While the media focuses on conventional operations and high-tech weapons, Ukraine has employed an ancient tactic against the Russian invaders: partisan guerrilla warfare.
The Ukrainians have taken a page from the old Red Army playbook. As the 1941 German invasion of the Soviet Union drove them back to the gates of Moscow, Soviet forces left behind groups of partisans to harass the invaders.
Bands of refugees and soldiers separated from their units joined these formal groups or set up their own bands. For example, the Bielski brothers, Jewish refugees from the Nowogrodek ghetto, created a particularly effective partisan force in the Belarusian forests.
Operating on their own, guerrillas rarely amount to more than a nuisance for regular armies. In cooperation with conventional forces, however, they can be quite effective. By the summer of 1942, Soviet partisans numbered approximately 125,000. They derailed 800 trains in Belarus alone between June and November of that year.
The impact of Soviet partisans on the war in Eastern Europe has been the subject of debate. They did not disrupt major German operations, but they forced the Wehrmacht to divert troops to guarding supply lines.
In the summer of 1943, the guerrillas posed a serious enough threat to require a major military operation against them. As losses mounted, the Germans had to divert troops to secure rear areas where attacks occurred. Partisans did not affect the outcome of the war on the eastern front, but they may have hastened its conclusion.
Unconventional forces have played a key role in other conflicts, notably the American Revolution. Partisans bands, ranger units and state militias operated in support of the Continental Army. They scouted, sprung ambushes and attacked British supply lines. They harassed loyalists and made it difficult for British forces to control the areas they captured.
The U.S. military has not enjoyed much success against guerrillas. It lost a hybrid war in Southeast Asia (1961-73), where it battled North Vietnamese regulars supported by Viet Cong insurgents. Thirty years later, U.S. forces faced intractable insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Ukraine provides an ideal environment for partisan warfare. Russia’s naked aggression and the brutality of its occupation have united Ukrainians behind the war effort. Spontaneous acts of resistance occurred in the immediate aftermath of the invasion.
Farmers dug up roads and towed away abandoned Russian vehicles, workers welded makeshift tank barricades known as hedgehogs, and a brewery converted production from beer to Molotov cocktails.
This spontaneous resistance supports a coordinated partisan campaign waged by the Ukrainian military. In 2015, following Russia’s annexation of Crimea and Ukraine’s subsequent abortive guerrilla campaign in the Donbas region, the Ukrainian military created a Special Operations Forces (SOF) unit to train and equip volunteers and professionals for partisan warfare.
As Russia massed troops on the Ukrainian border in preparation for the invasion in February, SOF stepped up its training of guerrilla fighters. It has even created a National Resistance website to coordinate partisan operations.
Given the disparity in size and resources between Russia and Ukraine, many analysts and the Ukrainian military itself believed Russia would occupy the country in a matter of weeks. In that case, a partisan war would have been Kyiv’s only option.
To the surprise of most observers, the Ukrainians not only halted the invaders but drove them back. Instead of being the only form of resistance left, partisan warfare became a “force multiplier” augmenting conventional operations.
The Ukrainian high command remains understandably tight-lipped about the precise nature and extent of partisan activities. However, in August, they made several SOF members available to be interviewed by the New York Times.
“The goal is to show the occupiers that they are not at home, that they should not settle in, that they should not sleep comfortably,” one interviewee stated.
Russian forces are particularly vulnerable to partisan warfare. Poorly trained and ill-equipped conscripts suffer from low morale. Fear of guerrilla attack by irregular fighters intimately acquainted with the terrain and enjoying popular support exacerbates that problem.
Poor logistics have plagued the Russian Army since the beginning of the war. Ukrainian SOF forces exploit this weakness. In August, an elite Ukrainian unit blew up an ammunition dump behind enemy lines in Crimea. That same month, partisans carried out a successful attack on a Russian airbase in Crimea.
Partisans have set booby traps, sabotaged rail lines and assassinated Ukrainians collaborating with the Russians. They have also provided Ukrainian forces with valuable targeting intelligence.
As Ukrainian forces advanced to liberate Kherson, resistance fighters carried out attacks and provided reconnaissance for the liberators. One group posted photos of Russian soldiers on its Telegram channel with the tagline “we’re watching you.” The group also hung a banner that boldly declared, “If the HIMARS [U.S. rockets] can’t reach you, a partisan will.”
Effective though it may be, partisan warfare comes with significant risks. Unable to come to grips with elusive guerrillas, the Russian military will take its frustration out on the local population accused (rightly or wrongly) of aiding the insurgents. Atrocities in Bucha, Mariupol and elsewhere may have been a deliberate strategy to cow civilians into submission.
The Russians are also conducting a brutal campaign of ethnic cleansing in occupied areas. At least 900,000 Ukrainians have been forcibly relocated, including 200,000 children.
The Russian military has a well-deserved reputation for brutality. Putin crushed the Chechen insurgency using extreme violence that included torture and murdering civilians. A United Nations report found that Russians bombed civilians during the Syrian civil war.
Russia has adopted the same tactic in Ukraine. With the frontlines frozen, it has been targeting civilian infrastructure, especially the electrical grid. By denying them heat, electricity and water, Putin hopes to break the will of the Ukrainian people and compel them to sue for peace.
The tactic is not working. Ukrainian morale is high and will remain so if the West continues to supply the country with weapons. Popular resistance to occupation will continue.
Tom Mockaitis is a professor of history at DePaul University and the author of “Conventional and Unconventional War: A History of Conflict in the Modern World.”