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Why losing the White House might be the ultimate win

What truly constitutes a political win? In the 2024 election, both political camps have clearly framed victory in the presidential race as success, which in turn informs both of their strategies.

This election cycle presents a historically unusual premise: A short-term win in the 2024 presidential election for either party stands a good chance of producing several consecutive election cycle wins for the opposing party, also to be enjoyed in the congressional and executive branches. 

I suggest that both parties’ current strategies to secure power are fundamentally flawed, anchored in a “go for broke” short-term objective of winning the presidency.

For example, four years of the Carter administration created a positive Doppler effect for the GOP that radiated forward. It resulted in three consecutive GOP presidential victories with steady increases in both legislative bodies, resulting in the first GOP-controlled house in 40 years during the Clinton administration. 

According to Gallup, Jimmy Carter started his administration with an approval rating of 66 percent, which declined to 34 percent upon his exit. This was principally due to perceived failed policies.


Hindsight allows us to reframe President Ford’s loss to Carter in the 1976 presidential election as the seminal event that hastened the rise of Ronald Reagan and the realignment of the Republican Party. This reframing illustrates how a short-term defeat to an unpopular presidential candidate can catalyze long-term political gains for the losing party.

Fast-forward to the current election cycle and the two candidates. Real Clear Politics reports favorability ratings below 50 percent for both Harris and Trump. Either candidates will be climbing out of a deeper hole at the commencement of the presidential term at nearly 20 percent approval points lower than Carter. Combining this with perceived failures in policies and leadership could generate similar or even greater positive Doppler effects for the opposing party.

For example, a Trump victory could result in a vendetta presidency, as the candidate has repeatedly announced his intentions to seek retribution against his political opponents with the full powers of the executive branch. 

Trump’s polarizing persona has evoked general societal disdain, bordering the anaphylactic in what some refer to as Trump Derangement Syndrome. Even within the GOP, Trump has alienated a swath of the party, between “Never Trumpers” and those who will vote for him only reluctantly.

If this is combined with perceived failed policies (particularly as they relate to the economy and the border crisis), it could generate significant longer-term election cycle gains for the Democrats in the legislative and executive branches.

The corresponding Harris loss would allow the Democrats to regroup around a candidate backed by a legitimate nomination process, who is less fictionalized and hasn’t been forced to inherit somebody else’s platform overnight. 

Moreover, Democrats under Biden-Harris have become balkanized into factions over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The party needs time to build a consensus position on this divisive issue, and this might be best accomplished away from the spotlight of the Oval Office. During this time, the party can refine policy objectives related to its core ideals of wealth redistribution, DEI, and climate change, reframing these ideals as a way to build an enduring, healthy economy. 

A Trump victory could also liberate Democrats from the generational constraints that have hindered the inevitable skin-shedding of classical liberalism and accelerate the party’s current evolution toward fully-fledged, postmodern progressivism. The party can reemerge in four years, united around a refreshed and refined policy platform, with a strong and articulate candidate who has undergone a legitimate nomination process.

So what happens if Harris wins? Although Harris has reenergized the Democratic base and appears strong in juxtaposition to Trump, there are concerns that, if she wins, her extreme progressive policies may alienate the bell curve of the American electorate, bracketed between left and right of center. This will be especially true if her policies fail to resolve the border crisis, high interest rates and burgeoning recession fears. 

There is also the claim recently made by Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.) that Harris is not being genuine in her rhetorical departures from the party’s platform. The idea is that, once elected, she will revert to extreme progressive form. If Sanders is correct, this great hoodwinking will agitate voters and energize a powerful and long-term Doppler Effect for the Republican Party.

A corresponding Trump loss would liberate the GOP from his cult-of-personality grip that has defined their party over the last four election cycles (inclusive of 2024), which will have resulted in eight major losses over this period. The party could begin a process of redefining itself around policy objectives sufficient to attract a majority of Americans that could translate into long-term power in the executive and legislative branches of government. 

The GOP would have four years to unite around a less polarizing leader who is articulate on the party’s salient issues, with a mature appreciation of the presidency’s role in a historical context.

Whoever wins, this race will be a squeaker. The RealClearPolitics’ average of polls shows both Harris and Trump as nearly dead-even with about 40 days until the general election. Both candidates are within the margin of error in the battleground states. Victory is not likely to produce a governing mandate for either candidate or generate down-ballot coattail advantages for congressional and senate candidates. 

Whoever wins will likely start the next presidential term with a closely divided Senate and House, and in Trump’s case as a lame duck, ineligible for re-election.

This legislative stalemate should dispel concerns of tyrannical excess of power and “end of democracy” claims propagated by both parties, which appear to be vastly overstated. Although the actions of Harris or Trump through presidential executive actions should not be overlooked, past newly elected presidents have succeeded in exercising robust executive action to overturn the actions of prior administrations.

What is done can also be undone, although we shouldn’t expect campaign functionaries to strategize ways to sink their own presidential candidate or for voters to check the opposition party’s box.

I only suggest that disheartened voters on the losing side find solace in this unusual election cycle. A loss of the presidency in 2024 could be the event that produces a more enduring, longer-term win for their political party.

Stephen Lile is a strategy and innovation fellow at the University of Cambridge Judge Business School.