A new Colombian president could mean a new drug war strategy

Last month, Gustavo Petro won a historic victory, becoming the first leftist candidate to ascend to Colombia’s highest political office. Petro’s election will undoubtedly reshape the relationship between the U.S. and Colombia, especially with respect to counterdrug cooperation, which has long been a hallmark of the bilateral relations between the two countries. 

Petro, a former member of the now-defunct M-19 rebel group, has been a harsh critic of the U.S.-backed “war on drugs” and ran on a platform based in part on taking a softer approach towards drug trafficking and the associated violence.

Throughout his campaign, Petro signaled his intention to “reassess” several key facets of U.S.-Colombian security cooperation, including the practice of extraditing drug traffickers to the U.S. and forcibly eradicating coca plants — the base ingredient in cocaine. Instead, Petro has emphasized the need for “truth-telling” and “compensation” for the victims of drug trafficking and crop substitution to help coca farmers transition into the licit economy. Petro has also expressed a willingness to reopen negotiations with the National Liberation Army (ELN) — the largest remaining insurgent group operating in Colombia and a key player in the drug trade — and revive the government’s 2016 peace deal with the left-wing Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) rebels.

Change is in the offing, but it is unlikely to be as rapid or dramatic as some have suggested for several reasons.

First, although Petro emerged the clear winner in the runoff election against real estate magnate Rodolfo Hernández, he still only managed to secure a little over 50 percent of the vote, and his party failed to capture a majority of congressional seats. This will make it difficult for him to pass any controversial reforms, for example, legalizing coca and cocaine. He is also likely to encounter stiff resistance from the Colombian armed forces, which wield significant influence and are deeply committed to the country’s counterdrug mission. Even if Petro seeks to replace military leaders opposed to his agenda (or they elect to step down), he will find it difficult to overcome the institutional inertia formed over decades of fighting some of the world’s most notorious drug trafficking organizations and insurgent groups.

And, of course, the drug traffickers also have a say. Petro may want to shift the government’s approach to the drug trade, but that doesn’t mean Colombian cartels like the powerful Clan del Golfo will go along with his plans. Although illicit synthetic drugs are on the rise, the cocaine trade in Colombia remains an incredibly lucrative business, generating as much as $12 billion each year, or almost four percent of Colombia’s gross domestic product.

As Petro prepares to take office, drug trafficking will remain one of the biggest challenges to Colombian peace and prosperity. While many of Petro’s proposed drug policies are well-intentioned, they are unlikely to result in any significant change to the Colombian drug trade, at least in the near term.

In 2020, coca cultivation and cocaine production in Colombia reached an unprecedented 245,000 hectares and 1,010 metric tons, respectively. Scaling back eradication and other counterdrug efforts will likely exacerbate this trend, and the prospect of more lenient sentences risks emboldening drug traffickers, as we’ve seen in Mexico with President Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s failed policy of “hugs not bullets.”

Drug control is hard. While Petro has committed to tackling the issue head-on, he must resist the urge to frame counterdrug policies as either “right” or “left” and use all the tools at his disposal to combat the drug trade. This includes continued close cooperation with U.S. authorities and other allies and partners and thoughtful consideration of how existing policies such as eradication and extradition can complement his own policy preferences. Eradication and rural development are not mutually exclusive, and Petro may find it useful to retain some flexibility in determining whether drug traffickers should be extradited from Colombia.

Colombia has been marred by drug trafficking, perhaps more than any other country in the world, and Petro should be commended for his willingness to advance new drug strategies. But if we’ve learned anything after years of fighting the drug war, it’s that it requires an “all-of-the-above” approach. 

Petro has an opportunity to introduce a new sense of energy, purpose and ideas to address the drug problem, but in doing so, must be careful not to throw the baby out with the bathwater.

Jim Crotty is an associate vice president at The Cohen Group, a strategic advisory firm based in Washington, D.C. He is the former deputy chief of staff at the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. The views stated in this article are his own.