Iranian society exists under high pressure and perennially explodes, as it has the past two weeks with thousands of people taking to the streets, seething, following the killing of a Kurdish-Iranian woman in police custody. Mahsa Amini — or Jina Amini, had her Kurdish name not been violently suppressed by a regime so insecure that it has sought to erase the identity of 10 percent of its population — ran afoul of the morality police for insufficiently covering her hair.
For many young Iranians, the images of 22-year-old Amini, intubated and lifeless on an emergency room table, were too much to bear and something snapped. Unlike the Green Movement demonstrations of 2009, which were largely peaceful, enraged protesters today have violently brawled with the police units that exist largely to crush them.
Some speculate that these protests might lead to an end of the regime in Tehran. It’s risky business to predict when and how Iran’s revolutionary government, in place since 1979, might fall. Iran-watchers should remember that optimism bias is a real thing, and the regime’s security architecture is purpose-built to crush internal dissent. For its part, the U.S. government has taken appropriate steps by sanctioning Iran’s morality police and working to re-establish internet access in Iran, which the regime disconnected in an attempt to prevent witnesses as it brutalizes its population.
In taking these actions, Washington should not forget that preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon remains the central pillar of U.S.-Iran policy, and a critical tenet for Middle East stability. It should consider that if the regime feels existentially threatened — from within or without — it will accelerate its pursuit of the bomb. The Biden administration should waste no time in returning its attention to the nuclear issue and reminding the regime that a return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is in not just America’s interest, but also its own.
Earlier this month, JCPOA negotiations reached an impasse when Iranian negotiators demanded that a separate, ongoing inquiry by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) — which is exploring why trace amounts of nuclear material were detected in places they should not be — be closed before the JCPOA is reimplemented. Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated earlier this month that these demands were a bridge too far. Although Blinken didn’t go as far as to declare a time of death for the JCPOA talks, he suggested they may be indefinitely comatose.
Throughout the talks, Iran’s negotiators appeared to stake out increasingly aggressive demands in exchange for a return to JCPOA compliance. Perhaps Tehran has surmised that the worst that happens without a deal is that it continues to enrich uranium and advance its nuclear weapons program at the cost of shouldering U.S. sanctions. Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi intimated as much in a recent interview on CBS News’ “60 Minutes.” Iranian posturing may become more recalcitrant with reports that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s health is failing. The ongoing protests likely will cause the regime to become more intransigent, lest it appear weak in the face of mounting internal pressure.
With all the noise, Tehran may have lost sight of the fact that living without a nuclear deal means more than bearing U.S. sanctions as the price for pursuing a weapon. It should understand the cost could be much higher.
Speaking to Israeli Prime Minister Yair Lapid late last month, President Biden reiterated U.S. policy: The United States will never allow Iran to obtain a nuclear weapon. There’s no equivocation in that statement. While President Biden’s position isn’t particularly nuanced, it also isn’t particularly well-advertised. In the lead-up to the original deal, President Obama was not shy about saying time and time and time again (and again) that, when it came to Iran, all options were on the table. This consistent reminder of the consequences of diplomatic failure likely incentivized Iran to commit to the JCPOA in 2015. President Biden should remind Tehran that it faces ramifications worse than sanctions absent a return to the JCPOA.
A U.S. military operation targeting Iran’s nuclear program could only temporarily delay the inevitable, but would do damage well beyond the radius of any bomb dropped. How might a smoking crater in Fordow or Natanz play on Iranian TV, and what message would it send to the Iranian people about the regime’s strength and sovereignty, particularly when protests are roiling the country? A public reminder of President Biden’s resolve might be a crucial step in getting Iran to soften its position and make a deal. It also could serve to remind Congress, which has expressed skepticism about the JCPOA, that there are things worse than an Iran nuclear deal.
Last month, 50 members of the House of Representatives sent a letter to President Biden expressing reluctance to return to the JCPOA, citing many of Iran’s malign activities beyond its nuclear ambitions. However, the letter does not suggest an alternative to negotiations to prevent Iran from pursuing its nuclear program. The Iran nuclear deal is easy to criticize when you’re not responsible for determining the alternative, so legislators might want to consider what happens if the deal is permanently abandoned: If it is U.S. policy not to allow Iran to obtain a nuclear weapon, and sanctions cannot deter its pursuit of the bomb, what options remain to prevent Iran from racing toward a bomb? The only option is military action.
If members of Congress squirm at the idea of supporting an Iran deal, they should consider how much worse their lives would become when President Biden asks them to vote to authorize military force against Iran’s nuclear program. In a House Foreign Affairs Middle East Subcommittee hearing last week, Rep. Gerry Connolly (D-Va.) concluded that if talks fail, all that remains is the military option, which he described as “catastrophic.” Sure, some Iran hawks might long for that day, but I doubt that most American voters do. Nor do those defense policy wonks who understand that another Middle East conflict would continue to rob the U.S. military of the crucial time and resources needed to recover readiness and innovate capabilities to support Ukraine and deter China.
To reset talks and place U.S. negotiators in a dominant position, President Biden should more loudly, frequently and explicitly announce that, indeed, all options remain on the table. He took the opportunity in his speech last week to the United Nations General Assembly to restate U.S. policy. That’s a good step. To finalize the deal, he must do so enough that Tehran is convinced of two things: First, it doesn’t control the timeline. An American military operation could come swiftly and unexpectedly and shake the foundations of Iran’s government. Second, a return to the JCPOA is less costly than the alternative.
Ironically, Congress needs to be reminded of the same. No one can credibly claim that returning to the JCPOA is the perfect solution, but given the other option, it starts to look like the better one that we have. President Biden would be wise to remind the deal’s detractors of that — in Tehran and Washington.
Jonathan Lord is a senior fellow and director of the Middle East Security program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). He previously was a staff member for the House Armed Services Committee; the Iraq country director in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; and a political military analyst in the Department of Defense. Follow him on Twitter @JonathanLordDC.