In compiling a list of the top five geopolitically significant events of 2022, the top three were rather obvious — Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, China’s military response to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s (D-Calif.) Taiwan visit and the strains on the global economy that are driving a revival of economic nationalism and protectionism. But picking the final two proved problematic, particularly as there were so many smaller events that are likely to have outsized significance far beyond their brief moments of attention. With that in mind, here are five lower-profile geopolitically significant events of 2022, and what they may mean moving forward.
- Turkey negotiates the Russia/Ukraine grain deal
Turkey’s facilitation of the Russia/Ukraine grain deal highlights the rising role of “middle powers” in a multipolar world. Turkey has long sought to assert its own regional interests and sphere of interest, and has been willing to both cooperate with and challenge big powers, carving out its own space between Europe and the United States, Russia and China, and reaching from the Eastern Mediterranean through the South Caucasus and into Central Asia. But Turkey is not alone among “middle powers” as the new multipolar system takes hold. Indonesia, Japan, Brazil, India and others are pursuing their own national strategies to maneuver among the big powers and shape not only their regional environment but broader concepts of shifting global norms as well.
2. The US launches the Artemis mission to the Moon
The Artemis mission represents a new phase in U.S. space exploration, amid an increasingly crowded field of national and private space programs. Core to the U.S. initiative is the idea of framing a new model of space norms and standards that will define civilian and military behavior in space. Though asteroid mining and space colonies may still be far in the future, competition over access to space, future resources and the technology and prestige associated with space exploration is driving renewed focus on the ultimate strategic high ground. With increased economic and information nationalism on Earth, it is only a matter of time before claims of territoriality reach beyond land, sea and airspace.
3. Collapse of the Arctic Council
Russia’s (re)invasion of Ukraine triggered the other seven members of the Arctic Council to cease participation in the body, which is under Russian rotational leadership. Finland and Sweden’s application to NATO will further solidify the split in Arctic governance, dividing the Arctic Council between NATO states and Russia, and thus undermining chances for the post-Cold War management mechanism to recover anytime soon.
On the one hand, this paves the way for China and other “near Arctic” states to call for a new, internationalized system of Arctic management, just one piece of a broader push to redefine global norms and systems. On the other hand, it drives the further remilitarization of the Arctic, ending a period of science-focused cooperation and testing climate change research and Arctic protection. Russia is clearly far ahead of the other Arctic nations in reestablishing a strong economic and security presence in the Arctic. But the war in Ukraine is draining financial and personnel resources, potentially pushing Moscow to rely on more Chinese investment, participation and activity in the Arctic.
4. Latin America tilts left
Latin America has seen (once again) a tilt to the left, with six of the largest economies run by leftist governments once Brazil’s Luiz Ignacio Lula da Silva takes office in January. While this could create space for more cooperation on issues of mutual interest (climate protection and expanded intra-regional trade, for example), there are two different competing economic models at play — the more populist economics of Argentina and perhaps Brazil, and the more statist policies in places like Chile and Colombia. Contrary to trend (and regional cooperation) sits Uruguay, which is seeking bilateral trade deals outside the Mercosur framework and testing the limits of South American cohesion.
5. North Korean conventional weapons tests
While North Korea’s nuclear weapons normally get all the attention, Pyongyang has stepped up development and testing of conventional weapons, with a particular focus on large-caliber rockets and shorter-range ballistic and cruise missiles. These are relatively low-cost battlefield weapons that give Pyongyang a greater ability to strike at military bases, depots and staging grounds in South Korea.
By upping its conventional capabilities, North Korea has developed a capability and apparent doctrine of calibrated escalation, something demonstrated this year during U.S.-South Korea defense exercises, when the North launched multiple rounds of missiles and artillery and ran large-scale air exercises of its own. Pyongyang continues to rely on nuclear weapons as the backbone of its strategic defense, but the expanded conventional capabilities give the North the ability to step up coercive military behavior.
While seemingly contradictory, this both increases the risks of short, sharp clashes between North Korean and South Korean (or even U.S. or Japanese) forces or assets and decreases the risk of rapid escalation to nuclear conflict or all-out war. Coupled with Japan’s shifting defense posture and continued Chinese military expansion, it portends a more contentious and unstable Northeast Asia in the coming year or two.
Rodger Baker is executive director of the Stratfor Center for Applied Geopolitics at RANE.