U.S. Navy’s lapse in sea lane security risks global trade

Over the last few months, the U.S. Navy has suffered its most significant setback in the last 50 years, a disaster more damaging than the pier-side sinking of the Bon Homme Richard or the loss of 17 sailors in two destroyer collisions.   

It is a setback that is existential, and casts into question a core reason for the Navy’s very existence. For the Navy is seemingly abandoning a key mission: keeping vital sea lanes open to commerce. After a nine-month deployment to claw back control of the Suez Canal and Red Sea from Houthi rebels in Yemen, the Dwight D. Eisenhower(Ike) carrier strike group returned to the U.S., without dislodging the Iran-backed Houthis. 

The impact on the global economy is significant: Container shipping is down 90 percent since December 2023. Some $1 trillion in commerce — 40 percent of all Europe-to-Asia trade — used to pass through that sea lane, the world’s third busiest, handling more ships than the Panama Canal. Only the English Channel and the Malacca Strait see more traffic.   

An estimated 90 percent of world trade (by value) travels by sea. It accounts for $5.4 trillion of U.S. annual commerce, and supports 31 million American jobs. 

Ships are being diverted around Africa’s Cape of Good Hope, adding over 11,000 miles, one-to-two weeks to each journey, and $1 million extra in fuel to each voyage. Insurance premiums are up 1,000 percent and a container that used to cost $1,500 to ship now costs $6,000. The impact is not limited to the Middle East, but is causing a “cascading impact” around the world.  

Keeping these sea lanes open has been a key part of the Navy’s raison d’etre since the founding of the republic, when the Navy was created largely to protect merchant shipping. And that role has endured through the present. As John Kennedy once said, “The United States must control the sea if it is to protect our security.”  

Our allies recognize the strategic importance of open sea lanes as well. In 2023, Taiwanese officials, for the first time, said that their annual military drills would include exercises in keeping its sea lanes open in the event of a Chinese blockade.  

Recently, President Biden’s secretary of Defense, Lloyd Austin said, “To tackle the national-security challenges of the 21st century, we need our Navy more than ever. It is especially vital in today’s world. And as [outgoing Chief of Naval Operations] Mike Gilday likes to say, ‘the global economy floats on seawater.’”

Nonetheless, when the Ike battle group returned to Norfolk last month, it didn’t fly a banner proclaiming “mission accomplished.” Instead, the Navy issued a message that was, at best, less than inspiring.   

The Navy boasted that the deployment was “unprecedented.” Not only was it unusually long, but it marked the first time since World War II that a U.S. aircraft carrier came under constant direct threat from an enemy. Plus, the Navy proudly announced that it was the first time a female combat pilot had shot down an enemy drone.  

On station, the ships launched 155 Standard-2 missiles against Houthi drones. We fired 135 Tomahawk cruise missiles at land targets, and naval aircraft launched nearly 60 air-to-air missiles and 420 air-to-surface weapons.  

Yet the mission failed. The Houthis continue to control the Red Sea. For all the effort, dedication and skill shown by sailors and air crews, it was too little to get the job done.  

The question is why. 

There are two possible reasons: First, the U.S. Navy lacks either the means and expertise to do anything about it. Or second, the Biden administration concluded that the cost, risk or strategic value of fulfilling such a mission is not worth the political juice. But whatever the reason, the failure undercut one of the key rationales for maintaining an expensive Navy. 

There are three ways to address the ongoing problem of Houthi control. The first is to recognize that the tools used by the Navy were largely inappropriate for the problem. The cost of each Tomahawk and Standard-2 missile was at least $2 million – to target a $2,000 drone. Even in the face of all we are learning from the Russia-Ukraine war about the use of drones, we are not adapting quickly enough to equip our ships for this new, asymmetrical reality.  

Second, we tend to measure inputs — munitions fired — rather than outcomes. This is Vietnam era thinking. Instead, the Navy should measure its success by the results it achieves.  

Third, political leaders need to be candid about — and accountable for — sending an ill-equipped Navy on an ill-defined mission. If the only way to eliminate the Houthi strike capability is with our Special Forces or Marines, just say so. Or if the path is through Iran, admit it.  

Yes, we are in the middle of a close electoral contest. And no candidate is likely to admit that we don’t have the resources (or political will) to win back control of this vital sea lane. But until then, we shouldn’t be sending our young men and women into harm’s way without equipping them to do the job with the proper gear and a well-defined mission. 

Steve Cohen is an attorney at Pollock Cohen, and a former member of the Board of Directors of the United States Naval Institute.