Taiwan’s green energy gamble  

China’s increasing militarism in the Taiwan Strait is no secret. Yet, as Taipei transitions from nuclear to renewable energy sources, it risks inadvertently amplifying its vulnerabilities and paving the way for Beijing to pursue its reunification goals.  

In the 1970s, Taiwan’s nuclear energy program took center stage, safeguarding the nation from global energy shocks and fueling its industrial boom. At its peak, six reactors generated over half of the island’s power. However, the Chernobyl and Fukushima disasters shifted public sentiment, gradually edging out nuclear power in favor of other energy sources.

Fast forward to today, Taiwan’s pivot to renewables is proving highly problematic. In decommissioning its nuclear reactors, the island has grappled with major power shortages and rolling blackouts. To address this, Taiwan significantly increased its liquified natural gas (LNG) imports, albeit without meaningfully expanding storage capacity. The transition to wind and solar has also faced hiccups owing to a dearth of available land and cost over-runs, not to mention their dependence on materials sourced from China.   

As a result, a staggering 98 percent of Taiwan’s electricity now hinges on imported fossil fuels, with a meager contribution from nuclear energy. This shift has led to record high carbon emissions and exposed Taiwan to substantial geopolitical risks. 

China’s military maneuvers around Taiwan last August underscored this vulnerability. During those drills, China effectively blockaded naval routes to Taiwan’s two LNG terminals — Taichung and Yung-An. Even tankers not headed for Taiwan fled, disrupting supply routes regionally. Given China’s increasingly aggressive posture, Beijing will almost certainly exploit Taiwan’s LNG dependence during a future blockade or bombing campaign.  

In either case, Taiwan’s limited LNG reserves would deplete rapidly, especially if its storage and transmission infrastructure were targeted by Chinese forces. Taiwan’s solar and wind installations, without adequate defense, could also quickly be disabled. Combined with sophisticated cyberattacks against the island’s other critical infrastructure, Taiwan’s cities, emergency services, and industrial base would likely screech to a halt in the opening days, if not hours, of a conflict. If that were to occur, the island would be a sitting duck until the arrival of U.S. forces, which could take a week or more according to even the most optimistic estimates.  

While Taiwan’s shift to renewables makes it an easier invasion target, returning to nuclear energy would provide asymmetric advantages that might deter an attack or, at a minimum, result in a pyrrhic victory for Beijing. The very nature of nuclear power and the potential devastation if facilities are hit would invite international scrutiny and galvanize support for Taiwan. 

Beyond undercutting China’s desire to be seen as a responsible global stakeholder, an attack that results in an uninhabitable, radioactive Taiwan would also undercut Xi’s principal reunification impulses — ushering in China’s great rejuvenation and condemning Taiwan’s 23 million citizens to live according to the Chinese Communist Party’s creed.  

What’s more, the almost certain mass exodus of Taiwanese citizens to Western countries after a potential nuclear meltdown would gravely complicate China’s secondary reunification goal of quashing Taiwan’s distinct identity and neutralizing any remaining vestiges of Taiwanese separatism — an objective Beijing has more or less accomplished in nearby Hong Kong. 

Moreover, the Chernobyl incident exposed Soviet governance flaws, leading to a loss of public trust. A nuclear catastrophe in Taiwan might similarly undermine Xi Jinping’s domestic standing, just as China’s economic slowdown raises uncomfortable questions about his stewardship. 

Interestingly, global sentiment toward nuclear energy is undergoing a renaissance. As nations grapple with energy security, especially in the wake of Russian aggression in Ukraine, many are reevaluating their stance on nuclear power. That includes Japan, which recently announced plans to extend its reactors beyond their current 60-year lifespan and build several more. Concerned about its deteriorating security environment, South Korea has also vowed to transform itself into a “global nuclear energy power.”  

For Taiwan, a return to nuclear power is not without political challenges, but it presents a strategic opportunity. If China believes it requires a few more years to prepare for a potential invasion, Taiwan has a comparable timeframe to fortify its atomic armor. Doing so would require a political about-face from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party, which has held firm to most of its renewable targets even though polling shows 70 percent of Taiwanese citizens fear possible power crunches — and that’s during peacetime.  

In essence, the self-governed island stands at a crossroads. It can pursue a renewable energy path fraught with vulnerabilities or re-embrace nuclear power, leveling the playing field in a high-stakes geopolitical game. For Taiwan, the choice is clear: it’s now or nuclear. 

Craig Singleton, a former U.S. diplomat, is a senior China fellow at the non-partisan Foundation for Defense of Democracies.