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Despite right surge, European Parliament election offers solid ground for transatlantic partnership

The European political center holding its ground against the advance of the radical right. Ursula von der Leyen has good chances for a second term as president of the European Commission and maintaining her role as special interlocutor in the transatlantic partnership, despite the disruption in Paris and Berlin.

Transatlantic relations have seen a new renaissance over the past three years. Driven by the U.S.’s renewed security provider role in the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine, the EU’s increasingly realist approach to China, and Europe’s bad memories of the past and renewed fears of a potential Trump administration, transatlantic partnership since 2021 has been resilient enough to overcome challenges without lasting damage.

However, another factor may have played a decisive role in exploiting areas of mutual interest for cooperation and mitigating the consequences of unavoidable conflicts: The skillful diplomacy and trust-based relationship between the European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and her counterparts in the Biden administration.

Given the importance of von der Leyen’s closed door diplomacy and effective coordination with the U.S., European Parliament election results could have significant impact on areas of U.S. interests, both by influencing the composition of the European Commission and the EU’s position on policy areas ranging from the green economy to trade or providing essential financial and military support to Ukraine.

The key question is whether Ursula von der Leyen can muster the necessary majority in the European Parliament for a second term, and whether she will have to make political trade-offs that could alter the Commission’s, and ultimately the EU’s, policy line in areas crucial to U.S. interests.


With the center-right European People’s Party (EPP), von der Leyen’s own political home, and the center-left Socialists & Democrats (S&D) actually performing well in the European Parliament elections, the traditional grand coalition of EPP, S&D and the liberal Renew Europe has a comfortable majority of 401 seats on paper in the 720-seat European Parliament. While a defection rate of up to 15 percent is expected among the members of the European Parliament of this informal grand coalition, making von der Leyen’s reelection far from certain, she has a good starting point. She may also be able to count on some support from the Greens, but this cooperation could cost a significant number of votes within the ranks of the EPP, as many conservatives are rather dissatisfied with the social impact of the EU’s signature project, the Green New Deal, and especially its consequences for Europe’s competitiveness in traditional industrial sectors.

Just as cooperation with the Greens may come at a cost, so too does potential cooperation with the radical-right European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) and their leading force, the Italian Brotherhood of Italian Prime Minister Georgia Meloni. The S&D has already warned von der Leyen that she can have their support or the ECR’s, not both.

While von der Leyen will certainly have to reach out to as many national parties as possible in the EPP, S&D and Renew in order to secure their support, she may have received a helping hand from an unexpected source: the domestic political disruptions in France and Germany. France heading for snap parliamentary elections after President Emmanuel Macron dissolved the National Assembly in response to the victory of the far-right Rassemblement National (RN) in the European Parliament elections, French politics will be quite inward-looking in June and July. Macron’s support or opposition to von der Leyen’s second term was until recently a great unknown in EU politics. The answer to this question is still not known, but it is definitely less relevant now.

If EU institutions will stick to the original timeline of passing the Commission president’s nomination in the European Council late June, and there is no indication that member states would be willing to deviate for French domestic reasons, Macron, paralyzed by the French political situation, will be both preoccupied and lacking the necessary political resources to put forward an alternative candidate to von der Leyen with any chance of success.

While approval by the European Parliament seems less likely in early July, simply because von der Leyen may need more time to organize solid parliamentary support, time and French politics may work in her favor. If the French radical-right triumphs and enters government and cohabitation with President Macron, it will send such shockwaves through European politics that the relative stability offered by a second von der Leyen term will become a rare and highly sought-after political commodity.

It will put enormous pressure on the rebellious national delegations of the EPP, the German Social Democrats and even the Greens to support von der Leyen without major concessions in order not to increase the political chaos and influence of the radical-right in the European Union.

Ursula von der Leyen has a good chance of using the turmoil caused by the political success of the French far-right and the subsequent French snap elections to her advantage. This could help keep a key European ally of the U.S. in place and keep transatlantic cooperation high on the European Commission’s political agenda.

Daniel Hegedüs is senior fellow of the German Marshall Fund of the United States.