s future direction in the post-Khamenei era.
Raisi’s rise to power was less about personal charisma or political acumen and more about his unwavering loyalty to Iran’s ruling system and his history of ruthless suppression. This complex legacy makes selecting his successor a highly sensitive task. The decision is not merely about appointing a new president but also about shaping the future of the regime and the Velayat-e Faqih system.
So far, the only prominent candidate for the next supreme leader is Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s son, Mojtaba Khamenei. His potential succession raises concerns about an unaccountable, hereditary transfer of power, undermining the very principles that justified the ousting of the Shah’s monarchy. Mojtaba is known for his behind-the-scenes enforcement of his father’s agenda and managing a vast financial empire. But this prospect will raise critical questions about the introduction of dynastic politics in Iran. Other than Mojtaba, there are hardly any prominent public figures in the queue.
How Ayatollah Khamenei orchestrates the upcoming presidential elections will reveal much about Iran’s future leadership. If Khamenei opts to impose his chosen candidate and exclude others, it will significantly depress voter turnout and reinforce the belief among Iranians that true change can only come from dismantling the current system. Conversely, allowing candidates from the reformist fringes, as he has occasionally done in the past, might provide a veneer of legitimacy at a critical moment. The upcoming elections will thus serve as a crucial indicator of the regime’s approach to governance and its willingness to engage with demands for reform.
One possibility is that Iran’s regime may appoint an even more extreme hard-liner to the presidential seat. This would be consistent with the regime’s strategy since the 2020 parliamentary elections, relying on the most dependable hard-liners in key institutions and decisionmaking roles.
Currently, the candidates vying for Raisi’s position are all striving to prove their hard-line credentials. This trend shows the absence of a major figure capable of fulfilling the stabilizing role that Raisi was expected to play. The process of selecting his successor is likely to be influenced by the conflicting interests of various power centers within the regime, potentially reigniting ambitions for the supreme leader position. This situation could enhance the prospects of hard-liners associated with the Revolutionary Guards, further entrenching the regime’s reliance on extreme elements. The potential appointment of a more extreme hard-liner could affect Iran’s foreign policy and nuclear ambitions.
The ascent of a hard-line figure to Iran’s presidency will have profound repercussions both domestically and internationally. Internally, the regime is likely to become increasingly intolerant of opposition groups, employing more stringent social control measures. This could intensify clashes between the regime and society, exacerbating the ongoing economic crisis, worsening living conditions and sparking spontaneous protests. Such developments could plunge the regime into an internal legitimacy crisis, widening the gap between the ruling elite and the masses.
Externally, a hard-line shift might result in a more confrontational stance towards neighboring countries, potentially undoing recent diplomatic efforts such as the restoration of relations with Saudi Arabia. The hard-liners’ influence might also impact Iran’s nuclear policy, especially amid demands to alter its nuclear doctrine. Such a shift could lead to a direct confrontation with the U.S. and the West, escalating tensions and possibly dragging Iran into a costly conflict.
Another possibility is that the Iranian regime might allow reformists and moderates to participate in the June presidential election to make the race more competitive. This strategy, if applied, would aim to reduce political tension and increase voter turnout, which has hit record lows, particularly in the last parliamentary elections with the lowest turnout since the 1979 revolution. However, this move would challenge the hard-liners’ strategy of monopolizing power, a direction Khamenei likely does not favor. The hard-liners, who have successfully sidelined reformists and moderates from decision-making positions, are expected to obstruct any efforts to reintroduce these groups into political life. Even if their participation is limited to merely running in the elections, the hard-liners will fiercely resist. This internal struggle reflects the broader tension within the regime as it grapples with maintaining control while addressing growing public dissatisfaction.
Nonetheless, the most likely scenario is that the Iranian regime will impose a candidate who will continue Raisi’s policies. During Raisi’s term, Iran made significant international gains despite limited internal improvements due to enduring economic sanctions. Though not confrontational with the West, Raisi’s administration sought to mitigate sanctions, achieving some breakthroughs. Iran managed to maintain a balance of deterrence following confrontations with Israel and avoided regional war by opening communication channels with the U.S. Even on the nuclear issue, Iran engaged in indirect negotiations with the U.S., mediated by Oman.
Continuing this approach could help maintain the regime’s external achievements and potentially improve its internal situation, aligning with American interests in regional stability and non-proliferation.
Imran Khalid is a geostrategic analyst and freelance writer. He is a physician and has a master’s degree in international relations.