The motion to vacate the speakership is a rare and shaky check on power 

Whoever said, “I’d rather study history than be a part of it,” must relate to how now-former House Speaker Kevin McCarthy (R-Calif.) feels today. He is the only Speaker in the history of Congress ever to be removed from that office by a vote of the House. He is not the first Speaker to be subject to such a vote. Speaker Joe Cannon (R-Ill.) holds that distinction. But he survived the challenge to his leadership in 1910. More on that later. 

Thomas Jefferson, while presiding over the Senate as vice president, compiled his “Manual of Parliamentary Practice” based on the precedents of the British Parliament. Citing Grey’s parliamentary practice and decisions at Westminster, he wrote: “A Speaker may be removed at the will of the House, and a Speaker pro tempore appointed.”  

Today, a motion to remove a Speaker in the U.S. House is presented as a question of privilege resolution which has priority over all other business. In the 116th Congress in 2019, when Democrats retook control of the House, they adopted a House rule that gave privileged status to a motion to “vacate the chair” only if offered by direction of the party caucus (Democrats) or conference (Republicans).   

However, when Republicans regained control of the House in 2023, one of the concessions McCarthy made to his Freedom Caucus colleagues in order to finally win the gavel on the 15th ballot was to revert to the old rule that any member can offer the motion to vacate from the floor as privileged.  

The only caveat is that the chair can postpone a vote on the resolution for up to two legislative days. McCarthy didn’t want to delay things that long so scheduled the vote for last Tuesday, just one day after its sponsor, Rep. Matt Gaetz (R-Fla.), noticed it to the House. The final vote on adoption was 216-210 to vacate, with all Democrats and eight Republicans voting for it. That was sufficient to achieve the requisite majority of those present and voting to prevail. 

With the removal of McCarthy as Speaker another recent rule kicked-in. In the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attack on America, the House adopted a new, continuity of Congress rule that requires a speaker, upon being elected, to file with the Clerk a list of speakers pro tempore, in order of preference, to take over if the Speaker is unable to serve due to death, incapacity, resignation or, yes, removal from office.   

The first priority of this newly appointed Speaker pro tempore in such emergency circumstances is to preside over the election of a new Speaker, or Speaker pro tempore. The first person on McCarthy’s list to be designated Speaker pro tempore was Rep. Patrick McHenry (R-N.C.) who promptly recessed the House for a week to allow for intra-party discussions and to nominate a new Speaker.   

There is no clear precedent to guide the House if it is once again delayed in choosing a Speaker on the first ballot as it was last January for four days, let alone as it was in 1849 (19 days and 60 ballots), and in 1856 (over two months and 133 ballots). Would the new Speaker pro tempore be empowered either by House adoption of a new rule or by his setting a new precedent, to allow for a resumption of legislative business pending the election of the Speaker? 

Getting back to the “revolt” against Speaker Joe Cannon in 1910, he too was the victim of a disgruntled group within his own conference. In that instance, progressive members of his party were impatient with Cannon as Rules Committee chairman for sitting on legislation they wanted to consider on the floor. So, the insurgents used parliamentary tactics to remove him as chairman and a member of the Rules Committee.   

Cannon then challenged his opponents to remove him as Speaker as well. A Democrat obliged by offering a motion to vacate the chair. However, Cannon held his party together and a motion to table the motion was adopted on a party-line vote. Republicans were not about to turn power over to the Democrats. 

The motion to vacate remains a valuable check on overly powerful Speakers today. But it can also be manipulated so that it is less a vote of no confidence than a cudgel to force ideological concessions or personal capitulation to other demands of a few members. To say it is a two-edged sword is self-evident. 

Don Wolfensberger is a 28-year staff veteran of the House, serving as Republican staff director of the Rules Committee from 1991-94, and chief of staff of the full committee from 1995-97. He is author of, “Congress and the People: Deliberative Democracy on Trial” (2000), and, “Changing Cultures in Congress: From Fair Play to Power Plays” (2018). The views expressed are solely his own.