Despite US rhetoric, democracy rings hollow

According to President Biden, history is at an inflection point: The future depends on a choice between democracy or autocracy. 

Is the struggle between democracy and autocracy the defining struggle of our time? In an April column, Fareed Zakaria argues that framing the issue as a struggle between democracy and autocracy is “neither accurate nor helpful as a guide for U.S. foreign policy.”  

Zakaria notes that democracies and autocracies can at times be allies, as is the case with India and Russia or the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. Such entangling alliances make the ideological case between democracy and autocracy less persuasive. But, there are deeper reasons for skepticism.  

Consider the existential threat of climate change. Over two-thirds of global emissions come from just 10 emitters, seven of which are democracies. A Foreign Policy article argues that democracies are structurally disadvantaged to respond to the climate emergency. Short-term political calculus effectively neuters their ability for meaningful action. 

Of the top 10 climate emitters, the single largest per capita is the U.S., accounting for almost 25 percent of all global emissions since the industrial revolution. The U.S. military alone emits more than the bottom 140 countries combined. Democracies are actively engaged in armed conflicts outside their borders. Twenty out of the top 25 arms exporters are either democracies or “hybrid” regimes; five are autocracies.  

Indigenous peoples, slaves and the colonized have historically been on the receiving end of direct democratic violence. For example, millions of Algerians died under French colonialism. Hundreds of thousands of Iraqi children died in the 1990s as a result of sanctions. Nearly another million people have died since 9/11 in the war on terror. According to a credible human rights organization, democracies also practice apartheid. 

It is undeniable that citizens of democracies enjoy richer civil societies and more freedoms. But these privileges have come at a high price, and the results appear unstable. Greek philosophy contemplated democratic backslide millennia ago. Plato held that a system of self-governance with mass participation eventually leads to the rule of tyrants. 

But philosophy is not destiny. If we could spread democracy to every corner of the globe, argue some, the external tensions that have compelled democracies to have bloody borders would subside, leaving us with peaceful and free societies — the “end of history.” Unfortunately, democracies also have a checkered record when it comes to democracy promotion.  

During the Cold War, democracies made the world less democratic. For example, in 1953, the U.S. and Britain overthrew Iran’s democratic leader, leaving a brutal autocrat at the helm. The history of democracies favoring friendly autocrats, ostensibly countering Communism, while conveniently advancing corporate interests, is well documented.  

What is less well-known is that the recent turn to overt “democracy promotion” is not what it seems. Sociologist William I. Robinson argues that democracy promotion is actually a guise for deep intervention in countries’ civil societies to shape electoral and policy outcomes. Robinson prefers the term “polyarchy” to “democracy,” which signifies the tight control of elites who are nominally elected, but who align themselves with transnational capital interests. 

Democracies also wage bloody proxy wars. In 1979, the U.S. used Afghanistan to — in the words of one senior official — give the Soviets their Vietnam. Afghanistan has since been wrecked. After voting against the U.S. in the U.N. Security Council in 1990, Yemenis were told that it would be “the most expensive vote” they ever cast. Yemen has been in trouble ever since, most recently with a U.S.-backed Saudi war that has left millions homeless and at risk of starvation. Yemen has been wrecked. 

While some dispute the extent to which the Russia-Ukraine conflict is a proxy war, experts have been outlining the perils of Western policies for the better part of a decade. In 2014, the U.S. supported regime change in Ukraine because it was drifting into Russia’s orbit. Recently, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin admitted that the U.S. aims to weaken Russia by continuing to arm Ukraine. Meanwhile, Ukraine has been wrecked. 

The rhetoric of “democracy vs. autocracy” arguably maintains a subtler and more sophisticated form of hegemony. So-called democracy promotion in the developing world is thus a near-perfect formula for, as Daniel Immerwahr puts it, hiding an empire. Spreading democracy abroad can never be a credible project when it is so transparently manipulative, even as the societies that evangelize democracy abroad backslide at home. 

Where does this leave us? Yuval Noah Harari speculates that in the age of big data, technology favors tyranny. His observation strengthens Plato’s hand. This is not to say that tyranny is desirable, nor is it to equivocate between democracy and autocracy. It is merely to understand why, to so many, the choice rings hollow.  

Actions speak louder than words. If democracy is going to be destiny, it needs to get its act together. If the democratic project is really that good, its proponents should just focus on doing the right things — addressing the climate crisis, advancing equity and inclusion at home, privileging diplomacy over militancy abroad and investing in global cooperation for sustainable development. History will take care of itself.

Mahan Mirza is executive director of the Ansari Institute for Global Engagement with Religion at Notre Dame’s Keough School of Global Affairs. Follow him on Twitter: @mirzamahan