The Chinese government is pursuing a new era in strategic alliances to guarantee a multipolar world. This move revolves around the creation of an expansive network of strategic partnerships that are less formal than the strategic alliances of the United States. They also reportedly sidestep hard commitments for mutual protection and mutual restraint.
Within this emerging constellation, each strategic partnership might be viewed as a living system that interacts with the totality of its environment. These open, self-organizing systems are shaped by things like beliefs, doctrines, emotions, ethics, feelings, morals, principles, and values. As a consequence, this sort of network cannot be explained away using practical concerns and realpolitik practices. They are not determined by the threat alignment rationale once assumed to drive strategic alliances during the Cold War.
Practically speaking, this mode for collaboration frustrates harmonization. It also creates the potential for dirty, emotional, and painful affairs. One might say that these strategic partnerships are competitive collaborations that behave much like friendships. They face uncertainty and encounter roadblocks. They therefore demand the sustained commitment of all parties. Otherwise, they risk breaking down and being thrown into the dustbin of history.
So long as this can be avoided, these strategic partnerships not only provide a useful way to steer clear of military entanglements. They also promise to open doors to alternative futures. Think about all of the future worlds made possible by the changing perceptions of young Africans about China.
From an analytical perspective, these strategic partnerships exhibit what scholars refer to as a mutual constitution of agency and structure. As noted, they are not mindlessly determined by the distribution of power out there in the world. They are mindfully constructed out of the beliefs, doctrines, emotions, ethics, feelings, morals, principles, and values held by their respective parties. They are therefore constantly subject to revision and reversion.
Here, perceptions matter. Competitive collaborators are hesitant to reveal their beliefs, doctrines, emotions, ethics, feelings, morals, principles, and values. They therefore must be inferred from observations of their actions and orientations.
As noted by Mahatma Gandhi, particular emphasis should be placed on what happens in times of crisis. This is because the true test of these kinds of relationships is whether assistance will be given in the face of great adversity. The Chinese government clearly appreciates this point. Consider their recent statement on the Russian invasion of Ukraine: “No matter how perilous the international landscape, we will maintain our strategic focus and promote the development of a comprehensive China-Russia partnership in the new era.”
From a strategic perspective, the United States government must be able to effectively and efficiently disrupt and subvert these strategic partnerships in order to win the global governance competition with the People’s Republic of China. The problem is that the United States government has failed to demonstrate the ability to do so. Just look at the recent Solomon Islands pact with China. That needs to change. And it needs to change quickly. Here are some recommendations on how the Biden administration could correct course.
First, the U.S. government needs to fundamentally understand the nature of the strategic partnerships of the People’s Republic of China. This includes grasping the underlying motives that precede and sustain competitive collaboration, processes used to assess and select strategic partners, processes used to negotiate and renegotiate strategic partnerships, relative valuations placed on the potential contributions of strategic partners, governance and control structures used within strategic partnerships, and mechanisms used to achieve organizational learning and knowledge acquisition.
Second, the U.S. government needs to identify potential high-impact vulnerabilities in the strategic partnerships of the People’s Republic of China. This not only includes identifying actions, orientations, and events that could change the perceptions of the People’s Republic of China about the beliefs, doctrines, emotions, ethics, feelings, morals, principles, and values of its strategic partners and potential strategic partners. It also includes identifying actions, orientations, and events that could change the perceptions of those partners about the beliefs, doctrines, emotions, ethics, feelings, morals, principles, and values of China.
Third, the U.S. government needs to systematically exploit the vulnerabilities that exist in China’s strategic partnerships. For that to happen, the U.S. not only needs to possess the defense, democracy, development, and diplomatic capabilities required to exploit those vulnerabilities. It also needs the domestic and international political will to risk using them, especially in times of crisis.
Michael Walsh is an affiliate of the Center for Australian, New Zealand, and Pacific Studies of the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. He served as the Chair of the Asian and Pacific Security Affairs Subcommittee of the Biden Defense Working Group during the 2020 United States presidential election. The views expressed are his own.