If Trump closes with another battleground state surge, 2024 will be a blowout. Improbable?
As of Oct. 20, Trump already held leads in all seven battleground states. And in 2020 and 2016, he closed with substantial surges in these seven states. If he only partially replicates his prior performances, it won’t matter what happens elsewhere.
Seven battleground states (Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin) will decide 2024’s presidential outcome — just like they did in 2020 and 2016.
In 2016, Trump won six of them; in 2020, Biden won six of them. In the last two elections, the margins of victory were relatively small; the conventional assumption is that the margins will be again.
However, while the seven states’ pivotal aspect remains clear, current and past trends raise the possibility that their margins may not be so close this time. Those coinciding trends are Trump’s current polling leads and his battleground state closing surges in the last two elections.
According to Real Clear Politics’ Oct. 20 averages of battleground state polling, Trump leads in each of the seven states — from 0.2 percentage points in Wisconsin to 1.8 percentage points in Georgia. Small as those margins are, Trump is substantially ahead of where he was on the same date in 2020 and 2016: in both previous elections, he trailed in each of the battleground states.
What’s more, in each of the last two elections, Trump surged in these states at the end. Both times, his popular vote percentages in these states made substantial jumps from his polling had been on Oct. 20.
Trump’s battleground state surge is 14-0: in 2020 its overall average improvement was 3.2 percentage points; in 2016, it was 7.2 percentage points. That amounts to an overall average improvement in the battleground states of 5.2 percentage points in those elections—ranging from 2.6 percentage points in Nevada to 8.3 percentage points in Michigan.
Even if just Trump’s 2020 improvement is applied to today’s polling, his victory margin across all seven states would range from 2.7 percentage points in Georgia to 5.9 percentage points in Wisconsin.
The counterargument is that Trump is already at his high now: his surge is already factored in. To that point, his range of battleground polling support today runs from 47.7 percent in Nevada to 49 percent in Arizona: his popular vote high in Nevada was 47.7 percent in 2020, and he hit 49 percent in Arizona in both previous elections.
However, the counterargument that Trump has already hit his ceiling of support also presumes that Harris has hit her floor. There are many reasons to believe she has not.
One is Harris’ fall in the national polls. According to Real Clear Politics’ Oct. 20 average of national polling, her lead was just 0.9 percentage points, that’s down from 2.1 percentage points on 9/20.
Another is Harris’s high unfavorable rating prior to becoming the Democrats’ nominee. On Oct. 20, Real Clear Politics shows Harris had a net unfavorable rating of 0.6 percentage points. Yet as recently as July 13, it was a negative 16.4 percentage points.
Harris’s sharp rise has been fueled by novelty and a lack of scrutiny; both factors could be wearing off — and could even more in the campaign’s final weeks.
There is also a support dynamic that could assert itself. If Harris continues to fall in the polls, her supporters could decide to not vote if they determine she is likely to lose. In contrast to Trump, whose supporters have voted in five national contests (three national primaries and two general elections), Harris has no proven vote support outside California: alone, she has never run a national race.
Should professed, but unproven, Harris supporters not vote, then even if Trump doesn’t gain supporters absolutely, his vote percentage would rise by default.
If a Trump surge materializes for a third time, election night could be over early. Trump needs to flip just 35 electoral votes to win. Harris has a realistic shot of flipping only North Carolina from Trump. Should she fail to, the entire contest is on her turf.
Trump victories in North Carolina, Georgia and Pennsylvania could end the contest. Assuming he holds North Carolina, even if Trump loses Georgia and Pennsylvania, he could get to victory by winning Michigan, Wisconsin, Arizona, and Nevada (a combined 42 electoral votes). And that doesn’t include the wildcard that Virginia could be for him.
Today’s poll trend is already ugly for Harris. Past Trump trends could make it even uglier. And Trump doesn’t need the full weight of his past trends to make that happen.
J.T. Young is the author of the upcoming book, “Unprecedented Assault: How Big Government Unleashed America’s Socialist Left” and has over three decades of experience working in Congress, the Department of Treasury, and the White House Office of Management and budget, and representing a Fortune 20 company.