Those who lamented French President Emmanuel Macron’s “folly” in calling early parliamentary elections, or chided him for delivering the coup de grâce to his political movement, as the Washington Post did, now have to eat a healthy portion of crow. (The less captivating French version of that metaphor involves words being forced down one’s throat.)
Fears of a parliamentary majority or near-majority for Marine Le Pen’s far-right National Rally have been assuaged, with her party finishing third behind the left-wing New Popular Front and Macron’s centrist, more or less European-liberal group Together for the Republic, which is usually referred to as Ensemble. The Republicans, center-right Gaullists who are natural allies for Macron, also made a respectable showing.
It’s a useful reminder that politics can have its surprises. About an hour before the polls closed in France, I received an email from the Financial Times, which is perhaps the best English-language newspaper when it comes to covering European politics. The message was what we had been hearing for the last few weeks: “polls set to close with far right expected to win most seats.” But French voters have pulled surprises before.
In 1997, for example, then-president Jacques Chirac of the right-of-center Gaullist party called early legislative elections, and polls all indicated he had made a good call. But the polls were spectacularly wrong, and the Socialists, the other main party in what was at that time a de facto two-party system, triumphed.
Still, Democrats in the U.S., especially diehard supporters of President Biden, should not conclude that something like a French “surprise” could happen here in November. There was actually nothing surprising about the French outcome. A lot of U.S. analyses of the French election simply equated RN’s largest share of the vote in the first round of the parliamentary elections with “victory.” But it’s a truism that what drives the first-round vote in France is the heart, while the head prevails in the second round. It’s not over until the bell rings at the end of the second round. We’ve just seen that in a big way.
Macron is not someone who just throws the dice. There was method to his alleged madness. I believe his decision to call early elections reflected a hard-nosed political calculus, that: 1) it was necessary to stop Le Pen before the situation deteriorated further; 2) the democratic values of the French Republic were still shared by a majority of citizens; 3) that citizens would rally, across a wide political spectrum, to defend French democracy; 4) that the specific fate to Macron’s political group was less important ultimately than the fate of the country. It’s hard to argue that he was wrong in the end, despite the crisis of confidence that was visible.
Some problems admittedly are just beginning. It will be hard to form a government capable of securing a parliamentary majority in support of a common program. It was possible for Macron and the Gaullists to find common ground with the left in defending democracy. Hundreds of candidates pulled out of the runoffs in order to concentrate the anti-Le Pen vote on the center or left candidate most likely to win.
This political pragmatism in pursuit of a vital objective was truly admirable, especially in a day and age when the tools of individual self-promotion and image-building are so powerful and reinforce the natural egotism of politicians. But when it comes to economic and social policy, the chasm between the left and the center is deep. The National Assembly and the government that will be in effect an emanation of the Assembly are likely to be ineffectual.
Of course, France has an elected president with real power, but there is normally a division between the foreign and security policy predominance of the president and the domestic policy of the prime minister and Cabinet. It’s too early to predict exactly how this will play out.
As we look at France from our side of the Atlantic, and try to draw some lessons, it’s best not to overdo with analogies. The political parties, institutions and culture in France and the U.S. are vastly different. But the French elections suggest some useful questions we should be asking ourselves. Notably, is there an ample majority of voters who are prepared to put the preservation of our national democratic institutions and practices before everything else?
Secondly, if such a potential majority is there, what forms of compromise and cooperation will be necessary to bring that majority to the polls in November?
Thirdly, in light of recent events, what candidates for president and vice president can most effectively embody that drive to secure democracy, appealing to a sufficiently broad political spectrum with a coherent message and generating the requisite enthusiasm? After all, the structure of American politics is more based on personalities than is true in parliamentary democracies like France, and the tactical voting seen in France is less common. But the French have shown us that uniting in defense of democracy is possible, and we should draw inspiration.
As a Foreign Service officer, Eric R. Terzuolo served at the U.S. embassy in Paris and other posts in Europe, the Middle East and Caribbean. Since retiring, he has taught international affairs and European politics at universities in Amsterdam, Rome and Washington, D.C., including seven years in charge of West European area studies at the Foreign Service Institute, the Department of State’s professional training unit.