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How Germany should handle its Trump problem

This month, German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel voiced his frustration with President Trump, lamenting that Trump’s security and economic policies pose a threat to the transatlantic alliance. Unfortunately, fracturing U.S.-German relations are a feature, not a bug of the populism that is Trump’s scaffolding. Seen through the prism of populist conservatives, Gabriel’s speech was actually an encouraging sign.

Economic nationalism and a refusal to take into account German opinions are part of Trump’s platform.

Gabriel complained that Germany will have to strike out on its own. Trump’s supporters retort: “Finally!” Trump isn’t one for multilateralism, and his base loves him for it. Core Trump supporters are three times more likely than Democrats to believe that European countries mostly benefit from our alliances.

{mosads}When Gabriel said that the United States treats Europe as a competitor, Trump’s supporters respond: “Trade deficits!” Leave the economic illiteracy aside. Core Trump supporters believe that other countries mostly benefit from trade deals; only a minority of Republicans generally say that international trade is good for job creation. Germany’s trade deficit, in other words, means that Germany is stealing jobs and therefore, Germany is already a competitor.

 

Populist conservative reactions to Gabriel’s speech is symptomatic of a movement that lives in its own ecosystem. A recent Pew study found that conservatives cluster around single news sources; 47 percent alone named Fox News as their sole information outlet.

Gabriel’s remarks were a clarion and necessary call to an establishment that chronically underestimates the strength and likely endurance of populist conservatism in the United States.

But for Germany to weather this political dynamic, Berlin will need to start a conversation with Trump’s supporters. Whatever Trump’s intentions, his political base will determine the extent to which his administration has the political capital to damage the U.S.-German alliance and the international order it fosters.

That means engaging the media outlets that resonate with conservative populists.

The fact that a small number of conservative media outlets wield such disproportionate influence creates an opportunity for Germany. It is easy and perhaps satisfying to write off all right-wing media as little Breitbarts, but the conservative media ecosystem also contains many thoughtful voices — and they have Trump’s ear.

Engaging conservative media is a prudent long-term play. As Gabriel correctly points out, America’s populism will not go away with Trump. Indeed, Trump emerged from a conservative movement that took issue with fundamental tenets of American strategy well before he pronounced “America First” on cable news. Consider that compared to 78 percent of Democrats, just 47 percent of Republicans have a favorable view of NATO. More than 40 percent of core Trump supporters believe that NATO is no longer essential to U.S. security.

Sure, four in five Americans still have a favorable view of Germany. But a quick survey of the conservative press indicates where much the other 20 percent lives. Just over half of core Trump supporters express confidence in Germany’s ability to deal responsibly with world problems — a demographic that, more so than Democrats, independents, or other Republicans, questions German influence on the world stage. In a two-party system, Trump supporters are Germany’s problem as long as a U.S.-Germany partnership remains in everyone’s interest (and it is).

Engagement through the conservative media will also help reach audiences that benefit directly from German investment. Spartanburg, South Carolina for example is home to BMW’s auto plant that has the most exports by value of any American automotive plant. Yet Spartanburg voters favored Trump 63 percent to 33 percent despite his policy promise to disrupt U.S./German economic relations.

It is a counterintuitive pattern found throughout the electorate — one of which Germany should take note. The number one foreign policy priority for 87 percent of core Trump supporters is the protection of American jobs. Manufacturing economies within the U.S. that benefit the most from foreign investment and trade tended to favor Trump, perhaps because about three quarters of core Trump supporters blame international trade for the loss of American manufacturing jobs. This holds true in Rust Belt states, home of so much German investment, where Trump barely eked out a victory.

The livelihoods of many of Trump supporters dovetail with Germany’s interests. It’s a reality that might be dismissed as “fake news” when reported in the pages of Politico or The New York Times, but, broadcasted in conservative media, it’s harder for Republicans to ignore.

Gabriel’s speech shows that Germany is under no illusions about the threat of conservative populism. He is quite right that were the U.S.-German alliance to unravel, the consequences would hardly be limited to the “globalist elites” Trump and his allies so deride. The question now is whether Germany can make its case to a populist movement that cannot be wished away.

Kristofer Harrison worked for Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and was a foreign policy advisor to Sen. Ted Cruz’s presidential campaign. He is a co-founder and principal of ITJ Strategies, a grassroots PR consultancy.